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INTRODUCTION
This is a study of the place of image or vision in
the interpretation of experience (cf. Goffman, 1974).
The experience considered is aging, in particular, the
old age problem.

It is argued that to understand the

meaning of old age and the problem of aging, one must
look beyond the fact of growing old, to the ways growing
old and its facts are envisioned.

The various approaches

that cast the aging experience in one form or another can
be thought of as "perception rules," or ways of actually
seeing aging.

As virtual cognitive languages, the

approaches serve as grammars for articulating and
perceiving the facts of old age and its problems.
Following the argument, I shall use grammar to signify
and denote the reality-constructive feature of the
approaches.

Each approach is, then, a grammar generating

a language of experience.

Each grammar constructs the

observables believed to be the problem of old age.
In examining each of the approaches, or grammars, I
shall consider three questions.

One, the question of

agency, refers to the source of the old age problem as
defined in an approach.

A second, the question of

timing, refers to the pattern by which an approach lays
1
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out the emergence of the old age problem.

The third, the

question of responsibility, addresses the issue of who or
what is held accountable for the problem, given a
particular view of agency and timing.
The following approaches are considered:

activity

theory, disengagement theory, the modernization approach,
age stratification, socio-environmentalism, the socialcareer view, subcultural theory, exchange theory,
developmentalism, the continuity approach.

Since the

late seventies, a new grammar has emerged in medical
form, defining the old age problem as disease,
Alzheimer's disease.

What was heretofore an old age

problem secured in the normal troubles of aging has now
become one expressed in pathology.

Old age is not just a

range of troubled experiences fueled by such agents as
unequal exchange, discontinuity, and falling status, but
is also articulated by illness.
Intervention, scholarship, and research are
substantively tied to negative construals of aging.

As

such, if old age were redefined in positive terms
distinct to itself, those who are responsible for
servicing elders and their problems, from geriatricians
to social workers would, in effect, lose the objects of
their labors.

It is the negative definition, implied in

the various approaches to old age, which makes it
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reasonable to search for solutions to what each sees as
the old age problem.
GRAMMAR/METHOD
I have chosen the term "grammar" as a way of
referencing the variety of approaches to the aging
experience.

The concept is akin to what Kuhn (1962)

calls "paradigms."

A paradigm, he asserts, is not just a

theory but an all-encompassing way of looking at, and
doing, things.

Kuhn argues that paradigm changes do not

come about through the gradual accumulation of bits of
information which eventually form a more accurate picture
of the part of nature under discussion.
1

Instead, he sees

paradigm as both theory and method and, in the final
analysis, as a world of data and experience.
The term grammar accords partially with Kuhn's
analysis in that it emphasizes rules and realities
(paradigms and communities), less historical emergence.
It stresses the discrete, experientially "generative"
basis of knowledge, in this case, how theoretical
languages in use construe experience in line with their
assumptions about it.

Webster's New World Dictionary of

the American Language (1978), for example, defines
grammar as "a body of rules for speaking and writing a
given language."

The Random House Dictionary of the

English Language (1973) defines generative grammar as "a
device, as a body of rules, whose output is all of the
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sentences that are permissable in a given language, while
excluding all those that are not permissable."

The

concept of grammar, then, suggests separate languages,
rules for actually seeing and organizing experiences a
particular way.
The theories of aging considered are not only
explanatory, but present those concerned with complete
worlds of data to which they individually belong.

Each

theory is as rhetorical as it is descriptive of the aging
experience.

Each persuades us of its own interpretation,

pressing adherents to convey the "facts" of aging taken
for granted to be relevant ones, others being extraneous.
So it is with the Alzheimer's disease experience, where
the ostensible facts of the disease can just as easily,
with a shift in grammar (perception rules), present us
with the inevitable facts of aging.

The issue under

consideration is not whether the facts can be accounted
for, but rather how facts are literally read into
experience in accordance with a working vision (grammar)
of them.
As such, each of the varied approaches to the aging
experience produces a body of data that are by-products
of its own documentation (Garfinkel, 1967).

The

different sets of data are not as mutually critical of
one another as they are about different visions of aging.
In this regard, the famous activity/disengagement
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controversy is virtually a kind of "talking past each
other," their respective grammars referencing entirely
different realities--social systemic and individualistic
objects of concern.

Strictly speaking, then, it is not

so much that the various grammars, in their broad range,
additively reveal separate parts of the aging experience
but, rather, that each grammar displays the entire
experience in accordance with its own system of
relevancies.
In Relation to Fieldwork
The concept of grammar serves to firmly link the
domains of theory and data.

The distinction mirrors some

rather recent commentary by Schwartz and Jacobs (1979)
and Emerson (1981; 1983) concerning the epistemological
status of qualitative analysis.

The authors distinguish

between two completely separate forms of inquiry in terms
of the conception of the nature of knowledge being
produced:
conception.

a positivistic one and an interpretive
The two conceptions represent different

theoretical interests, the first informed by symbolic
interactionism and human ecological arguments, the second
by ethnomethodological ones.

I highlight the difference

in the two in terms of what each considers to be the
researcher's sense of the reality at stake.
From the positivistic point of view, social objects
and events are treated as existing "out there," as it
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were, separate from one's attention to them.

In this

regard, it takes for granted that there is something
locatable, called "the field," and that its contents can
be accurately described and fully accounted for.

This

conceptualization represents what could be called a
geographic metaphor (Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979).

The

metaphor is implicit in the fieldwork literature linked
with the Chicago School, both in the way ethnographic
data are described in monographs and in methodological
discussions and/or advocacy on behalf of fieldwork (e.g.,
Becker, 1958; Becker and Geer, 1960; Bogdan and Taylor,
1975; Rabenstein, 1970; Gold, 1958; Thomas, 1923; Whyte,
1943; Zorbaugh, 1929).
When fieldworkers describe themselves or are
described as entering a field site and observing it
firsthand, the sense of what is being observed is not
seriously challenged as problematic in its own right.
Instead, fieldworkers are implored to go to the field, to
the place wherein they discover the facts of interest to
them.

The idea is that the data of interest are located

in some delimited arena of human interaction, that once
having entered it, the data would become available.

One

simply has to gain entry (something perhaps not so simple
in its own right) and, having accomplished that, to
observe the facts located there.

The major

methodological problem centers on gaining entry and role-
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making.

When, in effect, one enters and presumably takes

his or her place, the data that "anyone can plainly see
before his very own eyes" is gatherable.
The formal methodology of this conception of the
field is presented in Glaser and Strauss'
The Discovery of Grounded Theory.

(1967} book,

As their analysis

shows, it is not the field itself that is of interest but
rather its contents, a fairly clear separation being made
between them.

Thinking geographically, social facts and

formations are more or less established and available for
observation and discovery.
It is evident, from this approach, that the field is
a research-related concept.

That is, the concept of the

field is the researcher's way of delimiting what he
considers to be the relevant facts of interest to him.
{The facts obtained, after all, are located in the various
scenes observed.

The primary task of the researcher is

to make those scenes available to him--as might be urged,
to "get out there and get the facts."
The interpretive point of view coincides with
ethnomethodological interests (Buckholdt and Gubrium,
1979; Cicourel, 1968; Cicourel et al., 1974; Douglas,
1970; Garfinkel, 1967; Leiter, 1980; McHugh, 1968; Mehan
and Wood, 1975; Phohl, 1978; Wieder, 1974), and to some
degree, with Goffman's (1959; 1974) dramaturgical
concerns with conduct.

The metaphor here ceases to be
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geographic, becoming more linguistic and cognitive.
Indeed, field itself becomes more a topic of interest
than a resource for gathering information about the
"real" objects of concern.

(Ethnomethodologists have

used the topic/resource distinction to describe their
serious concern over their treatment of conventionally
trivial procedural matters as important research topics
in their own right.)

In contrast, the positivistic

approach sees the field as a resource used to contain and
offer up to fieldworkers its contents, interest being
centered not on the idea of field, but on what the field
makes available.

To treat field as a topic, in line with

the interpretive conception, focuses attention on how
contents, in effect, become contained (cognitively
structured) so that they can be offered up for one's
interpretation.
The field, as such, becomes a range of visions-someone's vision(s) or re-vision(s).

Being cognitive,

they do not exist so much in physical space as they do in
orientation.

Thus, the researcher's concern with

entering the field is primarily limited to administrative
details and is not as methodologically relevant in
relation to the criteria of objectivity, as it is in the
positivistic approach.

Indeed, any geographic field can

become an unknown number of potential cognitive fields
(for researchers and subjects alike).

As such, the field
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does not make as much sense as which field is being taken
up in some time and place.

The field, then, is the

research project, one question being what field is this
to be that is being observed, how is it accomplished?
From the positivistic approach, there is little or
no sense that fields are the social projects of their
members and as such that there might be variation in the

,t

researcher's conception of the nature of social reality
such that the idea of the field itself might be open to
question.

With the ethnomethodological challenge, the

field emerges as a theoretical problem.

From this point

of view, /whatever "the facts" are, are articulated by the
researcher's sense of reality at stake.

Theory, then,

not only serves to describe events, it produces their
very existence as well (Filmer et al., 1972).

The

recognition that the theoretical objects of one's
attention are, in their essential qualities, always, in
certain respects, constitutionally theoretical (Giddens,
1979) makes it reasonable to ask what kinds of "theory"
interpret the field.

This I have tried to capture with

the use of the term grammar.

Each of the grammars

considered, in effect, constitutes the experience of
aging in accord with its particular sense of the facts.
The analysis sets aside the question of what is to be the
standard of an adequate description and takes up the
practice of adequacy in its own right (as the

topic/resource distinction suggests).
not the

re~~~!ve

Thus, the issue is

truth value of facts, but rather how

facts are experientially generated as __c!i.s;c!"e1::e grounds
for

evaluating~the

observables in question.

Significance for Grammars of Old Age
The substance and style of the varied grammars of
the old age problem are analyzed around three root
questions:

(1) the question of agency, "Who or what is

the source of the problem?"; (2) the question of timing,
"When or how does the source of the problem operate?";
and (3) the question of responsibility, "Who or what is
to blame for the problem and what can be done about it?"
Each of the experiential grammars, from activity theory
to Alzheimer's disease, are virtual rules for seeing
particular sources of, timings in, and responsible
entities for the latter part of life.

Each constructs

the problem of old age in terms of its particular rules
for locating problematic experiences.

This is concretely

demonstrated in the analysis of the Alzheimer's disease
experience, where the ostensible facts of the disease can
just as easily, with a shift in grammar, be interpreted
as the inevitable facts of aging.
Alzheimer's disease has come to be called the
"disease of the century."

The phrase signals the

monumental importance of the disease for physicians,
their patients, helping professionals, and caregivers
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(usually a member of the patient's family).

Alzheimer's

is now recognized as the single most disabling illness of
old age, producing intellectual impairment in an
estimated 2.5 million American adults.

It is an organic

illness that results in progressive mental deterioration,
characterized by such symptoms as forgetfulness,
confusion, irritability, wandering and incontinence.
There is, at present, no known cause, prevention, nor
cure, yet the disease presents an illness and burden of
enormous proportions and significance to those concerned.
As part of a research project aimed at examining the
descriptive organization of senility (see Gubrium, 1986),
the focus of analysis is not so much to discover the
social components and complexities of the medicalization
of old age as it is to examine the social organization of
two types of discourse (grammar) by which to reference,
describe, and explain the "symptoms" of aging.
working question for the study is, What social

The

processes~

enter into discourse framed in terms of aging as opposed//
to framed in terms of disease, and what sustains the
latter as a new grammar of the old age problem?

The

transformation is not linear but, rather, oscillates on
various levels of the experiences of those concerned in
accordance with the descriptive needs at hand.

Thus,

medicalization, in this study, is an ongoing member
project, not a linear and progressive process of

"
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redefinition from old age to disease.
~~-

The study, then,

J1ot a _history of medicalization as much as it is a

~c~
sociology of knowledge approacl'l_t() .1' t •..t~QP
...--~\'i

\

ANALYSIS OF THE ALZHEIMER'S DATA
The vocabulary of Alzheimer's disease, the most
recent grammar of aging, is analyzed from a number of
different sources.

The substance and style of the

professional, promotional, and popular literature are
analyzed for aging versus disease conceptions about
senile/Alzheimer's patients.

The professional literature

includes medically-oriented texts as well as social work
and nursing literature.

The medical texts consist to a

large degree of conference proceedings or edited
collections of papers examining the biological andjor
behavioral status of the disease.

The nursing and social

work literature deal primarily with problems of care
management and adjustment.
Data are also analyzed from the extant literature of
the Alzheimer's Disease and Related Disorders Association
(ADRDA).

Founded in 1979, the ADRDA is a national

network which has grown to over 120 local chapters, one
in every major city in the country.

Its purpose is to

provide support to patients and families in the
management and treatment of Alzheimer's and related
disorders as well as to disseminate research information,
educate the public, and advocate on behalf of the victims
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of the disease.

The ADRDA's national headquarters,

located in Chicago, publishes a quarterly newsletter that
is distributed locally to each of the chapter outlets.
It informs members and interested outsiders of the latest
research findings, legislative successes, and publicity
campaigns.

Many local chapters publish their own

newsletters too, combining news from "National" with
matters of more immediate concern to caregivers such as
coping tips and profiles of caregiving experiences.

The

ADRDA also distributes a variety of promotional and
informational material in the form of pamphlets and
brochures.

Similar kinds of literature are, likewise,

offered from cooperating agencies like the National
Institute on Aging and the National Institute of
Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke.

In

addition, the news media features a growing number of
popular magazine articles, newspaper features, public
service announcements, and. broadcast programming.

The

information presented, for the most part, focuses on
portraits of particular Alzheimer patients and the coping
experiences of their caregivers, as well as news on
possible "breakthroughs."
I also gathered data by means of participant
observation 1 including conducting fieldwork for a period
of four months in a geriatric day hospital affiliated
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with a general acute care hospital.l

The day hospital

provided a structured, therapeutic environment for two
days a week for nine to twelve Alzheimer's disease
patients.

The hospital's day care program was conceived

as an experiment to assess whether the degeneration
associated with Alzheimer's disease could be stabilized.
As a participant observer, I often assisted staff in
their work, such as taking patients for walks, going
bowling, or swimming with them.

During the various

activities, I was able to appreciate the frustration and
the despair of the victim as well as the caregiver.

Yet,

at the same time, I managed to "stand back" and observe
the cognitive tension between the two forms of discourse
(aging versus disease) used to make sense of the variety
of problems encountered.
As part of the day hospital's research program, the
primary caregivers of the patients were tested for their
individual definitions of care burdens.

Here, too, I

recorded their perceptions of impairment and responses to
the burden of care, which were regularly evaluated by the
day hospital's social worker.
Participant observation was also conducted in a
variety of support groups.

Connected to the day

hospital's program was a weekly support group, in which
each patient's primary caregiver participated.
lAll proper names and places are fictionalized.

The
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session was routinely facilitated by a geriatric nurse,
social worker, and geropsychiatrist.
caregivers attended.

Nine to eleven

The ADRDA also sponsors support

groups for caregivers in over 120 cities across the
country, some being part of state-wide networks of
chapters and satellites.

Upon obtaining permission, I

collected data in ADRDA-sponsored support groups in two
cities.

Support groups in one of the cities were

regularly facilitated by service providers, commonly
social workers; support groups in the other city were
distinguished by their member facilitation.
Finally, I conducted a series of unstructured but
focused interviews with several staff members at the day
hospital as well as sixteen caregivers in the households
of Alzheimer's patients.

The interviews dealt with

matters concerning conceptions of the disease, its
manifestations in particular patients, the burdens of
care, and institutionalization, among a host of factors
related to the disease experience (see Appendix A for the
complete list of topics covered).

Not all topics were

discussed with every caregiver and staff member.
interview guide, itself, expanded as additional
interviews were conducted, raising new issues for
subsequent discussion.

The
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DISSERTATION OUTLINE
The dissertation is divided into the analysis of two
bodies of grammar for old age, distinguished according to
common usage in the field of aging.

Social

gerontologists regularly have contrasted their own
studies of the problems of old age with particularly dire
ones they have categorized as abnormal {e.g., Kuypers and
Bengtson, 1973; Rosow, 1963).

In this regard, for

example, several volumes of the Duke University studies
of old age are entitled:
Normal Aging II

Normal Aging {Palmore, 1970),

{Palmore, 1974), Normal Aging III

{Palmore et al., 1985).

Standing in contrast to this are

old age problems categorized as abnormal, increasingly
relegated to the medical domain.

Accordingly, part one

of the dissertation {chapters 1 through 3) considers the
so-called "normal" problems of old age.

Part two

{chapters 4 through 6) details abnormality--now
pathology--as an old age problem in its own right,
considering how select problems of aging are medically
distinguished from nonmedical problems.
Chapter 1 examines the grammar of the old age
problem from the perspective of activity theory.

The

chapter addresses the activity grammar as an
"individualizing" construal of the problem of aging, in
terms of maladjustment or life dissatisfaction.

The

problem lies in an individual state of living that no
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longer conforms to the ideal of adjustment reflected in
an activity-oriented, work-related standard.
The activity point of view, as the original theory
of aging, set the stage for challenge by a range of
distinct frameworks, each concertedly posing its own
interpretation of the problem of old age.

Chapter 2

discusses alternate grammars of life satisfaction and
individual adjustment, introducing a variety of social
and historical factors into the understanding of personal
well-being.

Chapter 3 presents the grammars of the

political economists and the social phenomenologists,
shifting the focus away from attempting to explain
individual aging to addressing more thoroughly social
conditions--respectively, ideological and epistemological
concerns.
Chapters 4 through 6 examine the most recent grammar
of the old age problem, Alzheimer's disease.

The

analysis presents, in detail, a medical understanding of
age-related troubles, now separating pathological as
opposed to normal old age.

Chapter 4 addresses the

question of agency regarding the distinction between
normal aging and disease.

Chapter 5 looks at the timing

of the disease experience, considering the onset and
course of progress.

Chapter 6 examines the issue of

responsibility in Alzheimer's, as informed by public and
private interpretations.

PART I

"NORMAL" AGING

CHAPTER 1
ACTIVITY THEORY AND LIFE SATISFACTION
This chapter examines activity theory, the oldest,
but still current (see, for example, Chambre, 1984), and
probably most widely applied grammar of aging.

Activity

theory represents the first analytic statement of the
social process of growing old and its impact on the
well-being of the elderly, setting the stage for the
systematic articulation of the old age experience, its
troubles, and problems.

Best represented by two key

works--Cavan, Burgess, Havighurst, and Goldhamer's
Personal Adjustment in Old Age (1949) and Havighurst and
Albrecht's Older People (1953)--the theory argues that
the life satisfaction of old people is related to the
amount of activity in their daily lives.

The more active

the elder, presumably the more satisfied he or she is
with life, the higher his or her morale.
The post World War II concern of sociologists of
aging was organized around the concepts of "adjustment,"
"activity," and "life satisfaction."

While the concepts

represented features of the aging process, they were not
part of a formal theoretical system, but rather centered
on the practical problems of elderly well-being.
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It was
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only later that the concern of sociologists in this
period came to be called activity theory, with the
emergence and direct challenge of disengagement theory
(Cumming and Henry, 1961).

As a grammar of the old age

problem, activity theory is analyzed around the questions
of agency, timing, and responsibility.
AGENCY
Activity theorists see growing old as a process of
encountering problems of adjustment due to role changes
in late life.

The authors conceive of the source of the

process as focally individual.

Growing old is a process

whereby individuals--not social systems, not structures
of domination, not ideologies--hope to alter themselves
in some way to deal satisfactorily with their
experiences.

The problem is not retirement per se,

poverty, widowhood, and/or social isolation; these are
the conditions, seemingly "natural" ones.

While they

referred to them as "the special problems of older
people" (Havighurst and Albrecht, 1953:10), the
conditions were accepted by the researchers as the way
things were, the facts of elderly life.
The route to individual adjustment is located in
self-assessment, how the individual defines his or her
own problem as well as what he or she is going to do
about it.

The problems old people face are understood to

be social only as far as their interpersonal experiences.
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Indeed, adjustment is defined as "the individual's
restructuring of his attitudes and behavior in response
to a new situation in such a way as to integrate the
expression of his aspirations with the expectations and
demands of society" (Cavan et al., 1949:11 [emphasis
added]). As such, the scope of concern with the social is
delineated by the degree that role loss is handled by
individual elders, not how systems of roles in later life
define personal adjustment, the latter being a
qualitatively different grammar of the old age problem
(cf. Chapter 2 of the dissertation).
It is unclear, however, just how the theory views
the organization of societal expectations or the
mechanics by which individuals respond to them.

Societal

expectations seem to be that the elderly certainly should
continue to engage in many activities.

As Havighurst and

Albrecht (1953:55) state, "The American formula for
happiness in old age might be summed up in the phrase
'keep active.'"

Yet, at the same time, society poses

restrictions on an elderly individual's activities.

The

restrictions tend to be "self-protective" for society,
dominated by middle-aged adults, and, in cavan and
associates'

(1949:22) words, "a way of 'easing' the old

person out of activities in order to give the adult group
an opportunity to function."

An elderly person is

expected to stay active but not be too active.

He should
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"taper-off" or slow down to a noticeable degree, but not
slow down too much.

As a newspaper headline quoted in

Havighurst and Albrecht (1953:36) states, "Grow Old
Gracefully--Totter A Little."
Likewise, just how elderly individuals are affected
by, or what their response to these demands is, is also
unclear.

While, on the one hand, Cavan and associates

state that an individual should conform to societal
demands in order to be well adjusted as well as the fact
that "personal adjustment • . • always takes place in the
context of a social situation" (1949:14), on the other
hand, the authors write:
Personal adjustment is not necessarily secured by
achieving the standards set by society, although
social standards may have entered into the
individual's formation of his level of aspiration.
A person tends to be adjusted if his performance
reaches his own level of aspiration and unadjusted
if he fails to attain it (1949:12).
The implication here is that continuity within ones own
life-span may take precedence over societal standards.
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of certain aspects of the
theory, however, what is clear is that whatever adjusting
needs to be done, it is the individual who will be doing
it.

In this respect, whether or not individual or

societal standards of comparison for assessing oneself
are used, "the individual is called on to act" (Cottrell,
1942:618).

The focus, as such, is not on individuals

engaged in role-playing (cf. Becker, 1970) but, rather,
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in "role-making," so to speak.

While social in nature,

it is individuals who make roles what they will be and
individuals who make do in relation to the roles they
occupy.
Later activity literature (Cavan, 1962; Phillips,
1957; Lemon, Bengtson, and Peterson, 1972), shifts the
focus from individual choice of roles to the
constellation of role relationships.

The analysis gives

greater credence to the social features of the adjustment
process, with individual well-being more directly tied to
role perceptions.

For successful adjustment in old age

to occur, what is now needed is an approved set of values
and roles respected by both society and the specific
groups with which an elderly person associates.

As such,

the informing grammar becomes societal, akin to a
qualitatively different way of seeing old age (see
Chapter 2).

Yet, while there is a social or cultural

factor, its independent impact on individuals is tempered
by individual action.

As Cavan (1962:535), for example,

further states in regard to successful adjustment to old
age:

"the person must be a member of one of these groups

and must value the group's evaluation of himself.

He

will then incorporate within himself the self image
approved by the group."
Like Cavan, Phillips (1957) and Lemon and associates
(1972) describe individual adjustment in terms of role
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definitions, examining various individual role-related
self-conceptions.

For example, in Phillips'

(1957) role

theory approach, self-conception means age-group
identification, again something over which the individual
has control.

Phillips argues that age-identification has

a significant impact on the relation between role changes
and adjustment.

He hypothesizes, for example, that role

loss leads to maladjustment, but a positive ageidentification (defining oneself as young or middle age
as opposed to old) reduces the strength of the
relationship.

Thus, while role loss--a social factor--

has an impact on adjustment, its effects can be
conditioned by an individual's virtual redefinition of
the role effect through varied identification.
TIMING
I now turn to the patterns of adjustment envisioned
by activity theorists.

Here, the question is, How long

can one be successful or well-adjusted while aging before
engaging the possibilities of maladjustment?

Activity

theorists do not specify a definite time point when an
individual seriously experiences the problem of old age.
As such, an elderly person conceivably can go from
adjustment to unadjustment and even back to adjustment
again.

The different theoretical possibilities range

from becoming unadjusted immediately after role losses,
to intermittent successful aging, to continual adjustment
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or maladjustment.

For example, in assuming that elderly

persons lose the roles they once occupied in American
society, activity theorists predict unadjustment as soon
as one retires, upon becoming widowed, or where other
major role losses occur.

Yet, the actual number, type,

and sequence of losses, as well as the individual "doing
something about it," can make for various courses of
adjustment.

Nonetheless, because role loss is considered

inevitable, all elderly people are expected to confront,
if not to experience, the problem of maladjustment.
Amount and Sequence of Role Loss
Activity theorists maintain that, though everyone
experiences some sort of role loss in late life, not all
experience them at the same rate.

Factors such as

physical or mental decline, death of a spouse, poverty,
and loss of leadership of various kinds occur at a higher
rate for some elderly individuals than for others.
Indeed, while "old age is what the individual makes it,
in the majority of cases" (Havighurst and Albrecht,
1953:47), role loss can become so extreme as to virtually
eliminate the effect of individual volition in the
adjustment process.
(1953:47) point out:

Yet, as Havighurst and Albrecht
"There appear to be few cases of

individuals who are so ill, or so dependent financially,
that they cannot find some reasonably satisfying roles to
live."

As a general rule, then, adjustment becomes a
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matter of individual incentive, taking as many forms or
having as many degrees as effort allows.
The sequence of role loss further complicates the
adjustment process.

On the one hand, for example, the

role loss experienced in the transition from adulthood to
old age may be gradual, what Cavan and associates
(1949:25) call ''one step at a time."

Yet, on the other

hand, the process may also involve several sudden
changes, or "crises," in previously held roles
(1949:28).

The latter may even make an elderly person

seriously maladjusted for a period of time.

Depending

upon the individual's response to his particular
situation, again, many patterns may take shape.

Indeed,

a form of intermittent or circular adjustment may result,
whereby one could conceivably become maladjusted at one
time and be adjusted at some later period, only to
subsequently experience maladjustment, should the
conditions allow.
Type of Role Gain
Successful aging depends not only on being active in
a variety of activities in everyday life, the activities
must be socially approved forms of conduct.

The

portraits of successful aging describe small town middle
American life, where acceptable daily life is centered on
hobbies, volunteerism, church, family life, and so on.
The image is quite evident in the various items of the
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chicago Attitudes and Activities Inventory (Cavan et al.,
1949:149-159).

The standard of adjustment reflects a

stereotypic, small-town, white, Protestant, American
lifestyle.

To successfully grow old is to be

community-involved, church-centered, club-oriented, all
reflecting an activity-oriented, work-related lifestyle
which serves as the standard of well-being or adjustment.
While the general variable is activity, not all
forms of activity appear in the vision of these
researchers.

Few of the following, for example, stand as

portraits of successful aging:

muggings, poverty,

divorce, telephone talking (cf. Hochschild, 1973),
small-time operators and other so-called underworld
elderly hustlers (cf. stephens, 1976), drunkedness, and
so on.

The vision of age also does not encompass an

earlier age in America (pre-20th century), where the
affairs of everyday life were affected by the challenges
of the frontier.

Small town rural America is settled in

activity theory, its way of life not continuously a
source of dire challenges.

Nor is the image in activity

a contemporary one, encompassing the central city
experiences of many elders, along with the portent of
institutionalization (cf. Frankfather, 1977; Siegal,
1978) .
Thus, in substance, it isn't roles gained per se
that substantiates readjustment, but the substance of
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particular roles:

gardening, not bootlegging; church

attendance, not pandering.

The adjusted person is one

who takes on a large number and variety of "respectable"
roles.

Without mentioning this normative definition of

role, the theorists predict that the more active the
person, the greater his or her life satisfaction or
adjustment in late life.
The case of Mrs. Brodie (see Havighurst and
Albrecht, 1953:39-43) is exemplary.

She occupies several

different roles, including mother, grandmother, wife,
church leader, club woman, and citizen.

Consider her

typical day:
The day starts early for Mrs. Brodie. By a
little after six each morning, she said she 1s up
and busy about the house. She works "like the
dickens" until noon, doing all of her own washing
and cleaning. Most of the afternoon she reserves
for club work and social activities. The main meal
of the household is at noon, and Mr. Brodie walks
home from his office for this. Afterwards, while
her husband stretches on the davenport, she often
reads the paper or magazines to him for a half hour
(1953:41).
In their analysis of Mrs. Brodie, Havighurst and
Albrecht (1953:41) flatly state that "It is unnecessary
to report that nobody in Prairie City has a negative
attitude toward Mrs. Brodie; or to say that she is a
happy, well-adjusted woman.

She fills a variety of

generally approved social roles."
Considering the image underlying activity theory as
being the implicit standard for successful aging, what
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then becomes of the nonrural, nonsmall town, nonWASP,
elder in American society?

Clearly nothing other than

unsuccessful aging, or maladjustment, regardless of
amount of individual effort realized.

The parochial

vision of what it means to be active sets the agenda for
what counts as volitional activity in the first place.
It is quite clear, for example, that such elders as
stephens (1976) describes as being adjusted to SRO
(single room occupancy hotel) living would not be
qualified as adjusted in these activity theorists'
judgments.

As the scoring system of the Chicago

Attitudes and Activities Inventory (Cavan et al.,
1949:183) illustrates, even the act of sitting and
thinking is not considered an activity, a score of zero
being given for this "nonactivity."

Ironically, the

researchers themselves would wind up losers on this item.
Continuity of Life Span
The Calvinistic aura in the work-related features
making for successful aging also suggests that elderly
individuals should be engaged in activities similar to
their adult years.

This implies that the type of roles

one should engage in should have continuity with earlier
roles.

The assumption is that work-like activity in old

age substitutes for roles typical of middle age as, for
example, the farmer in late life turning to gardening
illustrates (Cavan et al., 1949:16).

Activity theory's
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emphasis on the "proper" and unidimensional (work-like)
aspect of continuity contrasts with other continuity
research which takes continuity within one's life span,
in whatever form it takes, as its focus instead of a
particular kind and quality of activity as such (see
"continuity theory" in Chapter 2 of the dissertation).
Continuity also carries over into an individual's
personal attributes.

It is assumed that one's ability to

adjust to role changes and crises in old age is reflected
in an ability to do so at an earlier time in life.

As

Cavan and associates {1949:76) state:
It is to be presumed that the person who is
accustomed to adjusting to life's changes will
adjust better in old age than the person who has led
a static life; that the person accustomed to making
rational decisions will continue to make them; that
the person who has evaded issues will continue to
evade them.
The same principle is expressed in Havighurst and
Albrecht's {1953:50) prognosis for successful aging,
declaring that, "The best prescription for happiness in
old age seems to be happiness in middle age."
The continuity factor is further interpreted against
differences in gender expectations.
example, Cavan and associates'

Consider, for

{1949:23-24) remarks

concerning society's ineptness at providing
clearly-defined roles for the elderly:
This failure is especially marked in the case of the
old man, whose role was previously closely related
to his employment and his position as chief wage
earner in the family.
For the old married woman,
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the shift in role is less marked.
In fact, such a
shift may never be necessary if she is able to
maintain her position as manager of her house.
The situation of not having to experience role loss
implies that, for some women, adjustment in old age is
virtually automatic, something which seems to go against
the theorists' assumption that the challenge of
adjustment is inevitable in old age.

The contradiction

of sorts stems from the historical division of
conceptions of acceptable male and female work roles.
Nonetheless, for women as well as men, once role loss
does occur, readjustment is inexorably tied to acquiring
roles typical of middle age (see, for example, the case
of Mrs. Herman in Cavan et al., 1949:84-86).
The later activity literature, in giving greater
credance to social sources as being part of the aging
process, see the timing of adjustment as dependent on
societal input as well as individual incentive in
compensating for differential role loss.

In contrast to

the earlier activity formulations, the individual cannot
as simply overcome the effects of social conditions by
reorienting his or her investment in them, such as
altering his or her reference group or ageidentification.
RESPONSIBILITY
The standard for successful aging, as described,
portrays an elderly person as active in many roles,
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typified by the socially "appropriate" round of life in
proverbial small town middle America.

Maladjustment, low

morale, and life dissatisfaction are defined in
opposition to the standard; whatever "misfits" is
undesirable aging.

What or who is to blame when

adjustment goes awry?
It is quite obvious in activity theory that it is
the individual himself that is responsible for his fate
in old age.

As Cavan and associates (1949:27) state, for

example, in regard to retirement, "It is not sufficient
that the elderly person realizes intellectually that at
age 65 many people are retired in the trade or profession
that he follows.
himself."

He must accept that fact as related to

As such, the first step to be taken was for

the individual to accept the role losses that occur in
his transition from adulthood to old age.

The problem

was not retirement per se (or any other role losses for
that matter); this was considered to be a "natural"
condition of life.

Rather, the problem of aging was one

of the individual accepting this "fact" and, in turn,
adjusting to it.

Consider, for example, how the authors

(1949:27) describe the situation in which several
unrelated changes occur simultaneously:

"He [elderly

person] undergoes a definite period of unadjustment and
may become seriously maladjusted.

Usually, however, he
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is able to readjust by changed attitudes and activities"
(emphasis added).
cavan and associates (1949) describe continued
maladjustment in terms of individual resistance.

For

these practically oriented researchers, rather than
resisting the "facts" of old age, an individual should
ideally prepare for them in advance and even manipulate
the transition to avoid the crises which often occur, as
their description of retirement illustrates:
If he has a conviction or even a lingering hope that
he will be one of the rare exceptions, then he has
not faced the fact of retirement as it applies to
himself. In all probability, he has not prepared
himself for the change (Cavan et al., 1949:27-28).
Responsibility is not only tied to the acceptance
and preparation of role changes, but to certain ones at
that.

Indeed, when the "proper" roles are not chosen, it

is still the individual's own fault.

Consider, for

example, the placement of blame in regard to the plight
of Mrs. Egan, as opposed to Mrs. Bond.

In comparing

these two women to Mrs. Brodie's exemplary adjustment,
Havighurst and Albrecht (1953:43) conclude:

"Mrs. Egan

and Mrs. Bond have the unfavored role of widow, but
Mrs. Bond adds to this several acceptable and enjoyable
roles, while Mrs. Egan makes her case worse by adding a
number of inactive, unfavored roles."

And, in an earlier

passage, again comparing Mrs. Egan and Mrs. Bond to
Mrs. Brodie, who has the good fortune of being able to
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"grow old gracefully," the authors (1953:41) remark,
"What about the people whom the aging process treats less
pleasantly?

Even for such people there are pleasant and

favorable social roles if they will work for them"
(emphasis added).

As such, it is the individual elderly

person's responsibility to choose and work toward
accepting and living "active" roles in old age, in
effect, seeking, building, and realizing social approval.
Being responsible for his or her own plight in later
life, the aged individual is the agent for what is to be
done to treat or prevent maladjustment.
intervention virtually becomes self-help.

Thus, in effect,
The essence of

this is captured by that maxim of Protestant behavioral
persuasion:

"God helps those who help themselves."

The

resolution to maladjustment, then, is a matter of elderly
persons virtually picking themselves up by their
bootstraps and putting their lives in order.
Provision was made, of course, for the possibility
that elders might need help to solve their maladjustment
(Cavan et al., 1949).

This was to be located in the aid

of what was then a relatively underdeveloped but soon to
be a virtual "army" of service providers, whose ideas
about social pathology fit the scheme of things very well
(Mills, 1943).

And, still, it was the individual who was

responsible for making good on the services, taking
advantage of the opportunities they provided.
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The later activity literature (Cavan, 1962; Lemon,
Bengtson, and Peterson, 1972; Phillips, 1957), in making
greater overtures to the social nature of adjustment,
shifts responsibility from the aging individual choosing
roles to role-playing together with role-making.
cavan (1962:532-33) writes:

As

"She (elderly individual]

will receive a favorable reflection from her groups if
she is courageous, if she attacks practical problems
realistically, if she increases her civic or church work,
and so forth."

With greater emphasis on roles and role

constraints, for successful adjustment in old age to
occur, social forces must take over some of the
responsibility for providing the "proper" roles and
values for the elderly person to subsequently define
himself.
As the social sources of self-worth are emphasized,
a leap into the social is not far away.

But, it is

important to note, what is at stake in the grammars
considered in the next chapter is not a gradual turning
to social agents of "maladjustment" but entirely new
visions of it, lodged in social systems and structures.
As such, the "individual" now becomes a social entity.

CHAPTER 2
ALTERNATE GRAMMARS OF LIFE SATISFACTION
The analytic challenge of life satisfaction as the
key to the problem of old age took three forms.

One form

was to maintain the focus on the aging individual, and
life satisfaction in particular, introducing a variety of
social and historical factors into the understanding of
personal well-being.

A second form was that of the

political economists, who dismissed individual life
satisfaction as a major concern and turned to power and
privilege.

A third form was social phenomenology, where

the entire question of life satisfaction, aging, and
individuality were themselves put to analytic scrutiny.
In its own fashion, each form is a grammar for agency,
timing, and social policy in regard to the problem of old
age.

This chapter focuses on the first form; the next

chapter considers the grammars of the political
economists and social phenomenologists.
Included among the alternate grammars of life
satisfaction are nine approaches, each represented here
by particular exemplars:

disengagement theory (Cumming

and Henry, 1961); modernization theory (Cowgill and
Holmes, 1972); age stratification (Riley, Johnson, and
36
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Foner, 1972); socio-environmentalism (Gubrium, 1973); the
social-career view (see Becker, 1970a, chapters 17
through 20); the subcultural approach (Rose, 1965);
exchange theory (Dowd, 1975) ; developmentalism (see
Neugarten, 1968, chapters 6, 14, 17, 49; Erikson, 1950);
the continuity approach (Atchley, 1972).
examine the range of the grammars.

I will first

Then, with respect to

the range, I discuss each grammar's agency, timing, and
policy implications.
THE RANGE OF LIFE SATISFACTION GRAMMARS
Alternative grammars can be understood as occurring
across a continuum of micro- to macro-social arguments.
They range from macrosociological concerns, with causal
emphasis placed on large-scale social structures, at one
end, to microsociological sources, emphasizing
intrapsychological and face-to-face encounters, at the
other.

Accordingly, as the following scheme shows,

disengagement, modernization, and age stratification
theories turned to large-scale social conditions to
account for the life satisfaction of the individual.

On

the other hand, exchange, developmental, and continuity
approaches turned to personal and interpersonal sources.
And, mid-range, socio-environmental, social-career, and
subcultural approaches combined the extremes in different
ways.
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A Continuum of Life Satisfaction Grammars
Macro-Grammars
Disengagement
Modernization
Age stratification
Combinations
Socio-environmental
Social-career
Subcultural
Micro-Grammars
Exchange
Developmental ism
Continuity
Like any classification, the attempt to achieve a
sense of order out of a variety of perspectives
necessarily reduces its complications.

Likewise, while

the scheme does serve as a convenient means for comparing
the theories at a general level, each configuration of
theory, whether to the left, middle, or right end of the
continuum, has its own internal considerations as well.
In addition, each theory, in and of itself, is
necessarily reduced in complexity to fit my general
consideration of the alternate grammars of life
satisfaction.

It is the major focus of each theory, as

well as the similarities within each configuration, that
justifies the scheme.

Moreover, by serving as a device

for classifying theoretical variation, the scheme,
itself, serves my primary purpose of distinguishing each
major shift in the understanding of the problem of old
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age.

In this regard, for example, what separates this

chapter from the previous one is the emphasis these
grammars place on extra-individual sources of individual
adjustment.

Each, in its own way, stresses an ostensible

"outside force" that affects what the individual can do,
something in addition to the image of one simply picking
himself up by his bootstraps.
AGENCY
While all the alternate grammars are concerned with
explaining the process of individual adjustment, their
means of explanation differ.

Another way of putting it

would be that they have a common dependent
variable--individual well-being--but diverse independent
variables.

Thus, as far as the question of agency is

concerned, one can distinguish between them by asking how
each conceives of the source (the agent) of individual
well-being.
Macro-Sources
Disengagement theory set the stage for the
analytic challenge of life satisfaction, shifting the
focus of attention away from the individual as a source
of explanation.

With the publication of a tentative

statement in 1960 (Cumming et al.), along with Cumming
and Henry's (1961) book, Growing Old, disengagement
theory marks the first statement where a distinct theory
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of aging in scientific form emerges, separate from
practical applications, information gathering, and
policymaking.

Informed by Parsons'

(1951) social

systemic theorizing, Cumming and Henry (1961:14-15) argue
that aging cannot be understood separate from the needs
and characteristics of the social system in which it is
experienced:
In our theory, aging is an inevitable mutual
withdrawal or disengagement, resulting in decreased
interaction between the aging person and others in
the social systems he belongs to. The process may
be initiated by the individual or by others in the
situation. The aging person may withdraw more
markedly from some classes of people while remaining
relatively close to others. His withdrawal may be
accompanied from the outset by an increased
preoccupation with himself; certain institutions in
society may make this withdrawal easy for him. When
the aging process is complete, the equilibrium which
existed in middle life between the individual and
his society has given way to a new equilibrium
characterized by a greater distance and an altered
type of relationship.
While their study is composed of white, healthy, and
economically-secure Kansas city residents, the authors
nonetheless maintain the theory's universal status, that
the "theory is intended to apply to the aging process in
all societies" (Cumming and Henry, 1961:15).

The aging

process for disengagement theory involves a mutual
withdrawal, with society virtually giving permission to
the individual to disengage.

Whether it be, for example,

retirement for men (1961:146) or widowhood for women
(1961:154), each is treated as the central task of the
later adult years; the individual shows an inherent
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"readiness for disengagement" by means of these
processes.
Drawing on functionalist reasoning, in which all
behavioral patterns are construed in terms of the
equilibrium needs of the system, the analysis of social
interaction sees persons as being fused with society,
wherein they become parts of, and not individuals in,
social systems.

In turning to the system and its needs

for clues to the aging process, disengagement theory
explains persons' actions in terms of the ongoing
operations of the system of which they are a part.

For

example, in modern societies, with the emphasis placed on
standards of achievement and efficiency, the social
system, in order to be a viable one, requires its work to
be done expeditiously and efficiently.

Elderly persons,

it is argued, do not contribute to the social system with
the comparative efficiency of younger adults and thus
present a burden to it.

The functional maintenance of

social systems, therefore, requires some mechanism for
systematically disengaging the elderly from major life
roles, roles critical to social systemic maintenance.
While people make decisions concerning the life course,
the choices they are assumed to make are
normatively-defined.

The individuals that exist are,

thereby, "perfected," a quintessential individualism.
Cumming (1963:384) states:

As
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The disengagement theory postulates that society
withdraws from the ageing person to the same extent
as that person withdraws from society. This is, of
course, just another way of saying that the process
is normatively governed and in a sense agreed upon
by all concerned.
In contrast to the "good citizen" in activity
theory, which might be represented in the adage that "God
helps those who help themselves," disengagement theory's
"good citizen" is a complete member of his or her
society, a dutiful sentry for system equilibrium.

By

internalizing the norms and values (becoming fully
socialized) of society, the individual becomes the
perfect individual, so perfect that he disappears into
the normative fabric of the social order.

He does not

confront his society, participate in it as a member of
some self-interested segment, nor does he dramaturgically
manage his affairs in it.

Rather, what exists in social

life are systems of role-players, albeit individual ones,
that articulate the functional needs of the wider system
of which they are a part.
While, on the one hand, disengagement theorists were
decidedly not talking about individuals, they were still,
on the other hand, concerned with individual adjustment
and life satisfaction.

System adjustment spawns

satisfied individuals.

Based on data generated from the

Kansas City Study of Adult Life, wherein age-comparisons
in levels of various kinds of social involvement and ego
investment as well as attitudinal changes provided
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evidence of the disengagement process, adjustment in old
age hinged on proper system functioning.

The individual

in disengagement theory, in effect, takes it as his or
her obligation to disengage for the benefit of the social
order of which he or she is a part, something which
ultimately depicts persons as being completely
normatively governed.

Indeed, to the extent one

actualizes disengagement or becomes what Gouldner (1970)
calls an "eager tool" of the system, he is adjusted or
happy in old age.

Cited by Cumming and Henry (1961:164),

the case of Mr. Allen's retirement typifies the process:
One important characteristic of Mr. Allen since we
have known him has been his readiness to give up his
strong bonds to work. His earlier history was one
of competence, devotion, and pride in
accomplishment. Yet on retiring he was able to
alter his pattern with comparative ease, and with
only minor twinges of guilt and feelings of loss.
In common with many of our more successful male
'disengagers,' Mr. Allen can point with pride to a
past history of instrumental success, but he does
not feel still bound to these goals.
(See the cases of Mrs. Brown, pp. 171-179, Mrs. Clark and
Mrs. Duncan, pp. 181-189, for similar descriptions of
"successful" adjustment.)
Responding to the considerable controversy generated
by their original statement, Cumming and Henry offered
separate revisions of their theory.

This development is

similar to the "later activity theorists'" revisions,
except that for disengagement theorists, revision was
more concertedly related to criticism.

44
In her article entitled, "Further Thoughts on the
Theory of Disengagement," Cumming (1963) responded to the
problem of differential adjustment or individual
variations in the disengagement process.

In her

response, rather than merely acknowledging that
variations do occur at the individual level, she offered
a psycho-biological explanation for it, in a theory of
temperament.

Those who are temperamentally "impingers"

are most likely to remain engaged, while "selectors" are
most likely to disengage in later life.

Aside from this

amendment, the theory remains essentially the same.
Henry's (1965) more extreme revision of disengagement
theory practically abandons it in favor of a more
expressly developmental perspective, an approach
discussed later in this chapter.
Cowgill (1974; Cowgill and Holmes, 1972) is the
foremost exemplar of modernization theory.

The theory

argues that the elderly's high status held in past
societies has declined (at least until the recent past),
due to changes associated with industrialization.

Like

disengagement theory, the modernization approach is
influenced by functionalism.

However, whereas the former

emphasized the normative features of social order, the
latter focuses on structural/comparative factors, concern
centering on the analysis of various societies at
different stages of development.

Cowgill's is not a
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political economy of age, since he does not emphasize
class dynamics as the force behind the changing status of
the aged; rather, Cowgill's emphasis is on evolving
systems of age statuses rooted in technological advances.
Cowgill (1972) locates several variables associated
with age, across societies, and attempts to develop a
basis for a universal theory of aging.

For example, he

states that "the aged always constitute a minority of the
total population" (1972:3).

Additionally, he lists a

number of age-relevant factors that vary across
societies, such as level of technology, or degree of
urbanization.

Cross-cultural variations in income,

urbanization, social mobility, education, and aging of
the population, in varied combinations, ostensibly affect
the status of the elderly.

Together, these constitute

Cowgill's (1972:2) independent variable, referred to as
the degree of modernization, whereby "various societies
can be arrayed on a continuum from least modernized to
most modernized."
Cowgill argues that in every society, the status of
the aged is inversely related to the degree of
modernization.

As he (1972:12) writes, "The theory

adduced here purports to be general and applicable to all
societies."

The author uses cross-cultural data that

simulate history and thus over-determines the cause of
change, in which all societies are assumed to follow our
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paths.

Persons are, in effect, determined by social

structure, and one that is following a certain course at
that.
In his later work, Cowgill (1974) sets out to more
explicitly define modernization by focusing on how its
"four most salient aspects"--health technology, economic
technology, urbanization, mass education--contribute to
the diminishing status of the aged.

(Cowgill also

incorporates two other factors--what he calls
"extraneous" variables-- namely, Work Ethic and Cult of
Youth, but they are not as integral to the modernization
process.)

The four components of modernization represent

the source of status, with individual adjustment tied to
elders' relations to changing modes of production.
Age stratification theory stems from the work of
Riley and her associates (Riley, Johnson, and Foner,
1972).

It considers the historical and structural

experiences of elders as a means of understanding
individual adjustment.

The theorists argue that age

operates as a basis of stratification in a vein similar
to other stratification systems, notably class.

They

conceive of social stratification in a more general
manner than traditionally thought of, referring to it as
any kind of hierarchy.

In comparing and contrasting age

stratification with that of class, the authors attempt to
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shoW the viable features of using a stratification
perspective as it applies to age.
Riley and associates describe age stratification in
terms of differential age cohorts, suggesting that one
attempt to understand the individual experiences of
growing old in terms of one's placement in the age
structure.

Treating social structure in a Mertonian

fashion, the authors argue that an individual's location
within a given age cohort--defined as "an aggregate of
individuals who were born (or who entered a particular
system) in the same time interval and who age together"
(Riley et al., 1972:9)--determines his or her social
allocation of roles, forming his beliefs and actions.

As

Foner (1976:17) remarks, in regard to the question of
differential placement of individuals in strata, "a
concise answer is that stratum membership governs the
individual's access to the desiderata of the society and
shapes his behavior and attitudes in myriad ways."
The theory presents a cohort stratified society,
where there is a configuration of events for various time
slots or strata, experienced by select individuals--what
Riley and associates (1972) call ''cohort centric."

The

analysis paints a determinant and mechanistic picture of
human life:

stratum membership governs and shapes the

individual, leaving unattended the question of the
subjectively-practical interpretation of cohort.
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Cohorts are not described in terms of group-like
qualities.

Rather, they are taken to be statistical

categories and categorical uniqueness stressed.

The

approach does not question how, and with what
consequences, cohorts become groups for themselves, in
the service of their own interests.

(This, though is of

central concern to Rose (1965), for one, whose
subcultural theory is a theory of age-consciousness.)
With the group-interested feature of age cohorts
overlooked, the potential for intergenerational relations
and conflicts is glossed over.

The age stratification

theorists, in contrast, tend to treat cohorts
independently of each other, for analytic and research
purposes.

Their interest is in statistically contrasting

the social and psychological characteristics of various
cohorts historically in order to display cohort-related
variations in them, not in how, for example, their
concrete social relations might generate the
differences.

The source of individual age-status, as

such, is the cohorts themselves which, in turn, make for
personal well-being.
Mid-Continuum Sources
The socio-environmental approach, exemplified by
Gubrium (1973), came as a direct challenge to both
activity and disengagement theory.

Gubrium suggested

that the theories were too narrow in not taking into
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account what the meaning of activity or disengagement
(nonactivity) was for those concerned.

Activity

theorists assumed that activity was an individually
valued conduct; disengagement theorists took the opposite
point of view, interpreting value in terms of system
needs.

The author (1973:33), in stating that "No

particular kind or degree of activity is an indicator of
a specific attitude," attempted to combine the two
approaches by directing attention to the interplay of
individual and social contexts of the immediate
environment of the aged as it affects a person's morale
(see Figure 1) .
Figure 1 shows that the socio-environmental
perspective has three separate components.

The first

two--the individual and social components--make up a
given old age environment, entailing both activity
resources and activity norms.

Activity resources include

one's level of health, financial solvency, and social
support.

Activity norms are shared expectations of what

is appropriate behavior for different social contexts.
Each of the first two features is independent of the
other and each can pose various constraints on the
person, who makes up the third element of the theory.

As

Gubrium (1973:36) points out, "Environments for the aged
are external constraints on persons' actions.
constraints may be social and/or individual

The
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Figure 1.

The Socio-Environrnental Approach
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Persons, on the other hand, take into

account the meaning their own activity resources (e.g.,
good versus ill-health) have in light of surrounding
norms.
In considering both the individual and social
dimensions of his environment, and the relationship
between the two, an elderly individual's adjustment is
determined.

As the author (1973:59) states:

The aged take both the conditions of their
individual resources and the conditions of their
social world as contingencies of their
environments. Life satisfaction or morale, as a
state of mind, is significantly influenced by this
two-sided environment.
As such, the object of concern, or independent variable,
for this theory is the combined effect of contextual
interaction.

Depending on the degree of congruence

between them, one is either adjusted or not.
Others have advocated a similar kind of approach to
old age adjustment (e.g., Kahana, 1974; Kuypers and
Bengtson, 1973), whereby the impact of different
environments on the well-being of the aged has been
examined.

Kahana (1974), for example, has argued that

individual adjustment in old age is contingent on
congruency in person-environment fit, wherein the
characteristics of the aging individual are aligned with
environmental conditions.

As she states (1974:203), "it

is hypothesized here that a close fit between
environmental characteristics and individual preference
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and needs should result in a sense of well-being and
adequate functioning of the elderly individual."
What might be called the social-career view of aging
(see Becker, 1970a, chapters 17 through 20) is a brand of
symbolic interactionism in that it looks at the roles
people engage in and how they are socially organized.
Life change or stability is a matter of others'
definitions of the self.

The relationship between self

and role is interactional, whereby one comes to know and
realize himself by means of various roles (habitual forms
of action) played (cf. Karp and Yoels, 1982).

The

situations people encounter in life provide structured
settings that socially define the self.

The self, on the

other hand, is also an active entity that changes with
situated interactions.

The process involves taking the

role of the other, with the self seeking others'
definitions of its behavior and subsequent course of
action.

Accordingly, shared understandings of life

experiences develop, making social order possible.
The approach, like many forms of symbolic
interactionism, stands between the micro and macro points
of view.

Becker (1970c) sees both--the analysis of

personality components of the self as well as the proper
instillation of societal values--as being too simplistic
in suggesting that a single course of life change can
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explain the many variations in the life cycle.

Instead,

he (1970c:287) argues,
social structure creates the conditions for both
change and stability in adult life. The structural
characteristics of institutions and organizations
provide the framework of the situations in which
experience dictates the expediency of change.
similarly, they provide the counters with which
side-bets can be made and the links between lines of
activity out of which commitment grows. Together,
they enable us to arrive at general explanations of
personal development in adult life without requiring
us to posit unvarying characteristics of the person,
either elements of personality or of 'value
structure.'
Becker's analysis is organized around the concepts
of situational adjustment and commitment.

Situational

adjustment is used to account for variations in adult
life (as well as life in general), whereas commitment
explains constancy.

Becker (1970c:279) states that

people exhibit marked changes as they move through youth
and adulthood (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, styles of
interaction) and that concomitant situational factors
require one "to act in a certain way or to hold certain
beliefs."

The author also asserts that situational

adjustment is often a collective process involving a
"batch" of people.

He cites his famous study concerning

medical students' shift in belief from a naive idealistic
approach to one oriented towards "getting through the
system" (see Becker et al., 1961).

The self, as such,

does not act at will, but rather is constrained by the
actions of others or co-participants, a process "in which
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individuals take on the characteristics required by the
situations they participate in" (Becker, 1970c:276).
During this process, wittingly or not, persons make
side-bets, a process involving "a variety of commitments
which constrain one to follow a consistent pattern of
behavior in many areas of life" (Becker, 1970c:285).

The

concept of commitment provides for personal stability in
light of changing situations over the life span.

As

Becker (1970b:301) explains:
A person is committed whenever he realizes that it
will cost him more to change his line of behavior
than it will to continue to act in a way that is
consistent with his past actions, and that this
state of affairs has come about through some prior
action of his own. So committed, he will resist
pressures to adjust to new situations that push him
in a contrary direction, perhaps moving out of those
situations where that is possible or else attempting
to change the situation so that he can continue in
the direction of his commitment.
Here lies the dualism of self and social structure.

The

interplay between the processual self, on the one hand,
and the chains of roles organized over time that serve to
define it, on the other, make for social-career lines.
The object of concern, or independent variable, focuses
on the social definition of careers, out of which emerges
individual adjustment.
Rose's (1965) subcultural theory of aging also
incorporates macro and micro elements in its analysis.
The perspective considers the nature and extent of
contacts among the elderly as well as the affinity they
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have for each other.

For Rose, a subculture occurs, when

a certain category of people interact with each other to
a much greater extent than with other categories of
people.

The net result, in this case, is the development

of an aged-subculture with distinctive norms and values,
providing a new set of roles for the elderly to define
themselves.
It is clear that Rose is referring to one
predominant subculture for the elderly.

This is seen in

frequent references to g subculture or the subculture of
the aged in his descriptions of the theory.

The title of

Rose's (1965) article "The Subculture of the Aging"
suggests the same, depicting the notion that "the aging
subculture is a general one that cuts across other
subcultures--those based on occupation, religion, sex,
and possibly even ethnic identification" (1965:7).
Rose argues that the aging subculture has both
positive and negative aspects to it.

He (1965:78)

describes them as follows:
The positive things are those which older people
enjoy doing together, or which the whole society
encourages them to do together, or which they
interpret as being a special opportunity for those
with their status. The negative things are those
which the elderly do together because they find
themselves rejected or otherwise in opposition to
the rest of society.
The author compares the negative aspect of the subculture
to a counterculture in American society, much like other
minority groups.

In this respect, minority group theory
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(Streib, 1965) can be thought of as a theory of
subcultures, in this case, a minority aged subculture.
Rose also claims that the status systems of older
persons only partially reflect that of the rest of
society.

As such, the behavior of the elderly is not so

much evaluated in terms of some overall social standard
or norm but, rather, is tied to the meanings generated
out of an endemic subculture, as is the case with other
kinds of subgroups.

In this regard, such factors as

physical and mental health as well as active leadership
in old age associations take on special importance.
Being relatively harder to achieve, or maintain, they are
more highly regarded and thus have higher status among
the elderly.
In general, the theory holds that, as soon as one
begins to define himself or herself as old in American
society, there comes a corresponding negative change in
self-conception, which ultimately leads, for most elderly
people, to disengagement and depression.

However, a

phenomenon known as ''aging group consciousness" is,
likewise, occurring.

The process involves the elderly

seeing themselves not merely as a group of people but as
a group conscious of itself, having its own common
interests and associated courses of action.

This enables

a new set of meanings and evaluations of old age, such as
group pride, to emerge.

Here, then, lies the object of
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concern, or independent variable:

subcultural variations

that provide diverse contexts, and standards, by which to
evaluate the aging process.

A subculture of age provides

a collectively representative source of personal
understanding and self-evaluation, specific to its
members' unique characteristics.
Micro-Sources
Dowd's exchange theory (1975) argues that the
relationship between the conduct of elderly persons and
individual adjustment, or life satisfaction, can be
understood against a contribution/return logic operating
in elders' experience.

In contrast to activity and

disengagement theories, in which the author states
(1975:585) that "neither theory • . . attempts to offer
anything but the most perfunctory of explanations for the
decreased social interaction itself," exchange theory's
main concern is with the question of why elders, for the
most part, withdraw from social life.

Informed by Homans

(1961) and Blau (1964), Dowd's analysis "views social
interaction as basically an exchange of rewards between
two social actors, be they individuals or groups of
individuals" (1975:592).

The language of economics is

used to describe the contingencies of exchange.
However, what is exchanged is not necessarily dollars or
goods; it may include such nonmaterial returns as
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recognition, compliments, avoidance, or other valued
rewards and aversions.
In presenting evidence for elderly dependence
"representing the structural realities of
twentieth-century industrial society," (1975:109) as well
as cohort effects, Dowd does make overtures to macro
elements in his theory.

Yet, his exchange approach

ultimately leads to an analysis of face-to-face
encounters, as the following remarks show:
Exchange theory . . . posits that the degree of
engagement in old age is an empirical question, an
outcome of a specific exchange relationship between
an individual or group of individuals and the
society in which the more powerful exchange partner
dictates the terms of the relationship (Dowd,
1975:593).
Dowd presents an image of age and social integration
built on a cost-benefit model of social participation.
In contrast to disengagement theory, he maintains that
the withdrawal andjor social isolation of elderly people
are not the result of system needs or norms of mutual
consent, but rather of an unequal exchange process in
which older people are not "getting a fair shake."
Adjustment is contingent on the immediate economy of
costs and benefits that exist between persons.

A

principle of distributive justice--the balance of
contributions and rewards--comes into play in aging such
that, as elders find they can make fewer contributions
because of decrepitude, they experience a decline in
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power at not being able to justify social returns.

As

such, they begin to disengage to balance the exchange
equation.

Accordingly, Down explains life satisfactions

and dissatisfactions.
Developmentalists, in general, are interested in
patterned ego changes across the life course.

In regard

to old age, the work of Neugarten, Gutmann, and others
(Neugarten, 1964; 1968; Neugarten, Havighurst, and Tobin,
1968; Havighurst, Neugarten, and Tobin, 1968; Neugarten
and Gutmann, 1968; Gutmann, 1968; 1976), as well as part
of Erikson's theory of ego/cognitive development (1950),
are exemplary.

The primary concern is with the person's

internal or intrapsychic responses to the aging process.
A personality type is treated, at least in principle, as
something analytically distinct from self-regard.
Because of this, developmentalists are able to raise
questions about the relationship between self, on the one
hand, and developmental type, on the other.
The theories differ in regard to how they define
particular elements of the developmental process.
Concern may center on "developmental tasks," thereby
allowing for alternative modes of personality development
(Erikson, 1950), or on developmental styles that grow out
of different personality types (Neugarten, 1968;
Neugarten, Havighurst, and Tobin, 1968), as well as
universal, intrinsic properties of growing old (Neugarten
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and Gutmann, 1968; Gutmann, 1968; 1976).

Thus, while

some emphasize the environment in shaping growth, others
focus in on the coping styles of types of persons across
environments.

All, nonetheless, focus on a developmental

logic as the source of self-adjustment.
The internal processes or personality are measured
by either asking elderly individuals questions or having
them interpret visual protocals (among other projective
techniques), the answers to which provide a clue to
adjustment.

The clues also represent the particular

stage one is at.

The stages are understood to have some

sort of im'pact on the personality, an impact that is
universal in nature, regardless of roles inhabited.

In

effect, the particular stage one is located in determines
the personality's adjustment in old age, as when, for
example, one manifests an active versus passive mode of
mastery in relating to the environment (Neugarten and
Gutmann, 1968; Gutmann, 1968; 1976).
Erikson's model, however, does provide for a modicum
of freedom for the individual by allowing for
developmental alternatives.
associates'

Likewise, Neugarten and

(1968:176-77) analysis of personality types,

called "personality continuity," sees the individual as
one who "continues to exercise choice and to select from
the environment in accordance with his own
long-established needs."

Yet, while addressing human

61
freedom, both schemes merely pay lip service to it, the
focus instead being on the personality or developmental
type arising over time.

Consider, for example, how

Neugarten and associates (1968:177) summarize their
analysis:
we regard personality as the pivotal dimension in
describing patterns of aging and in predicting
relationships between level of social role activity
and life satisfaction. • . . in normal men and
women, there is no sharp discontinuity of
personality with age, but instead an increasing
consistency. Those characteristics that have been
central to the personality seem to become even more
clearly delineated, and those values the individual
has been cherishing become even more salient. In
the personality that remains integrated--and in an
environment that permits--patterns of overt behavior
are likely to become increasingly consonant with the
individual's underlying personality needs and his
desires.
The object of concern, or independent variable, for
developmental theorists is located in one's personality
or inner ego processes, the normal (successful)
resolution or particular developmental type making for
individual adjustment in old age.
The continuity approach (see Atchley, 1972), while
not presented as a formal theory of aging, has also been
taken into account by a variety of researchers.

The view

holds that:
in the process of becoming an adult, the individual
develops habits, commitments, preferences, and a
host of other dispositions that become a part of his
personality. As the individual grows older, he is
predisposed toward maintaining continuity in his
habits, associations, preferences, and so on
(Atchley, 1972:36).
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As Atchley argues, individuals are inclined to
maintain a consistent line of behavior in old age.

In

contrast to the developmental perspective, where the
focus is on emerging inner-psychological life, the
concern here is with continued patterns of behavior based
on lifelong experiences that are repeated as one ages.
The continuity perspective differs from activity theory
as well, in that, rather than advocating a "normal"
process of continuity (i.e., work-like activity) in late
life for successful aging to occur, the focus is instead
on continuity per se, regardless of what form it takes.
Thus, the source of individual adjustment is the
regularity of life conditions over the life course.
Empirically, Townsend (1968) exemplifies the
continuity perspective as it relates to adjustment in
later life.

The approach is a useful foil to the

unidimensional and global views of both activity and
disengagement theories.

Specifically, Townsend had

social regularity in mind as a critique of activity
theory.

Rather than take for granted a modal (normal)

level of activity throughout the life cycle, the author
focused on the regularity of any level of activity over
the span of one's life.

He found desolation (e.g., an

irregular isolation due to the recent death of a
spouse), and not lifelong (socially regular) isolation,
to be the major factor affecting one's life satisfaction
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in old age.

Social regularity or continuity in lifestyle

was the critical variable, not any particular level of
activity.

The source of adjustment, then, is continuity

in one's lifelong style of life, what one has become
accustomed to as personally normal.
TIMING
I now turn to the timing factor in the alternate
grammars.

As in the previous section, I look at the

macro theories first, then the mid-continuum sources and,
finally, the micro end of the continuum.
Macro-Timings
Disengagement theory is described as being not only
a mutual and universal process, but also inevitable in
later life (Cumming and Henry, 1961).

The theory

presents the adjustment process as an inexorable feature
of old age, eventually occurring in everyones' lives, in
all societies.

While certain to happen to all, how is

its timing explained?

In other words, what is the social

chronology of the system's adjustment process?
Cumming and Henry (1961:221) use a rainbow metaphor
to describe social ties across the life course, with
childhood and old age being categorically, but not
necessarily totally, individualistically disengaged
relative to middle age.

There is a continual and

systematic confluence of ties with the normative
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structure of society as one proceeds from early to middle
age (i.e., internalizing society's norms and values); the
opposite phenomenon occurs from middle to old age,
whereby persons, in their readiness to disengage, become
less and less bound to the fabric of society.

Once

begun, it "becomes a circular, or self-perpetuating,
process" (Cumming and Henry, 1961:211).
Besides being inevitable and systematic in its
patterning, disengagement theory also has a structured,
incremental decline in societal involvement to it.

The

authors (1961:134) refer to this process as involving at
least four stages, as follows:
Those at the beginning or first stage have none of
the three characteristics of disengagement; namely,
over sixty-five years of age, withdrawn object
cathexis, or lack of a central task. The
respondents in this category are considered fully
engaged. Those at the second and third stages are
considered partially disengaged and have one and two
characteristics, respectively. Those at the fourth
level have all three characteristics and are
considered fully disengaged.
Cumming and Henry (1961:211) also state that
"Because people differ in physiology, temperament,
personality, and life situation, disengagement occurs
earlier for some people than for others."

They point

out, for example, that such occupations as university
professors and preachers, by having styles "more
compatible with the disengaged condition" (1961:146), or
those "especially endowed biologically" (see the case of
Mrs. Elton, pp. 196-98), are exceptions to the gradual
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and systematic decline process.

Moreover, in addressing

disengagement as a whole, the researchers remark, on a
number of occasions, that the precise form the process
takes will differ for each person.

Thus, at the

individual level, the theory allows for considerable
variation in the disengagement process, as any
unidimensional and global theory must do.

On the other

hand, drawing on functionalist reasoning, disengagement
theorists were not dealing with individuals per se.
Indeed, the individual articulation of what they consider
to be a feature of aging roles within a social system is
another matter altogether.
In line with their social structural argument, and
with functionalism in general, Cumming and Henry point
out differences in gender roles and how they affect the
timing of disengagement.

The differences are due to a

division of labor within the system, where men are said
to prefer instrumental paths and women socio-emotional
ones.

As a result, the transition is seen to be easier

for women who, granted they are dutiful, may never
experience problems of adjustment in the disengagement
process; men, on the other hand, categorically experience
a more abrupt transition and, as such, may be temporarily
unadjusted. Both men and women, however, will experience
a crisis after being removed from their central roles in
life (work and marriage, respectively) if they are not
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provided the proper "disengaged" roles in their gradual
process of decline in activity in old age.

The

structural differences between men and women, within a
given system, are similar to those between various
systems.

As the authors (1961:218) state, "Disengagement

is a culture-free concept, but the form it takes will
always be culture-bound."
Cumming and Henry interpret the gender differences
as simply involving men and women coming upon various
stages of the disengagement process at different times,
wherein for women, as opposed to men, "There is time to
absorb each stage in the well-spaced transition"
(1961:159).

Indeed, in the final analysis, the two

patterns merge into one, as both men and women "display
in their eighties and nineties the same pattern of
dependency, self-satisfaction, self-centeredness, and
placidity" (1961:158).

(Those who don't display these

patterns are, likewise, said not to be adjusted or
satisfied).

And, as the authors go on to compare those

in their eighties and up, categorically referred to as
"the very old," to those in their seventies, assumed to
be at an earlier stage of disengagement/adjustment, the
continual and systematic pattern of withdrawal is further
illustrated:
These very old people seem inwardly directed; all
their energy is spent in one form or another on
self-concern, without interference from the social
norms that once forced them to consider others. On
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the other hand, our seventy-year-olds still seem to
be in the process of being freed from these
norms (1961:204).
The ultimate or total form of disengagement,
however, is death.

Here lies the final end point of

timing for disengagement theory; in time, all will
disengage.

By the same token, it follows that, in time,

all will be adjusted.
Death also provides further evidence for the theory
as being both an inevitable and universal process of
life.

The process leading up to death initially involves

a psychological shift, where individuals ready themselves
for the actual relinquishment of roles central to
societal functioning.

Functional prerequisites require

some means to facilitate one's removal from its
infrastructure.

As the individual withdraws from more

and more social roles, it leads to a final preparation of
his or her separation from the social order:

"By the end

of his life, his bonds have been all but
severed--disengagement is complete, he is free to die,
and death is the last logical step in the process of
living" (Cumming and Henry, 1961:227).
By gradually removing oneself from society and
making room for others, one is "free to die," as such,
without disrupting the equilibrium of the social system.
Dying, therefore, is the final contribution one makes to
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societal functioning.

Death, in time, sustains the

ultimate efficiency of the social system.
In Cumming's (1963) later psychobiological analysis,
the sense of timing remains the same.

Henry's (1965)

revision, on the other hand, takes on a developmental
mode of timing, which is discussed later in this chapter.
Modernization theory, like disengagement, is a
functionalist theory of aging.

The pattern individual

adjustment takes is not the same, however.

While both

are presented as universal theories by their respective
proponents, individual adjustment for the modernization
perspective, in contrast to that of disengagement, is
connected to history, to the timing of modernization.
While disengagement theory acknowledges variations in
forms of withdrawal that differ culturally, all, in time,
eventually do disengage.

Modernization theory, on the

other hand, sees a direct link between the rapidity of
social change and elderly adjustment.

As Cowgill

(1972:13) states, "the role and status of the aged varies
systematically with the degree of modernization of
society"
Each of Cowgill's salient variables--health
technology, economic technology, urbanization,
education--begins a set of changes adversely affecting
elderly adjustment.

As he (1974:140) explains,

"Selecting the four most salient aspects of
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modernization, we have sought to delineate the causal
chain linking each with the ultimate outcome--diminished
status for the aged."

Consider, for example, the health

technology factor, as it sets in motion a linear,
straightforward sequence of events leading to lower
status for the elderly.

The process begins with the

increased longevity of older people.

This, combined with

the lowering of the birth rate, results in the aging of
the population.

The greater proportion of older people

causes intergenerational competition in the work place
which leads to the elderly being forced out, thus
decreasing their status.

The other three variables

(economic technology, urbanization, and education)
similarly trigger their own sequences of events, all
ultimately resulting in the elderly's falling status,
Cowgill's term for maladjustment (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 depicts individual adjustment as a
long-term phenomenon, tied to the timing of modernizing
influences within all societies.

Modernization theory's

global and linear pattern leaves unattended the differing
effects industrialization has had on elderly people (cf.
Quadagno, 1982).

The approach's linearity is not

inevitable, however, but rather represents an ideology of
developed countries.

Modernization is but a glorified

expression of the Western model toward which all
societies ostensibly move ''in time."
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Palmore and Manton's (1973) additional evidence
shows that educational and occupational differences
between the elderly and other aged groups tends to level
off in more advanced stages of modernization.

As such,

the pattern of adjustment is curvilinear or, more
specifically, J-shaped, where early industrialization
depresses the status of the aged, later industrialization
increasing it somewhat.

This accords with cowgill's

(1974:142) version of change where he states that,
while modernization is detrimental to the status and
interests of the aged in is (sic) early stages this
trend may "bottom out" in later stages of
modernization and from then on there is some
comparative improvement in the status and condition
of older people.
Age stratification's sense of timing also
focuses on long-term adjustment patterns, the particular
forms taken being linked to cohort/historical components
(see Figure 3).
Figure 3 shows that the aging process takes place in
a chronological fashion:

one grows older, not younger.

Simultaneously, groups of cohorts, taken together (age
strata), "age" at the same time, a pattern that is both
continuous and unchanging.

As Riley and others (1972:9)

state, "The succession of cohorts . .

. is an inevitable

and irreversible process."
The critical time element making up individual
adjustment in old age is the historical dimension,
expressed through cohort analysis.

Each cohort enters
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and proceeds through the age strata with a particular set
of historical experiences.

The various experiences one

may encounter, in turn, make for differential patterns of
adjustment.

As Riley and associates (1972:11) explain:

patterns of aging can differ, not only from one
society to another and from one century to another
• . . but also among successive cohorts in a single
society. For any given cohort, the pattern of aging
will reflect the unique historical background of the
cohort, and the special patterns of its
compositional segments."
Various demographic characteristics such as race and
sex composition as well as differential patterns of
longevity, both within and between cohorts, along with
one's historical situation, make for a given pattern of
adjustment in old age.
cohort-specific.

Thus, the timing of adjustment is

In this regard, Riley and her

associates' work, like cowgill's, features a structured
time component.
The authors (1972:524) use an escalator metaphor in
analyzing the structured flow of cohorts over time:
imagine an escalator rising through the several
floors (which bound the age strata) of a building.
All entrants to the building move directly onto the
bottom of this escalator (are born), ride steadily
upward (grow older), and exit from the building once
they reach the top (die). One the way up, the
riders can view the scenes on each of the several
floors.
They go on to describe what they call a "stable
situation," which entails homogeneous successive cohorts
on the escalator, versus a "flexible situation," where
the size and composition of cohorts both entering the
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escalator and riding upward varies, and how such
variations make for differences in the age structure.
The authors then bring in the historical dimension to
display how successive cohorts may differ in the aging
process.

As they (1972:525) state:

Perhaps the scene on some of the floors is
undergoing continual alteration. Then different
riders, even though arriving at the same floor, are
exposed to widely varied experiences on that floor
depending on the time of their arrival. This is the
temporal feature of cohort succession that links the
population processes to history.
Thus, it is argued that elderly people's evaluation
of life--whether life satisfaction, morale, depression,
hopefulness, optimism, conservatism--can only be
understood by looking at historical and cohort
experiences as a way to understand individual adjustment
(Riley, 1973).

Various examples such as living through

the Great Depression, increased longevity, and changing
women's roles are cited as evidence of differential
cohort effects.

For example, it has been argued that, as

elderly people age, they become more parochial in their
thinking, preferring more conservative lifestyles and
taking a reserved view of political and economic change.
While much data has supported the proposition, Riley and
associates would maintain that this may indeed be a
cohort effect.

If age experiences were stratified into

age cohorts, the foregoing support might only apply to a

75

particular one.

And, at some other historical times, for

some other cohorts, the relationship could be reversed.
The timing of individual adjustment, then, rather
than being universal, inevitable, and irreversible, is
bound (cohort centric) by a particular time and place.
While the aging process (chronological aging) is
presented as universal, inevitable, and irreversible,
being bound to cohorts and, as such, history, makes for
variability in patterns of individual adjustment.

To the

degree time and place are diverse (i.e., flexible
situation) so, too, are patterns of individual
adjustment.

Similarly, more similar conditions produce

the opposite effect (i.e., stable situation).
Still, the pattern of adjustment in old age, while
infinite to the extent different historical periods are
unique, is nonetheless limited in its duration.

The

finitude of cohorts was shown in the earlier quote about
the escalator, where all "passengers" leave the building
after their ride through life, regardless of the form
adjustment takes.

Thus, in time, all eventually do

become maladjusted, but in different ways.

As such,

while particular cohort experiences are historically
specific, history has a general course of increment.
Mid-Continuum Timings
Gubrium's (1973) socio-environmental approach sees
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the timing of individual adjustment as situationally
problematic.

As he puts it:

From the socio-environmental point of view, persons
and their self-dispositions or attitudes shall be
taken as situationally and actively variable. The
action of persons is contingent on the significant
expectations of others within particular contexts of
social interaction. Attitudes toward self vary with
changes in the contexts of social interaction and
emerge out of the individual and social
contingencies of these contexts (1973:34).
Activity resources and activity norms are the two
socially contingent factors most prominent in old age.
Depending on one's health and economic state, as well as
degree of social support, an elderly person will either
have the activity resources for being very active or, its
opposite, very inactive.

As the author (1973:39) states,

"Depending on their potential, activity resources
determine the flexibility to decide upon a course of
action that persons have at their disposal."

These

resources are also influenced by the activity norms of a
person's environment.

In the same manner that people are

constrained by the extent of their activity resources so,
too, are they confronted by certain expectations in a
given environment.

As such, depending on one's activity

resources as well as the norms for interpreting them,
there are either positive or negative consequences for
adjustment in old age.
The constraining features of old age environments
make for relatively stable self attitudes, or life
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satisfaction, over time.

Nonetheless, it is conceivable

for there to be many patterns of adjustment in old age,
each stable over time.

As Gubrium (1973:43) writes,

"there are at least as many potential states of high
morale as there are legitimized degrees and kinds of
activity which are fulfilled by the elderly."

The same,

of course, holds true for unadjustment in old age.

As

such, maladjustment is not as much a process in time but
one that, depending on the stability of its social and
individual contexts, has some or no timing at all.
The social-career view also entails problematic
adjustment patterns.

The interplay between the emerging

self and the variety of social roles that serve to define
it make for a number of different possible timings.
Becker's concepts of situational adjustment and
commitment not only make up social career lines but, at
the same time, provide for diversity in its structure
over time.

On the one hand, career lines can be very

unstable and erratic, which

"re~ult

from situations which

do not permit people to become committed because they
deny to them the means, the chips, with ·which to make
side-bets of any importance" (Becker, 1970c:285).
(Becker cites, as examples, students' medical training
and their increasing divorce rate.)

Other conditions, on

the other hand, foster consistent lines of behavior:
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Commitment can only occur when there are things
present in the environment which are valuable enough
that their loss constitutes a real loss.
But
objects acquire that kind of value only through the
operation of a social organization, which both
embodies the consensus that ascribes major value to
them and creates the structural conditions under
which they achieve the necessary attribute of
scarcity (Becker, 1970b:301).
The degree to which social structure provides these
mechanisms varies not only at the individual level, but
also in more institutionalized settings, where side-bets
tend to be formalized.

Becker and Strauss (1970)

describe such patterns in their analysis of career lines
in work organizations.

Organizational career lines can

range from the ideal (which is never fully realized),
whereby "recruits enter at the bottom in positions of
least prestige and move up through the ranks as they gain
in age, skill, and experience" (1970:246), to any number
of social configurations.

The authors (1970:246) use the

metaphor of escalators to describe the patterns:
The flow of personnel through an organization . . .
[involves] . . . a number of streams; that is, there
may be several routes to the posts of high prestige
and responsibility. These may be thought of as
escalators.
In applying the metaphor, Becker and strauss
maintain that, while some career lines may be fairly well
laid out, in which "higher positions are routinely filled
from aspirants at the next lower level" (1970:247),
others involve a pattern much more complicated in time
and space.

The movement of a career line, for example,
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need not be upward, but may also be downward, as well as
lateral, where one switches to another escalator
(switching careers).

The speed or pace at which one

advances might also vary; for example, sudden vacancies
or "being at the right place at the right time" make for
rapid movement, while opposite situations such as lack of
skills may lead to being "frozen" at a certain level.
Indeed, "some people never set foot on a work escalator
but move from low job to low job" (1970:255).
While any number of situational possibilities can
make for differential career line patterns, such as
recruitment and replacement, training, group allegiance,
career interdependence, as well as the changing work
world, the focus remains on g developing career over
time.

This involves various organizational as well as

personal side-bets.

For example, organizations may

provide a set sequence of positions and skills related to
a person's age, along with monetary and other rewards, to
provide incentives for a certain type of career
movement.

Individuals, too, may have invested time and

money, as well as
route.

perso~al

loyalties, along a career

The particular side-bets involved, which vary by

organization, help make for stability.

As such, the

timing of the particular path a career line takes is
related in large measure to the type of structural
side-bets.

Progress in the course and value of
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self-references making up individual adjustment develops
accordingly, for better or worse, as selves become
committed to certain situated definitions to the
exclusion of others.

Applied to later life, aging is

confronted in terms of the investments and divestments
experienced in varied careers of the life course.

This

makes it possible to relate varied careers to success in
the later years.
For subcultural theory, the timing of individual
adjustment is linked with an emerging collective
consciousness, although exhibited by different degrees of
involvement among the elderly.

As Rose (1965:3) states,

"the aging subculture is developing."

While

acknowledging the process has a ways to go in that there
are certain influences (e.g., mass media, elderly
employment) which have kept the aged "in touch" with the
rest of society, Rose (1965:74) nonetheless maintains
that, "There are certain trends occurring in our society
which are tending to create some of the conditions
necessary for the development of a subculture."

These

trends include demographic, ecological, and social
organizational processes.

The aging of the population,

the increase in age-segregated housing, the creation of
social welfare programs targeted for the elderly, and the
growth of old age organizations, among other factors,
combine to produce distinct "aged" conditions (e.g.,
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mandatory retirement) as well as isolate them, as a
group, from other age groups.
In so doing, the cultural trends serve both to
promote interaction among older persons and maximize
their exclusion from the population in
general--increasing their chances of forming, in Rose's
phrase, "aging group consciousness."

Various factors

related to elderly involvement, however, such as those
who continue to accept middle-age values, those who
become isolated from all of society except for family,
and those who were never "engaged" in the first place,
make forecasting the future uncertain.
Micro-Timings
In exchange theory, the timing of individual
adjustment is linked with continued social involvement
which, in turn, is inextricably tied to the rewards one
receives in interaction with others.

As Dowd (1975:586)

states, "Certain patterns of interaction among social
actors (either groups or individuals) are sustained over
time .

.

. because men find such interaction

rewarding--for whatever reasons."

Depending on the

structure of social rewards, interaction is either
pursued or avoided.
In regard to the elderly, Dowd argues that, as
persons age, their conduct presents a burden to ongoing
interaction with others.

It takes greater and greater

82

effort to supplement an individual's shortcomings in a
style taken for granted by one's co-participants.

With

each attempt to maintain a prior lifestyle, an
individual's contribution to it, with decreasing
competence, shortchanges what others get in return.

The

benefits to the others outweigh the costs to his
continual participation; for example, an older worker's
outmoded skills force him to accept a demotion in his
job, because he can no longer contribute according to
expectations.

On the one hand, the elderly person

confronts the cost of growing dependence and compliance;
on the other hand, others experience the cost of a
growing burden of support.

The dissatisfaction

associated with this leaves the elderly person no other
choice but to withdraw or disengage from others.
While Dowd's major concern is with the conditions of
disengagement between the elderly and the rest of society
(including other elderly persons), by the same token,
using the logic of exchange theory, he would also
describe the conditions of continued engagement.

Dowd

would argue that when exchange costs and benefits in the
interaction between elderly individuals and others are at
least equal, or better, profitable, such elderly persons
do not disengage.

Likewise, in analyzing the aged as a

whole, the author (1975:116) asserts that the unbalanced
exchange relationship between them and society "reflects
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current realities and need not, therefore, be
characteristic of aging in the future" when more
favorable educational and economic factors could change
power resources.

Maladjustment in old age, therefore, is

not inevitable but, rather, is linked to the net return
of ongoing exchange transactions.

As Dowd (1975:118)

states,
an exchange theory of aging predicts outcomes of
variable interaction and level of engagement in old
age depending upon the relative power of the
individual older person or group of older persons
vis-a-vis the source of the rewarding interaction,
society.
Accordingly, for exchange theory, an infinite number
of adjustment timings are possible, depending on the
structure of costs and rewards in one's everyday
experiences.

Individual adjustment among the aged

becomes, in effect, a matter of the relative costs versus
benefits received in social interaction.
Developmental theorists share a linear concern for
the organization of life experiences, typically, a life
course with distinct stages or patterns of development.
While acknowledging that every individual is different or
unique, the perspective assumes that all follow a certain
developmental course.

The explanations for how and at

what pace the self proceeds is one way to represent the
variety of theorists (see, for example, Gergen, 1980).
Depending on whether, for example, stages are conceived
of as transitional (Neugarten and Gutmann, 1968; Gutmann,
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1968; 1976) or problematic (Erikson, 1950) the self
experiences, respectively, what he inherently goes
through, or encounters options related to developmental
tasks in what he can go through and become.
The concept of development, conceived of in an
orderly and progressive manner, is the dimension that
ties age-related experiences together.

Consider, for

example, the way in which Neugarten and Gutmann (1968)
conceive of an ego psychology of adjustment in old age.
The process involves three major stages, called mastery
styles, which characterize the inner workings of the ego
in relation to its outer world.

Stage 1 entails active

mastery or control of the ego over his world.

stage 2,

passive mastery, involves an accommodation process of the
ego with his world.

And, stage 3, magical mastery,

occurs with ego regressing to non-instrumental actions
with his world.

According to the authors, these are

age-related, although there are significant
gender-dependent timings affecting their progress.
The personality, in its own right, is also conceived
of as having distinct patterns as it develops over time.
As suggested in the title of their article, "Personality
and Patterns of Aging," Neugarten and associates (1968)
analyze distinct patterns, or developmental styles, of
personality in old age that grow out of different
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personality types.

To take from an earlier quote, the

authors conclude that, in the normal aging process,
there is no sharp discontinuity of personality with
age, but instead an increasing consistency. Those
characteristics that have been central to the
personality seem to become even more clearly
delineated, and those values the individual has been
cherishing become even more salient (1968:177).
The key to adjustment, then, is tied to the
particular personality type formed (e.g., "integrated"
versus "passive-dependent").

Whatever the element of

concern--particular personality type (Neugarten,
Havighurst, and Tobin, 1968), intrinsic property of aging
(Neugarten and Gutmann, 1968), features of societal
structure (Neugarten, 1964), developmental tasks
(Erikson, 1950)--the timing of individual adjustment for
developmentalists has a fixed set of possible patterns.
They relate to an orderly sequence of growth, of
"becoming," as it were.

While differences in the pace of

development occur from theory to theory, all "in time"
are either adjusted or not.

For some (e.g., Neugarten

and Gutmann, 1968), this process is completely
determined--all (men before women, however) are destined
to be maladjusted-- "out of our hands," so to speak; for
others (e.g., Erikson, 1950), it hinges on following what
is considered to be a "normal" course of development, a
universally set pattern allowing for successful
adjustment in old age.
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The continuity approach is based on only one
particular pattern in the timing process of individual
adjustment in old age, regardless of what social category
he fits into or what conditions he faces.
involves continuity in behavior over time.

This pattern
As such, what

continuity theorists seem to be telling us is that
changeless time itself--duration--is the key to
adjustment.

While adjustment patterns may differ from

person to person, for each given individual, it can take
only one form.

To the extent one continues his lifelong

personal pattern in mode of behavior or, after disruption
(i.e., desolation), develops a new one, he remains
adjusted in old age.
RESPONSIBILITY
Each of the alternative grammars has an implicit
moral bent, wherein something is held accountable for
adjustment in late life.

Accordingly, points of

intervention can be located and social policy enacted.
Macro-Policy
The macro approaches, all sharing a common focus on
large-scale societal sources--whether structural or
normative--as providing for individual adjustment in old
age, see responsibility and its implied policy as a
long-term proposition.

Disengagement theory analyzes

individual adjustment in old age by focusing on the needs
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and requirements of the social system.

Lacking the

freedom to act "on their own," persons exist within this
system only by virtue of carrying out behavior which is
normatively prescribed.

The process of disengagement is

a gradual one, with continued withdrawal in later life
the hallmark of success.

Cumming and Henry (1961) show

this in their comparison of persons eighty and over (very
old) with those in their seventies, the former being
described as more adjusted because of their greater
degree of disengagement.

Individuals, in effect, must

aim toward becoming more and more "settled" in old age.
The system, in turn, is responsible for moving them
along.

To the extent one realizes his obligation and

withdraws from life's major rolesjactivities, the happier
he is.

As the authors (1961:209) state, "The factor with

the greatest bearing on morale seems to be the ability to
disengage."
In order to operate smoothly and efficiently, the
system must systematically disengage elderly persons from
life.

To the extent this is achieved, society remains in

a state of equilibrium.

However, when the process

fails--when persons remain engaged in later life--it
represents a dysfunctional infringement on system
maintenance.

It is, therefore, the system's, or

society's, responsibility to correct the problem,
entailing nonpurposive, evolutionary system adjustment.
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Those unwilling to accept society's dictates make
continued unsuccessful attempts to stay engaged and
become unadjusted.

Indeed, when one confronts his

society or has some self investment in it, such as
enjoyment in continuing to work in later life (see, for
example, the case of Mr. Everett, pp. 190-96), he is
considered to be maladjusted, a form of deviance from
this point of view.
These "late life engagers" represent the problem of
old age for disengagement theory.

By disrupting "social

necessity," they present a burden to system efficiency.
As such, the system is responsible for either providing
room for their quirks or forcing them to disengage along
with others, who, by and large, typify disengagement.
At the system level, no voluntaristic type of social
policy follows from disengagement theory.

It is

eventually system adjustments and readjustments, in a
general disengagement process, that sustains the norm.
Strictly speaking, individual variation is not what
disengagement theory is about.

Policy at this level,

say, retirement consulting, would constitute patchwork
solutions to what is essentially a nonindividual
problem.

In effect, the system's long-term equilibrating

needs stand as its own system of adjustment.
Modernization theory argues that social status in
old age is tied to elder's relations to changing modes of
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production.

The harmful effects of technology,

urbanization, and mass education towards the elderly have
served to diminish their status, making for unadjustment
in later life.

As Cowgill (1972:13) states,

"[maladjustment] is chiefly a by-product of urban,
industrial, mass society."

In particular, each of his

four salient variables--health technology, economic
technology, urbanization, and mass education--instigate a
process wherein the elderly, as a whole, become
increasingly dissatisfied.

Yet, this is most apparent in

the early stages of modernization, the later stages
providing some improvement in their status.
Responsibility thus lies in the transformation of
society, individual adjustment contingent on the degree.
In a manner similar to the "nonpolicy" implications
of the disengagement view, one has little or no control
over the modernization process as a whole.

While varied

institutional sectors may be concertedly modernized or
persons "motivated to achieve" (cf. McClelland, 1961),
the overall process is evolutionary.

Thus one can only

let things work out for themselves, wherein the elderly
should eventually gain back at least part of their
previously held status.
Age stratification locates age experience within the
context of age-graded cohorts.

Treating individuals as

being bound to them, the approach portrays an elderly
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person who, in all the concrete times and places of his
everyday life, acts solely as a member of his own
particular cohort.

One is, in effect, a product of his

times, "marked by the imprint of history" (Riley,
Johnson, and Foner, 1972:4).

Likewise, location in one

or another cohort determines individual adjustment.

When

problems in old age do occur, they are presented as
"cohort effects," the particular cohort one belongs to
being seen in relation to the other cohorts concurrently
making up the age strata.

Responsibility for individual

adjustment, as such, becomes a historical/structural
question, bound to cohort experiences.

Tied to cohorts,

one must, again, let society (cohorts) run its course.
It is changes in the system of age stratification that
will influence successive cohorts in the future.

For

example, higher standards of education, while lowering
the status of elderly cohorts at one point in history,
may make future age cohorts more compatible, or even
reverse the relationship between education and aging.
All in all, being a social system concern and,
thereby, no one's particular responsibility,
maladjustment at the macro end of the continuum is, in
effect, something about which no effective social policy
can be made.

The result is not so much a social fatalism

as an evolutionary optimism where, in a manner of
speaking, nature knows best.
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Mjd-Continuum Policy
The mid-continuum approaches locate adjustment
problems in the joint effects of structural and
face-to-face factors.

The socio-environmental approach

focuses on the interplay of individual and social
contexts of the immediate environment of the aged.
Analysis centers on the impact of both individual
resources and societal norms on an elderly person's wellbeing.

In a situation where his activity resources are

not compatible with surrounding expectations, he is
unadjusted.

As Gubrium (1973:35) states, "(adjustment]

becomes a salient problem among the aged because their
activity resources so often lead to a degree of
activeness that is at variance with social expectations.
This variance leads to negative self-judgments."
Responsibility for maladjustment stems from incongruency
between persons and their environments.
The kind of social policy suggested by the state of
incongruency is to establish programs that meet
particular needs and characteristics of the elderly.

For

example, the provision of certain kinds of housing for
the elderly (e.g., age-integrated versus age-segregated),
in which they are able to interact with others of similar
background (e.g., health, money, family support), would
lead to a congruent situation for them.

What Kahana

(1974) calls "person-environment fit" is an apt way to
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describe the prevailing strategy.

The consideration of

the person is in terms of individual well-being; the
environment at stake is face-to-face and immediate.
The social-career view, in emphasizing the
importance of others' definitions, focuses attention on
social configurations of roles and their consequences for
individual adjustment.

While the effect that social

arrangements have on the self varies with situations,
individual behavior can be sustained over time through
the process of commitment.

As such, depending on how one

defines himself in relation to a given configuration of
"career" roles, one is either adjusted or not.

Those who

define their career lines negatively, as interpreted
through other's definitions, become unadjusted,
encountering a problematic old age.

Responsibility for

unadjustment lies in the intermingling of given
structural arrangements and an active, meaning-seeking
self.
The type of policy envisioned by this perspective is
one where social settings are organized so as to provide
positive meanings for individuals to define themselves.
Programs would be developed, as Becker (1970c:287) puts
it, "[to] create situations which will coerce people into
behaving as we want them to and then to create the
conditions under which other rewards will become linked
to continuing this behavior."

For example, in the case
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of occupational career lines, plans would be instituted
incorporating upward movement in an orderly and regulated
fashion with each next position having appropriate
rewards.

This would provide both a sense of continuity

in one's life and an anticipation of future benefits,
enabling persons to continue on a path of adjustment.

As

far as old age is concerned, this would serve to fill, in
an orderly fashion, what Burgess (1960) once called a
"roleless role."

For example, by tying retirement to

company activities, rather than separating its roles from
work organizations, career lines would carry into old
age.
Subcultural theory centers on developing old age
consciousness among the elderly.

A subculture

effectively isolates the aged from other age groups in
society, providing a structure of age-appropriate
meanings for self-definition.

As such, rather than being

interpreted according to societal norms, elderly behavior
is appreciated or devalued against the background of
expectations tuned to member characteristics.
Ostensibly, to the extent an elder is part of an aging
subculture, an opportunity to adjust is available to
him.

However, his behavior still must be interpreted

according to a new set of norms and values and, in that
regard, adjustment is personally problematic.
Nonetheless, not being a part and as such subject to
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society's often negative judgments, one risks structured
unadjustment.

This includes, according to Rose

(1965:12), a shift in self attitude "as progressively
physically and mentally handicapped, from independent to
dependent, and from aspiring to declining."
Responsibility is attributed to the developing age
subculture which, while it is said to be developing,
still has a way to go.
Old age policy centers on the development of
self-help or self-pride organizations.
old age power sentiment is notable.

In this respect,

The organizations

would include various senior centers and recreational
facilities as well as political organizations fostering
self-recognition and common interests.
Micro-Policy
Micro approaches see individual adjustment as the
outcome of problems in personal or face-to-face
experiences.

Dowd's exchange theory takes the balance of

interactions existing between the elderly and others as
the key to personal satisfaction.

Individual adjustment

in old age hinges on contributing one's share in return
for common values.

Dowd (1975:587) describes the

negative side of this as being a matter of "a series of
exchange relationships in which the relative power of the
aged vis-a-vis their social environment is gradually
diminished until all that remains of their power
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resources is the humble capacity to comply."
Responsibility rests on the unequal exchange
relationship, where the elderly are either forced to or
willingly withdraw from social life.
The social policy imperatives envisioned by this
approach involve providing the kinds of resources
necessary for the elderly to "hold their own."

Programs

would include plans for studying possible employment
opportunities for the aged as well as lobbying groups.
The Gray Panthers, for one, have been and continue to be
instrumental in this regard.

Whatever the details,

programs would aim at providing for more equality in the
exchanges made between the elders and others, thereby
enriching their quality of life.
Developmentalists look to the relation between
personality and the developmental environment in
analyzing individual adjustment in old age.

The source

of adjustment centers on a developmental life course and
its impact on the individual.

Specifically, it hinges

on, for example, the successful completion of respective
tasks at each stage along a particular course or on the
development of a particular personality type.
Responsibility for maladjustment, in these cases, is the
particular unsuccessful path followed--from abnormal
resolutions of, say, ego-cognition stages along the way.
For others, the developmental path is fixed and
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determinate, stages being intrinsic properties of aging.
Here, problems of adjustment are inevitable in old age.
To the extent that developmentalists "fix" course
and stages, voluntaristic policy in unavailable.

One is

left with the inner-psychological mirror image of
functional necessity.

Those developmentalists who stress

emergence over developmental patterning allow for
intervention, for example, training or counseling for the
skills or insight necessary to successfully address
developmental tasks.
The continuity approach, in arguing that it is not
the absolute level of activity per se that determines
adjustment in old age but, rather, how continuous current
activities (lifestyles) are with earlier ones
(lifestyles), locates the source of responsibility for
unadjustment in discontinuity.

As such, policy

necessarily centers on the social maintenance of
lifestyle.

Researchers of institutional relocation

(Tobin and Lieberman, 1976), for example, have advocated
smooth as opposed to abrupt relocations, facilitated by
individual preparation.
The grammars in this chapter emphasize extraindividual sources of life satisfaction as the key to the
problem of old age, "rounding out," in a matter of
speaking, the activity theory approach.

None, however,

rethink the individual problematic of aging, something
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which is focally addressed in the following chapter,
where one begins to see the possibilities for reflexive
grammars.

As such, the objects of old age themselves--

roles, the person, life satisfaction--become topics in
their own right.

For some, they are ideological; for

others they are social constructs.

CHAPTER 3
BEYOND LIFE SATISFACTION:

POLITICAL ECONOMY

AND SOCIAL PHENOMENOLOGY
In this chapter, I explore the two forms of grammars
of the old age problem--of power and privilege and of
social construction--which go beyond life satisfaction.
They are radical grammars in the sense that they deny the
central reality of the individual as the focus of the
aging experience.

Rather, individuality is conceived as

a by-product of other social forms or processes.

It is

ideological for the political economists; it is a social
construction for the phenomenologists.
THE GRAMMARS IN THE SCHEME OF THINGS
How can political-economic and phenomenological
grammars be understood in terms of the macro/micro
continuum presented in the previous chapter?

The

political economists (Estes, 1979; Olson, 1982; Myles,
1984) would judge it as representing bourgeois society,
based on a reification of individualism, in "the spirit
of capitalism."

As current gerontological theory would

have it, the aged, as such, are a social problem (rather
than having problems created by society) and have
98
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innumerable troubles.

Given this assumption, common

theoretical practice has been to investigate the
immediate conditions that might serve to maximize or
minimize the troubles, conditions like level of activity,
role loss, social isolation, and social support.
Depending on the state of these conditions, their impact
on adjustment and life satisfaction varies.

When the

conditions that affect the life satisfaction or
adjustment of elders are located, solutions to
dissatisfaction and unadjustment are thought to be
evident.

The solutions lie in the alteration of

immediate conditions, for example, reactivating withdrawn
elders.
The political economists have been critical of the
"individualistic" thinking in gerontological theory.
Olson (1982:15), for example, writes that all preceding
formal theories of aging--from activity to disengagement,
developmental, socio-environmental and age
stratification--are individualistic and, in her words,
"represent attempts to explain existing conditions in
terms of individual adjustment."

They are what she calls

either "free-market conservative" or "liberal
accommodationist" views of the relationship of the state
to its constituency.

The argument is reflexive in

recognizing that the theories are more than alternative
formal explanations for the so-called "facts" of aging;
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their political undertones serve to marshall select
facts.

Through research practice, they virtually work to

establish certain facts which, upon inspection, confirm
an implicit but alienating production process.
The social phenomenologists (Gubrium and Buckholdt,
1977; Hochschild, 1975; Starr, 1982-1983) would see the
entire continuum as a construction.

They would "bracket"

it in order to investigate the reality of its components.
The concern here is with the social production of
individuality and individual adjustment.

While focused

on the question of age and aging as a lifespan concern,
Gubrium and Buckholdt (1977) have been concerned with the
nature of age as such and how it can be described.

In

examining what is conventionally understood as the life
course and its varied stages, they describe the practical
discourse by which interested members produce a sense of
age andjor aging, in the data available to them, about
select persons in and about service institutions.

Age is

treated as a product of experience, rather than as a
resource by which to examine it.

Likewise, age-related

concepts are considered, not in terms of how they
represent their objects, but in terms of how they assign
meaning to them.
The social phenomenologists have criticized theories
of the aging process for taking the existential status of
age for granted.

While all the theories in the continuum
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look at variations in the meaning of age and age behavior
along, for example, historical, cohort, and exchange
lines, the variations are accepted as background factors
or forces operating upon the aged (what I have referred
to as the independent variable).

As such, the

interpretation of the so-called forces and their
transformation, in the ongoing practice of everyday life,
is ignored.

The metatheoretical feature of the argument

is that the language of age has an intentional quality
(Schutz, 1980), such that its use serves to construct a
reality for subsequent observation.

Being set,

background factors andjor the conduct of elderly persons
themselves, as studied by gerontologists, tends to
reproduce the existing relationships envisioned.

Glossed

over is a concern for how age, agedness, and age-related
"facts" are produced and reproduced in the first place--a
concern for facticity over "facts" as such (Raffel,
1979) .
Making use of a similar argument, Hochschild (1975)
takes up the issue of reality-production by focusing
specifically on disengagement theory.

She presents both

a theoretical and empirical critique of cumming and
Henry's (1961) argument.

Hochschild's epistemological

concern, however, centers on proposing a clarification of
vaguely-defined concepts for disengagement theory, rather
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than developing it into a full-fledged critique of the
intentional quality of the theory.
AGENCY
Political Economy
The political economists focus on the role of the
state in shaping the social and economic conditions of
American society and, in particular, of the elderly as a
group.

This turns them away from the problems of old

people as largely lying, according to gerontological
theorists, in "their private troubles" and toward the
political economy of growing older.

To apply Mills'

(1959) language further, attention is largely centered on
(1) the public issue of age and, less importantly, on (2)
the relationship between public issues and private
troubles.

Political economists tend to treat private

troubles as direct distillations of public issues, as if
individuals automatically realize in their personal
experiences what is defined at large.
The sources of private troubles such as social
isolation and role loss in old age, for political
economists, is found in the relations between the state
and the economy.

Marxists give signal governance to the

economy; Weberians provide for relatively independent
state influence in social relations.

Estes (1979) and,

in a more analytic fashion, Olson (1982), reflect an
economic emphasis.

They argue that the "facts" of aging,
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in a capitalist society, are part and parcel of the work
requirements of a labor market controlled by the needs of
industrial development, the state being but a handmaiden
of capitalist interests.

Myles (1984), on the other

hand, has recently argued for greater state autonomy.

In

effect, the former analysis centers primarily on the
social relations of production or economic sphere, while
the latter gives greater credence to the interplay of
both the economic and political realm.

Both analyses,

however, while differing in emphasis placed on state
"protection" versus the dictates of the marketplace,
agree that the primary source of concern is the social,
political, and economic conditions of American society
and its effect on the elderly.

I will consider the

Marxian argument first and then discuss Myles' Weberian
"amendments."
In her book aptly entitled, The Aging Enterprise,
Estes (1979:2) argues that aging, in American society,
must be understood as a business:
In using the term aging enterprise, I hope to call
particular attention to how the aged are often
processed and treated as a commodity in our society
and to the fact that the age-segregated policies
that fuel the aging enterprise are socially divisive
'solutions' that single out, stigmatize, and isolate
the aged from the rest of society.
Olson (1982) carries the message further, focally arguing
that the aging experience cannot be understood separate
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from its relation to the mode of production.

What she

calls "a radical theory of the state" sees:
the origins and persistence of age-related problems
as inherent in the normal functioning of American
capitalism. Capitalist imperatives for unfettered
capital accumulation and maximization of profits are
inextricably linked with a ceaseless drive for
growth; increasing concentration of private market
activities; increasing socialization of production
costs with profits appropriated privately; rising
structural unemployment; cyclical economic crises;
significant and growing inequalities in income,
wealth, and power; and production for profit at the
expense of satisfying human needs . . . . the
government is committed not only to the values of
private ownership and private profits but also to
the necessity of economic and social inequality.
These factors profoundly affect the distribution of
benefits and deprivations among the population,
including older people (1982:21).
The government, then, rather than serving the needs of
the masses, caters to the capitalist class, wherein "the
primary role of the state has been to buttress capital
accumulation and private profits" (Olson, 1982:21-22).
Both Estes (1979) and Olson (1982) present various
examples of "the aging enterprise" in operation.
Consider, for example, the Older American's Act of 1965
(OAA), which was informed by a logic of aging not far
removed from that of contemporary gerontological theory.
While OAA had the ideal of establishing the independence
and well-being of the elderly, its welfare-oriented
articulation further transformed the elderly into a
state-dependent class, a welfare class.
(1979:30) states:

As Estes
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The symbolic aspects of the goals of the Older
Americans Act reassure the public that somehow the
aged are being cared for, while policy is
simultaneously constructed so that its material
impact will not disrupt the ongoing functioning or
power arrangements within society.
The program saw the solution of the problems of aging, in
application, largely in local planning for the
coordination of fragmented recreation-like programs.

For

example, rather than make the elderly economically
solvent, the strategy was to keep them happy in the
confines of places like senior centers.

Rather than make

them independent, individual managers of their affairs,
their very sustenance became bound to a system of
dependence, perhaps best symbolized by nutrition programs
(hot meals and meals-on-wheels programs).

Such programs,

Estes (1979:22) asserts, "ignore the widespread poverty
of the aged and provide no direct economic relief.
Instead the aged become consumers of services that simply
feed the expanding service economy."
What Estes and Olson are arguing is that, upon close
inspection, such policies, rather than presenting a
burden to a capitalist society in the form of a drain of
surplus values, generate considerable economic expansion,
all presumably in the "service" of elders.

The army of

experts, professionals, and service providers that have
arisen to dole out benefits of various kinds to the elder
population have expanded the service sector of the
American economy.

A tremendously complex welfare
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bureaucracy that both controls and presumably benefits
elders also provides an ever-expanding job market for the
young.

The control comes with the credentialing of job

holders (Collins, 1979).

The process results in a large

discrepancy, on income grounds alone, when comparing the
income of bureaucrats servicing the elders with the
income of the elders serviced.

In effect, the political

economy of aging serves those who serve the state more
than it serves those who are troubled by its conditions.
Another example of the state support of those who
benefit in the political economy of aging is the health
care system.

The medical welfare bureaucracy, in payment

for services to largely self-controlled providers of
health care like physicians, hospitals, and nursing
homes, is a state-supported means of perpetuating the
private troulbes of the elderly (Estes, 1979; Olson,
1982).

The economic support that the elderly receive is

just enough to keep them alive and not enough to
alleviate their extreme dependence and poverty, as a
result of the minimal benefits.

Instead, the health care

system produces and expands the panorama of health
problems said to be in need of care, which futher expands
the market for the services of health care providers.
effect, the politics of health care feed on the very
target of its presumed concern (Alford, 1975) .

And all

of this is periodically publicized as a problem of

In
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critical

prop~ions

said to be a current "crisis" in the

care-needs of the elderly (Edelman, 1977).

The process

both stimatizes the elderly and serves the interests of
those who control the state, namely, capitalists.
The issue of state control is seen differently by
Myles'

(1984) more recent argument on public pensions

(see also Quadagno, 1984).

Rather than simply

representing the whims of the marketplace, he views the
current status of the state as incorporating a democratic
notion as well--what he (1984:4) calls, "the two main
pillars upon which . . . [modern Western]

. . . societies

are built: a capitalist economy and a democratic polity."
The dialectic makes up what Myles calls "the liberal
democratic state," consisting of the two contradictory
principles, one basing rights on the ownership of
property and the other on persons as citizens.

The

liberal state professes the principle of "to each
according to his or her contributions" (1984:32),
depicted in policies that adhere to the standards of the
marketplace (that commodity labor).

The democratic state

professes the opposite principle, "to each according to
his or her needs" (1984:32), in which a person's needs
are advocated (decommodifying labor).

Both principles,

embedded in the current structure of the state, are
involved in the determination and implimentation of
social policies for the aged.

As such, rather than
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having programs that simply feed on capitalist
expansionist interests, as Estes and Olson would have it,
such programs also entail requirements providing for
certain basic needs.
social Phenomenology
The social phenomenologists center their attention
on membership in various communities of discourse as the
agent accomplishing life in general and, in this case,
old age.

Borrowing primarily from the works of Schutz

(1962; 1964; 1967) and Garfinkel (1967), Gubrium and
Buckholdt (1977) treat age, agedness, and other age
categories as rhetorical/negotiated features of the
occasions for the interpretation of such experiences.
Members are treated as articulating the realities and
categories considered to be immediately at stake.

As the

authors (1977:viii) explain:
Age-related expectations are created by members of
society as they interact with one another on varied
occasions. They share ideas about what is real and
what is false, practical theories about age and
behavior in relation to themselves and others. As a
collection of people who deal with each other in the
affairs of everyday life, they talk about growth,
age, maturity, regression, and the like.
The
meaning of age is presented and negotiated from
moment to moment as people participate in sometimes
elusive but serious conversation. Through
statements like "act your age," "look how grown-up
he is," and "you're too old for that kind of work,"
people invoke life course expectations and thus make
age. When they are convincing, a life may seem to
cycle. When they are not, a life seems problematic
until a proper definition of age is secured.
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From this approach, the positivistic concern with
objectivity is eclipsed by a theoretical interest in
facticity, the latter being the process by which objects
gain objective quality.

Gubrium and Buckholdt (1977:35)

argue that the objects of human life are without inherent
meaning; yet, they have experiential reality:

"Whatever

is real about the social world is located in the talk and
work that members do to constitute it."

By setting aside

belief in the reality of objects as things separate from
the language used to describe them, facts of aging are
assigned and located in the use of age-related language.
In this respect, such age-related expectations and facts
as "growing old," "maturity," "human development,"
"stages," and "life crises" come to life in their
assertion, invocation, realization, and utility.
The analysis focuses on the organization of
discourse, the reality of age lying in talk itself.

As

the authors (1977:34) state:
Using this frame of reference, when members refer to
such things as a 'stage' of life that they have or
have not reached, we treat the stages as features of
their talk--not some place or entity at which they
have arrived or may arrive. What members consider
to be their talk about life and living, we treat as
talk of them.
As such, rather than asking how developmental stages
organize one's experiences, Gubrium and Buckholdt turn
this around and ask how persons make use of developmental
explanations and justifications for how they treat each
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other.

It is not as if talk has no concrete objects but,

rather, the concreteness of things reveal objects to
speakers only by, and through, their meaningful
relationship to them--something which is an outcome of
the reality-defining labor of practicioners of everyday
life.

The key here is that discourse is to be understood

as discourse-in-use, a matter of practice.

Theirs is a

social phenomenological understanding of the language of
age.
Discursive organizations and transformations are
linked with a spectrum of possibilities associated with
stocks of knowledge and limitations in horizons of
meaning, what Schutz (1970:237) calls one's "world within
common reach."

Worlds are, in effect, typifications of

human conduct, providing meaning to objects in everyday
life as well as organizing experiences.

They are not

understood as concretely isolatable and aggregatable, but
as diffusely linked and socially emergent constructed
types.

Indeed, a given world of discursive understanding

is not a place, a container of facts, but rather is
productive of facts as such, any location conceivably
organizing myriad worlds.
Being an artifact of its accomplishment, worlds of
everyday life are treated as process.

As such, the world

one belongs to does not make as much sense as which world
is being accomplished for all practical purposes, each
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accordingly organizing different experiences of conduct.
The analytic concern becomes one of how certain times and
places come to be treated as the locations for the
application of certain interpretive rules in the
accomplishment of conduct--the production of a given
world of understanding being described in its time and
place, the same place being productive of other worlds on
other occasions.

Consider how Gubrium and Buckholdt

(1977:46-47) describe membership in this regard:
Our use of the term member . . . connotes a sense of
the world as comprising those who, in the course of
their action, belong together at times and at other
times not. . . . Being members of some meaningful
occasion, people speak a common ordinary language
that references the same taken-for-granted
realities; they take the same natural attitude
toward things. To be a member of a collection of
people gathered somewhere for some purpose is to
proceed, together with other members, to use the
same tacit rules and understandings (for example,
glossing practices) to "put on" that place.
The authors' sense of the world as an occasioned,
member-relevant condition of interpretation, is akin to
Garfinkel's (1967) "background expectancies."

The

approach to the issue of agency is discursive and
practical.

The agent is not

Q

person or some structure;

rather, it is both a sense of the source of conditions as
well as the rules and typifications used to produce the
sense.

112
TIMING
Political Economy
The political economists link their concern with
timing to widespread social and historical change, in
effect, the history of the state.

The precise pattern

the process takes varies somewhat, however, among the
proponents of the approach.

While Estes (1979) does not

deal directly with history per se and, as such, does not
significantly develop an analysis of social change, her
approach, in general, is comparable to Olson's (1982).
This being the case, I discuss Olson's (1982) and, in
turn, Myles'

(1984) implicit patterns of change

concerning the social, political, and economic
relationship of the state and the elderly.
Following Marx, Olson (1982) places the relationship
between the state and its constituency within the context
of the history and structure of the social relations of
production.

The history of capitalist relations of

production (ownersjcapitalists versus
workers/proletariat), within the framework of Marx's
writings (see Bottomore, 1956), is such that they are
represented by at least two stages of development.

Marx

traces the roots of mid-nineteenth century capitalism to
the emergence of market opportunities in combination with
the availability of freed labor in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.

Early competitive capitalists took
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advantage of new markets, inventions, and technical
developments (not necessarily in that order) in
establishing new means of production, more or less free
of ongoing traditions of obligation--all aimed at
maximizing profit and the further expansion of capital
(Edwards et al., 1973).

Combined with a growing pool of

labor expropriated from agrarian relations by such events
as land enclosure movements and declining agricultural
markets, this sets the relational scene for further
development of the capitalist system.

Thus, a variety of

forces bring together two potential classes, one in need
of labor and one in need of wages.

With the expansion of

the capitalist system, the relations of production are
crystalized and universalized.

Consider how Olson

(1982:27) describes the plight of the elderly in this
regard:
deep transformations in the American economy and
civil society, fostered by industrial leaders to
meet their own needs and supported by growing
national state activities on behalf of capital, have
had pernicious effects on the elderly. The rise of
monopoly capitalism was accompanied by a steady
proletarianization and de-skilling of the work
force.
These changes, along with other corporate
and governmental practices intended to enhance
private accumulation and profits as well as to
control and motivate workers, generated increasing
unemployment, forced retirement, economic
dependency, and poverty among older people.
Olson's (1982) sense of timing regarding the ongoing
class relationship is abrupt and disconnected, though not
transformational.

The process is one of continual
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conflict, involving periodic "crises" between opposed
interest-related groups.

As she (1982:3) states,

"'Crisis' situations affecting the aged and the
institutions serving them have erupted intermittently
since the 1930s.

During the last several decades these

have occurred with increased frequency and intensity."
The author's analysis depicts tension not only between
the state and old age problems, but concrete kinds of
confrontations where things "come to a head," so to
speak.

(Marx would see this as a struggle between the

"relations" and "forces" of production.)

While clashes

between classes do occur, they are resolved, for the most
part, in a manner favoring capitalist development.
Consider, for example, the Social Security Act of
1935.

Presumably, the benefits of this program were

directed toward the interests of old people.

As a worker

ages and becomes less and less efficient, his capacity to
contribute to industrial production decreases, or so it
is argued.

There must be, then, a systematic means for

retiring unproductive workers from the labor force (ala
disengagement theory).

Yet, it would be undesirable to

produce a whole class of disenfranchised members of
society.

Thus, the social order presumably should

provide some means of security for this problem.
Olson (1982), in contrast, argues that the history
of social security is the history of the ideological
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usages of the alleged incapacities of the aged to feed
the expansionist production needs of industrial
capitalism.

It is a means of reserving a pool of labor

that efficiently services capitalist production.

It is

also a means of placating an increasingly restive labor
pool that comes with downturns in economic cycles.

The

author (Olson, 1982:44) explains:
The underlying concern of the Social Security Act
was to control the turbulent masses who, in response
to widespread unemployment, mortgage foreclosures,
depletion of savings, and destitution, were raiding
local relief agencies, mobilizing rent riots,
participating in Communist-led marches, and
organizing violent protests . . . . As growing
numbers of people began to question the legitimacy
of existing institutional structures, a clear threat
to monopoly capitalism and the political system
materialized. . . . To promote stability and restore
confidence in the system, the Social Security Act
aimed at mitigating economic insecurity among
selected factors of the working class.
As Olson describes, the years prior to the passing
of the act were years of depression in this country, with
high unemployment.

One way to alleviate unemployment was

to reduce the demand on available jobs, to systematically
but "fairly" ease a portion of the labor force out of it.
The origin of social security, as such, was not so much a
compassionate interest in the security of the aged, as it
was a means of dealing with unemployment, by making the
jobs that existed available to the young while placating
the poverty of the retirees.

Social security was a big

enough crumb to reap the gratitude of an economically and
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systematically disenfranchised segment of the labor
market.
While Olson (1982) sees time in terms of "crises"
encounters, Myles (1984) presents an evolutionary
pattern, in a more Weberian analysis.
treatment of history.

Consider Myles'

Although he writes of a similar

process that took place as Olson (1982), his analysis
takes on a more subdued tone.

Rather than continued

conflict, the author sees a system of compromises, a sort
of "give and take," at work.

His dialectical view of the

relation between the state and economy, what he calls a
"marriage between a protective state and a capitalist
economy" (Myles, 1984:30), entails an accomodation
process between owners (capitalists) and citizens
(workers).

This was due to an historical process

"fraught with conflict and struggle," whereby citizenship
achieved certain concessions, which resulted in the "two
opposing doctrines [being] subsumed within a single
structure, thereby producing the internal tension which
provided the source of its own evolution and
transformation" (Myles, 1984:30).
It is important to note that Myles'

(1984)

evolutionary sense of time is not "evolution in time"
(compare Cowgill, 1972) but, rather, an "achieved" time,
as it were.

The process involves institutional kinds of

accomodations, over time, where things gradually "get
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worked out."

The evolution of social security, thus, was

a continual struggle of compromises between the two
principles of distribution--a protective state and a
capitalist economy.

As the author (1984:37-38)

describes:
Since the state was not subject to the discipline of
the market, state pensions for the elderly could
potentially be organized along guidelines other than
those derived from the market. The state, however,
was and is, subject to the discipline of the
political process. Hence market criteria were
frequently abandoned as politics required. What
politics required in a formally democratic polity
was that from time to time the claims of citizenship
and the principle of need be acknowledged.
Social Phenomenology
The social phenomenologists treat time, itself, as a
social construction.

It is an assignment, a means of

describing the time-related features of personal human
conduct.

Gubrium and Buckholdt (1977:vii) "do not assume

that life inherently cycles in some ordered or
progressive fashion."

Rather, they argue that aging,

growth, maturity and other developmental "facts" of life
are products of the application of a linear, mechanical
and temporal mode of interpretation to the diverse,
concrete and practical experiences of the everyday
laborers of human affairs.

Following this, the authors

argue that the use of developmentally-informed theorizing
or related forms of gerontological thinking, in their
concrete application, produce the facts of aging that,
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ironically, upon their inspection, reveal them to the
observer (a process of "objectification").

As they

(1977:8-9) state:
The important questions are not how people respond
to life change or proceed through stages, but how
they negotiate and generate the reality and meaning
of change, stages, and development; how they come to
have a sense of them as things separate from
themselves . . . and how they subsequently respond
to them as real things.
In this regard, consider, for example, Gubrium and
Buckholdt's (1977:187-91) analysis of Kimmel's
developmental mode of description, in his book Adulthood
and Aging (1974).

Kimmel asked his respondents a series

of questions about life in terms of a clock-time metaphor
(see Hendricks and Hendricks, 1976), which he illustrates

in several vignettes.

Respondents were asked about life

changes, particular stages, and what Kimmel refers to as
"milestones."

It was not uncommon for respondents to

raise a number of questions and make a variety of
comments that suggest they were answering
developmentally-framed questions in terms of particular
interpretations.

Questions posed to respondents tacitly

become, for the respondent, a "question-for-me."

This is

evident when the respondent asked how he should answer
the question in relation to specific conditions in his
life, how he felt in this or that situation, and with
what period of time or time frame he should organize his
response.

When Kimmel's intended sense of some aspect of
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life was accepted by a respondent, the respondent
formulated a response.

A few declared that they had not,

or did not think of their lives in a certain way, yet
went on trying to do so at Kimmel's behest.
For Gubrium and Buckholdt, Kimmel's respondents were
not simply reporting the developmental facts of their
lives, but were doing so within the substantive purview
of what they took to be the author's requests.

Being

tied into a clock-time chronology, once produced--being
on the respondent's mind as it were--the metaphor
"reasonably" organized experiences accordingly.

Kimmel's

questions, in effect, seemed to be as much a part of his
data as was the content of his respondents' lives.

From

the social phenomenological approach, then, developmental
discourse is not just a vehicle for symbolically
representing realities; its usage in the practical
activities of everyday life--whether inside or outside of
the interview situation--is concretely productive of the
realities.
In a similar fashion, Gubrium and Buckholdt's (1977)
analysis of the discourse of service providers, in
formally organized settings, reveals that the language of
aging, in its application, concretely produces and, with
institutionalization, reproduces a widespread mode of
description.

Being formally organized in application,

the discourse, while "artful" (Garfinkel, 1967) to a
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degree in its interpretive flux in respect to the
interpretation of particular events, nonetheless
homogenizes conduct into conventional images of
experience--typically being longitudinal, linear,
progressive and mechanical.
The authors present evidence of another vision of
experiential interpretation, one that is at the center of
practice but, for that reason, perhaps too obvious to
notice.

Their data reveal worlds upon worlds of time

construction, time reversibility, time multiplicity and
their complications.

In line with this argument, Gubrium

and Lynott (1983) have challenged one of the central
"facts'' of concern to gerontologists, the life
satisfaction of elders.

Investigating the language of a

variety of life satisfaction measures, analyzed
thematically, it is suggested that to ask elders to
represent their lives in a chronologically linear fashion
is to ask respondents to interpret their life experiences
accordingly.

To the extent they do so, they produce a

developmental understanding of their experiences.
Taking from Garfinkel (1967), the authors ask what
the facts are of life satisfaction on the occasion of its
measurement.

Life satisfaction researchers have taken

the interview situation to be neutral, virtually
nonsocial.

But, do respondents consider it likewise?

For them, it is a situation that, by request and

121
acquiescence, calls out an interview-appropriate set of
interpretations of their experiences.

Thus, that world

produces a display of respondents' total life in its own
fashion.

But, other occasions, too, serve to display

members' total lives, but in their own ways.

The

authors' use of ethnographic data reveals the occasioned
and constructed features of life satisfactions,
presenting us with a multifaceted view of the aging
experience.
In this regard, consider, for example, Frankfather's
(1977) study of "looping" by down-and-out elders in urban
environments, where agedness, descrepitude, and
competency change their meanings as the elders enter into
encounters with members or representatives of various
types of organizations (worlds of understanding) .

The

author shows that as an elder loops from, say, a
community residence, to encounters with the police,
medical hospitalization, mental hospitalization, nursing
home residence, and deinstitutionalization, his life
fluctuates among many senses of what it is and has been.
Life comes to be a set of "multiple and contradicting
interpretations of the same 'facts'" (Frankfather,
1977:15).

Being satisfied with life may, as well, be a

feature of which world is at stake in a given encounter.
What Gubrium and Lynott (1983) are arguing is that,
one feels old or not, behaves elderly or not, feels

122

satisfied with life or not, depending upon the background
expectancies or relevant worlds serving to interpret the
aging experience.

Though not described by the authors,

consider an episode cited by Matthews, drawn from her
study, The Social World of Old Women (1979), where shifts
in encounters typify worlds of experience.

Matthews

describes how many of her respondents stated that they
felt old, or older than they otherwise would, whenever
they were in new situations.

The elderly women reported

that, in their initial encounters with other persons,
much of their interaction centered on the clues given off
by their appearances to such things as their typical
feelings, their typical attitudes toward things, their
typical lifestyle, and their typical capacities and
incapacities.

As Schutz (1944) might have it, strangers

have recourse to nothing but appearances as a means for
initially organizing their responses to the older women
(or anyone else, for that matter).

Reasonably, the

personal typification, culturally signified by gray hair
and an elderly stature, made the elderly women feel old.
This continued until other relevancies besides appearance
entered into the interaction.

As Gubrium and Buckholdt

(1977:65) state, "Once an occurrence has been redefined
as typically something other than previously believed,
again, in a flash, another whole world is generated."
Unfortunately, many episodes or encounters of everyday
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urban life are not lengthy enough to permit much beyond
the typifications signaled by appearances to enter into
interaction (Karp, Stone, and Yoels, 1977).

Thus older

women, in the context of encounters with strangers who
typify appearances accordingly, felt old among strangers.
In time, such a world for defining age may or may not
shift as a condition for interpreting and organizing
behavior.
What the phenomenological approach suggests is that,
to the extent a form of discourse becomes
institutionalized (becomes the organizing principle of a
variety of formal activities), objects become systematic
productions and reproductions of their application to
human affairs.

Yet, at the same time, worlds upon worlds

can also be generated whereby all kinds of seemingly
contradictory and inconsistent opinions could be
entertained which, all in their proper perspectives
(worlds), may seem perfectly reasonable.

The analysis

reveals the contextual and productive quality of worlds
of discourse that serves to make the object described
reasonable in any number of ways.

As such, time is as

stable and fixed or as fluid and changing as are ongoing
concerns with it.
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RESPONSIBILITY
In this section, I examine the sense of
responsibility following the respective grammars'
positions on agency and timing.
Political Economy
The political economists argue that to understand
the problems of the elderly, one should attend to the
political and economic conditions surrounding them.

This

stands in stark contrast to the notion that the aged have
problems which they are virtually blamed for--blaming the
victim.

The solution, for the latter, is for the elderly

to "do something about it" or, as actually happened, for
an army of experts to help them with the task.

To coin a

sixties-like phrase, the army "makes war on aging."

But,

the political economists maintain that "Older persons
individually are powerless to alter their social status
and condition" (Estes, 1979:15), positing that it is the
structure of society itself that has created the problem
of old age.

Just as its proponents differ in their

assessment of the source of the problem, so, too, they
differ in where responsibility is to be placed.

For

Estes (1979) and Olson (1982), it is the class structure
per se; for Myles (1984), it is the class structure and
the political arena.

I consider each in turn.

Estes (1979) and, more forcefully, Olson (1982),
argue that, as an ongoing condition of daily life, the
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class structure and its social relationships prevent the
majority of its members from enjoying a variety of
opportunities or advantages.

The rewards of a capitalist

society, aligned with the relations, do not represent the
relative contributions to the system of production.

It

is, on the other hand, in someone's interest to see
economic equality and inequality as as structure of
rewards, and thereby legitimize the ongoing relations of
production.

As such, the authors contend that, given the

current political economic system, the solution to the
problem of aging can only be a matter of patchwork.

The

system, after all, serves the interests of those who
control it.

Therefore, when problems arise, the issue of

control is glossed over by the concern for the management
of the problem.

The structural source of the problem is

ignored and replaced by less threatening causal arguments
(cf. Chapter 2).

It is in this sense that much current

gerontological theory serves the state, is an apology for
the status quo, and justifies the social organization of
"help."

As Estes (1979:225) remarks:

Underlying many such approaches has been an implicit
value bias toward social policies and programs that
would enhance the social activity and life
satisfaction of the aged, with far less attention
being given to the economic, political, and social
conditions that largely determine the quality of
their lives.
Estes (1979) and Olson (1982) offer a more radical
policy, one that involves "progressive changes that move
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society in the direction of democratic socialism" (Olson,
1982:228).

To accomplish this end, to "dismantle the

aging experience," necessitates a change in economic
structure, to a political economy not centered on the
maximization of individual interests but on the maximal
benefit of all.
Myles (1984) places responsibility for the current
situation of the elderly on both the economy and the
polity.

In this respect, policy is not a matter of

radical state and structural change but, rather, is an
evolving empirical problematic.

As the author (1984:119)

states, "whether it is possible to achieve a full-fledged
social democracy and the total realization of citizenship
that it entails is a question that can only be answered
by the future."

What Myles (1984) is arguing is that, in

the ongoing evolutionary relationship between the economy
and politics, many solutions are possible.

It is,

however, conceivable (while for now, unlikely) for the
elderly to achieve a much desired effect.

Indeed, Myles

(1984:120) ascertains that "If the citizenship principle
continues to evolve, the 'elderly' are likely to slowly
disappear as a distinctive status group in a larger
society."

Whatever the future holds, for better or

worse, it is the class and the political system that
enter into the particular evolutionary path of age
relations.
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social Phenomenology
The social phenomenologists do not deal with the
issue of responsibility, other than its social
attribution.

The reason is that, while the approach

generates important data about the process of social
production, at the same time, it tends to ignore its
structure.

That is, it tends to leave off its analysis

when the human products of the process have been
produced, considering the product not as a configuration
of social conditions independent and perhaps confronting
members but, rather, in terms of its resources and
production and reproduction--a concern for structuration
rather than structure as such (Giddens, 1976).

To treat

the human contingencies of confrontation--where
practitioners of everyday life come face to face with the
products of their labors--would necessitate a more
concrete vision of objects or social forms than the
social phenomenological treatment.
One sees, then, that while the political economists
and social phenomenologists are at rather opposite poles
in their form of analysis, they both nonetheless change
the focus of attention away from attempting to explain
individual aging, to addressing social conditions.

The

political economists address them in terms of the impact
on, say, an impoverished collectivity of elders, of their
relative relations to the mode of production and how
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class dynamics produce poverty.

(Note that the

modernization approach links mode of production (not
class dynamics] on the one hand, to age status, on the
other.)

The social phenomenologists entertain both the

social and individual conditions of aging as constructs
organized by prevailing stocks of knowledge.

In both

cases, the central focus of the alternate approaches
presented in Chapter 2--the individual's success at
aging--disappears and is replaced by age as a social
form, either as a social class or category.

PART II
PATHOLOGICAL AGING

CHAPTER 4
NORMAL AGING VERSUS DISEASE:

THE QUESTION OF AGENCY

Turning to the Alzheimer's disease experience, one
finds an entirely new grammar for defining the old age
problem, one founded in a medical construal of growing
older.

Rather than, as in the first part of the

dissertation, viewing the old age problem as a by-product
of normal individual or social sources in later life, the
old age problem here is treated as an abnormality.

Not

normal aging, the old age problem, in principle, can be
cured.

Furthermore, as "pathology", the old age problem

has medical sources, degenerative timing, and
nonvolitional accountability--medical specifications of
the questions of agency, timing, and responsibility.

In

this chapter, I focus on the question of agency regarding
the distinction between normal aging and disease.
Chapters 5 and 6 consider the questions of timing and
responsibility, respectively.
Alzheimer's disease was first described in 1907 by a
German physician named Alois Alzheimer.

It did not

emerge as an old age grammar, however, until the 1960s
and 1970s.

Before then, the disease was believed to

chiefly affect those under the age of sixty-five and, as
130
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such, was referred to as "presenile dementia."

As for

old age ("senile dementia"), itself, the common
understanding was that it resulted from arteriosclerosis
or "hardening of the arteries," a view which, as Reisberg
(1981:12) notes, is still prevalent today:
The popular image is of blood vessels which become
progressively narrowed from fatty deposits. As the
vessels of the brain become strangulated and
sclerosed, less and less blood is able to reach the
brain and provide the nourishment necessary for
optimal functioning.
Behavioral deterioration is
thought to result from these circulatory changes.
First, a person may begin to forget things.
Later,
the lack of blood and oxygen may cause the person to
become entirely demented. Often the narrowing of
the blood vessels is thought to result in strokes
and, ultimately, in death.
Dramatic evidence to the contrary came in the 1960s
from a group of pathologists and psychiatrists in
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England (Blessed, Tomlinson, and
Roth, 1968; Tomlinson, Blessed, and Roth, 1968; 1970).
Having compared the autopsies of fifty demented aged
persons with twenty-eight nondemented elderly used as
controls, the researchers reported that arteriosclerotic
changes accounted for much less dementia than was
thought, a much greater percentage (over 50 percent)
attributed to certain histopathological changes
indicative of Alzheimer's.
The findings, along with results from pathological
studies conducted at the Einstein College of Medicine in
New York (Terry and Wisniewski, 1975; Terry, 1978),
suggested that Alzheimer's was not limited to its
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presenile form (as interpreted by Alois Alzheimer in
research on a fifty-one-year-old patient), but was a
dementia of old age as well.

As Reisberg (1981:15) puts

it:
Hence, 'Alzheimer's disease' is now thought to be
the same condition whether it occurs in a fortyfive-year-old person or a ninety-five-year-old
person. The underlying pathology and the disease
process, so far as is known, is the same, regardless
of the age of onset.
The new disease classification has resulted in
considerable confusion over the terminology of
Alzheimer's (see Reisburg, 1983:3-5).

Because the term

"dementia" is primarily a clinical disorder, originating
from many types of organic lesions, one of them being the
neuropathologic changes associated with Alzheimer's, the
phrase "senile dementia of the Alzheimer type" (SDAT) is
frequently used to distinguish the disease.
Alzheimer's is considered to be both an organic and
a behavioral disease, the former characterized by
neurofibrillary tangles and senile plaques in the brain,
the latter by memory loss and confusion.

While the

brain/behavior markers ostensibly make for a disease
entity separate and distinct from aging in general, the
distinction is by no means straightforward.

All existing

evidence, from neuropathological to psychological, can be
and is garnered on behalf of both.

Indeed, as published

transcripts of medical conferences on Alzheimer's disease
show, the fundamental factual tension of the disease is
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its nosological (categorical) status in respect to the
"normal" aging process.

As will be shown in this

chapter, conference proceedings display direct evidence
of the interpretive work involved in sorting out what the
realities at stake--disease versus normal aging--are to
be.

It is being argued that it is not the facts per se

that serve the distinction, but how the facts are put to
use or socially constructed.
Alzheimer's can be devastating for the victim and
the caregiver.

Yet, what is the devastation to be?

The

devastation of premature or advanced aging--something
which is believed to be normal--or the product of a
disease agent?

The issue is not whether people suffer,

but to what suffering is to be assigned.

Biological

sources of the suffering is considered first, the
behavioral sources second.
THE BIOLOGICAL SOURCE:

READING NEUROPATHOLOGY

The neuropathological markers of Alzheimer's are
revealed by light and electron microscopy.

They include

neurofibrillary tangles and senile plaques as well as
granulovacuolar and other bodies.

Severe cerebral

atrophy (shrinkage) is also present, but does not serve
differential diagnosis.

Neurofibrillary tangles are the

organic hallmark of the disease.
19) describes:

As Reisberg (1981:17-
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The most important and characteristic change is the
appearance of unusual quantities of neurofibrils in
certain areas of the brain. These neurofibrils have
a characteristic shape and size. In Alzheimer's
disease they are found predominantly in the cerebral
cortex. They are found in particularly large
concentration in the hippocampus, which is the part
of the brain thought to be associated with shortterm memory, and especially in the pyramidal cells
of the hippocampus . . . .
The neurofibrillary tangles .
consist of
pairs of filaments wrapped around each other in a
helical fashion. . . . [They) are also known as
paired helical filaments (PHFs) because of their
unique configuration, [and] have been found only in
human beings, [and] are encountered in certain human
conditions apart from Alzheimer's disease.
Reisberg goes on to describe the two other
histopathological changes characteristic of the disease:
Classical senile or neuritic plaques, as they are
also called, consist of an amyloid core surrounded
by degenerative neuronal processes and reactive
nonneuronal cells. The degenerative neuron
processes are known to consist almost entirely of
axonal terminals or perterminals. In the region of
these degenerative neuronal processes, and to a
lessor extent in the dendrites and synaptic endings
outside the plaque area, one encounters the PHFs
(1981:24).
And the author continues:
The third characteristic pathological change in the
brains of patients with Alzheimer's disease is
"granulovacoular degeneration." This is really a
descriptive term for certain changes which appear
inside cells. Specifically, the interior of a cell
undergoing this form of degeneration becomes crowded
with fluid-filled "vacuoles" as well as with
granular material • . . • An increased concentration
of granulovacoular degeneration [is found] in
certain areas of the hippocampus (1981:35).
Yet, there is clear evidence of the same organic
bodies in the brains of normal elderly persons, leading
some researchers to be cautious about the disease
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implication.

The researchers point out that the changes

commonly associated with Alzheimer's, as opposed to the
normal aging process, are the basis for a quantitative,
not a qualitative distinction.

As Terry (1978:12),

expressing his reluctance to make the disease
distinction, explains:
It is usually argued that there are clear
differences, and that senility is a disease while
normality in this sense is the absence of disease.
This writer, however, is less than convinced on this
point. . . . Plaques and tangles are present in area
H2 of the hippocampus of the elderly normal and the
SDAT specimens. This is true ofthe great majority
of aging normal people. The difference here is
clearly a quantitative one, since large numbers of
these lesions elsewhere (H1) in the hippocampus and
the neocortex correlate quite closely with the
presence of dementia. Even the chemical changes do
not present qualitative differences between elderly
normals and dements.
Given such evidence, Terry and Wisniewski (1977:3)
conclude:
One cannot help but wonder, then, whether we should
consider that a pattern of continuous changes
characterizes the passage from normalcy to that
dreadful extreme, senile dementia.
The nosological tension often gets repeated in
descriptions of the neuro-organicity of Alzheimer's
disease.

For example, in Reisberg's account of the

characteristic changes associated with Alzheimer's quoted
earlier, the author (1981:35-36) also takes note of its
age-related features:
Each of these pathological hallmarks
(neurofibrillary tangles, senile plaques, and
granulovacuolar degeneration], individually, is
positively associated with progressive idiopathic

136
(senile) dementia in man. Each of these pathologic
hallmarks is also seen increasingly frequently in
many nondemented aged individuals.
Moreover, Tomlinson, Blessed, and Roth (1968:355), in
their pioneering work, assert that:
Finally it is clear that great caution is
needed in the interpretation of 'senile' changes of
the kind described in the pathological investigation
of any disease in old age, since, provided they fall
within the range described they are likely merely to
reflect the age of the patient.
In effect, what is tacitly being said, but at the same
time glossed over, is that the neuropathological markers
of Alzheimer's can be the organic hallmark both of a
disease and of advanced (normal) old age.
Other researchers, however, are inclined to
interpret the facts differently.

Katzman, for example,

in a discussion following a conference paper presented by
Terry and Wisniewski (1975), entitled "Pathology and
Pathogenesis of Dementia," takes issue with Terry's
quantitative interpretation.

Quoting from the

transcription:
DR. KATZMAN: I did want to emphasize the one major
difference in outlook between Dr. Terry and myself
in regard to the relationship of normal aging to
Alzheimer's disease. I have become convinced that
Alzheimer's disease is a disease and not simply an
acceleration of normal aging. There are, to be
sure, pathological changes which are identical in
the two. However, the distribution of these changes
differs, that is, they are primarily in the temporal
lobe and hippocampus in the nondemented patients.
Tomlinson has reported that if you look at the
cortex of demented and nondemented patients, there
is clearly almost no overlap in the number and
incidence of both plaques and tangles in the two
population groups (Fields, 1975:147).

137

Unlike Terry, who is reluctant to distinguish the disease
qualitatively from what is called "normal aging," Katzman
sees the distribution of neuropathological changes in the
brains of demented and nondemented persons as great
enough to merit a disease distinction, a category in and
of itself, not merely an extreme version of the aging
process.
Whether the observables are taken to be a disease
entity or advanced old age, their reality-status is not
obtainable by a mere detection of the "facts" at hand.
Rather, the question becomes one of how the facts are to
be interpreted.

As Terry's and Katzman's statements

show, facts "do not speak for themselves" but, rather,
are spoken for.

As such, they become facts-for-us,

description being as much a part of the data as
representative of it.
While the age-related features of the organicity of
Alzheimer's disease underpins a continuing controversy
among medical researchers as to what exactly it is they
are dealing with, in the final analysis, even among the
skeptics, the disease definition prevails.

Still, given

the problematics concerning the neurological basis for
clearly differentiating ostensibly diseased from normal
elders, how the conceptualization of an abnormal entity
is arrived at is not a simple and straightforward
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process, but rather often involves considerable
interpretive discretion.
Published transcripts of edited discussions
following paper presentations at medical conferences
display the social and interpretive work that enters into
discourse, a process of framing in terms of a disease
grammar or framed in terms of aging.

Consider, for

example, an excerpt (Katzman, Terry, and Bick, 1978:265266) taken from part of the proceedings of a 1977
conference on Alzheimer's disease, senile dementia, and
related disorders.

The conference was co-sponsored by

the National Institute of Neurological and Communicative
Disorders and strokes, the National Institute on Aging,
and the National Institute of Mental Health:
DR. SOKOLOFF: Are these plaque formations part of
the normal aging process or part of the disease?
DR. ROTH:

Statistically they are normal.

DR. TERRY: All normal people have a few, but I
think that we are working at this from the wrong
end. We still have to prove that the plaque and the
tangle are more than simply labels, that they are
causal. They are associated with disease, but we
haven't proved that they cause the disease.
DR. GRUFFERMAN:
In the absence of dementia,
wouldn't you hesitate to diagnose the living patient
as having Alzheimer's or senile dementia just on the
histologic diagnosis?
DR. TERRY: No.
If you gave us an opportunity to do
the histology tests, I certainly wouldn't hesitate
for a moment.
DR. SOKOLOFF: Then you would call a lot of normal
people demented.
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DR. TERRY: No, because we are not counting plaques
or tangles in the hippocampus. If you give me a
good biopsy, we can be quite accurate on the basis
of histology.
DR. SCHEINBERG: The question was whether this is a
natural aging process or a disease process.
DR. SOKOLOFF: If it is due to normal aging, we
certainly are not going to cure aging.
DR. TERRY: Childbirth is a natural process, and
physicians have had an ameliorating effect on it.
There is no point in our arguing about this business
as to whether it is a disease or normal.
It is a
process that diminishes the well-being of the
public, and if we can have an effect on it, we
should do so and not worry about whether it is
normal or a disease.
DR. SOKOLOFF: In what age groups do you see this?
Do you see it in infants who died?
DR. TERRY:

No.

DR. ROTH: Whether it is pathological or normal
aging does not influence the desire to control the
phenomenon if it is correlated with intellectual
impairment and, at its extreme, with gross
intellectual impairment.
DR. SOKOLOFF: It may be correlated with a process
about which I can do absolutely nothing.
DR. ROTH:

You can't assume that in advance.

DR. SOKOLOFF:

We don't know that it isn't.

DR. ROTH: What is the purpose of deciding that in
advance of investigating?
DR. SOKOLOFF: That brings us back to the last
question.
Is it a disease or is it normal aging?
DR. ROTH:
disease?

Would you accept senile dementia as a

DR. SOKOLOFF:

Yes.

DR. ROTH: If you accept senile dementia as a
disease, then the existing evidence, such as it is,
shows that it is merely an extreme variant of what
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you find in the brains of perfectly well-preserved
people who go to their graves with plaques in their
brains, nobody being any the wiser. If it is an
extreme variant of that sort, there may be hope of
influencing the factors that potentiate that change,
and there are many factors which do: pernicious
anemia, hyperthyroidism, head injury, and perhaps
serious cardiac failure. If you accept that this is
so, then we are justified in investigating the
conditions under which the accumulation keeps you
this side of the threshold.
In the excerpt, the issue arises of how to define
the neuro-organic observables under consideration.
Initially, the researchers engage in what might be called
a "philosophical agenda," concern focusing on what the
objects seen before their very eyes are to be considered.
Here caution is exercised over the evidence pertaining to
an underlying disease structure.

As Terry notes, "We

still have to prove that the plaque and the tangle are
more than simply labels, that they are causal" (Katzman,
Terry, and Bick, 1978:265).

Immediately following this,

however, the "philosophical" concern is glossed over and
the conversation shifts to a more "procedural agenda," as
the issue of diagnosing the disease is raised.

This

leaves a pathological interpretation intact, with
empirical discovery the primary issue.
The shift from caution over the disease's
existential status to disease as such is not just
accidental but involves getting on with the task at hand,
the reality-status of the observables being intricately
tied to a desire to intervene in the matter.

It is,
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after all, as Terry states, "a process that diminishes
the well-being of the public."

Terry's remarks depict a

certain impatience with dwelling on the epistemology of
'

the observables.

Rather than debate the issue of what it

is, he asserts that the concern should be one of doing
something about it, it being a distinct thing about which
something can be done.
For these pathologists, doing something about it
involves attempting to locate the cause or causes of a
disease (a medical agent), treating its symptoms, and
eventually finding a way to prevent the problem.

The

concern is with locating abnormality and disease in
patients, not variations of normality in aging persons.
Interest in intervention implies a disease entity,
disease being something that can be detected and cured,
as opposed to aging per se, a natural process of
inevitable human variation to be accepted and cared for,
not medically eliminated.

Sokoloff's later remark that

"It may be correlated with a process about which I can do
absolutely nothing" shows that for his purposes, as a
neuropathologist, to do something about it, it must be a
disease, not normal aging--reiterating his earlier
comments that they "certainly are not going to cure
aging."

Here again, the procedural agenda overshadows

the philosophical issue, shown in Roth's "scientific"
response to Sokoloff that the matter will only be solved
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empirically, by further investigation where, eventually,
the facts will hopefully speak for themselves.
The philosophical issue over whether the observables
depict a disease entity or aging itself is dismissed as
the neuropathologists shift concern to investigating and
ameliorating its devastating effects.

As such, the

question of what it is, is revealed in the practical and
useful purposes it can serve, such as destroying the
menace that "dims bright minds" and which "makes shells
of former selves," two familiar slogans.
The sense of urgency to intervene is repeatedly
expressed by all those involved with the problem, a
problem which, if not concertedly dealt with, will pose
an even more serious threat to society in the future.
Consider, for example, Hughes' (n.d.:10) alarm in this
regard:
By the year 2030 more than a third of the country's
population will be over the age of 65 and a huge
number will be subject to Alzheimer's disease. It
is estimated that at this time approximately 10% of
those over age 65 may have the disease, and if this
percentage continues, then a large absolute number
will need to be cared for in nursing homes and in a
very expensive manner by the year 2030. Aside from
needs that individual families have now, the country
as a whole has a considerable stake in working with
this disease process and making it amenable to
modern medical treatment.
Aronson (1982:7) presents in more detail the devastating
financial costs of the disease:
For society, the dollar cost has not been determined
accurately. Sixty percent of all patients in
nursing homes carry some diagnosis of dementing
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illness. Thus, if one were to take 60% of the
current $25 billion long term care bill, dementing
illness would appear to cost $15 billion per year.
However, more dementia victims--even very
deteriorated patients--reside in the community than
in nursing homes and other institutions, so this is
a vast underestimate. A figure used by Drachman
(1982) is $20,000 per patient, which would yield an
estimate of $60 billion per year. Thus, whatever
the actual amount, the cost to society is
staggering. And with a demographic projection of a
large increase in the elderly population by the year
2000, there will be a proportionate increase in the
number of demented individuals. Thus, dementing
illness is a major and fast-growing medical and
social problem which impinges on all gerontologic
practice.
Framed in terms of a disease grammar, the
demographic projection warns of the expected increases in
diseased persons.

At the same time, the relationship to

age itself is glossed over.

Indeed, the costs to society

and the alarm it generates makes those concerned flatly
state that, "Alzheimer's disease is not a normal
consequence of aging," as the following illustrates:
Alzheimer's disease is a surprisingly common
disorder that destroys certain vital cells of the
brain. It produces intellectual disability (senile
dementia) in more than 50 percent of all persons
admitted to nursing homes. Consequently, over 1.5
million American adults are affected at a cost of an
estimated 20 billion dollars annually. This
incidence and cost are many fold higher than those
associated with multiple sclerosis, cystic fibrosis,
or most of the better known lethal diseases of man.
In fact, Alzheimer's disease is the fourth most
common cause of death in the United States. One
family out of three will see one of their parents
succumb to this disease. In some cases a familial
predisposition to the disease will occur and whole
generations will be affected. Alzheimer's disease
is not a normal consequence of aging (Glenner,
1982:59 (emphasis added]).
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As a distinct disease entity, it is reasonable to
entertain the hope that one day it can be exposed,
treated, and even eliminated.

This has led to much

research being conducted into the possible cause for the
neuropathological changes associated with Alzheimer's
disease (see Katzman, Terry, and Bick, 1978; Katzman,
1983; Reisberg, 1983).

Such factors as environmental

toxins and trace metals (especially aluminum), viroids
(e.g., a slow virus), and genetics have been suggested as
ultimate causes.
Evidence linking aluminum accumulation in the brain
come from studies of animals, such as cats and rabbits,
who showed progressive dementia and neurofibrillary
degeneration after being injected with aluminum salts
(Klatzo, Wisniewski, and Streicher, 1965; Crapper,
Karlick, and De Boni, 1978).

Yet, the evidence is

inconclusive (Terry and Pena, 1965; Wisniewski, Sturman,
and Shek, 1980).

Studies done on humans also have

supported the aluminum theory, showing higher levels of
aluminum in autopsied Alzheimer's patients than in agematched controls (Crapper, Krishnan, and Dalton, 1973a;
1973b; Crapper, Krishnan, and Quittkat, 1976; Trapp et
al., 1978).

Other researchers, however, found no

significant differences in this regard (McDermott et al.,
1977; McDermott et al., 1979; Markesbury et al., 1981).
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As the Report of the Secretary's Task Force on
Alzheimer's Disease further notes:
The role of aluminum . . . is far from clear, since
those with the greatest exposure to aluminum, such
as aluminum workers and individuals on renal
analysis, do not develop neurofibrillary tangles nor
Alzheimer's disease. Scientists are still uncertain
as to how aluminum actually gains access to the
brain. The etiological role of environmental toxins
in the pathogenesis of Alzheimer's disease remains
unproven and controversial (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 1984:13).
Likewise, the role that viroids and genetics play is
inconclusive.

While there is data suggesting a

connection between slow viruses and Alzheimer's (see
Salazar et al., 1983), attention has also been called to
the fact that "as yet there is no direct evidence that
slow, latent, masked, hidden, incomplete, or defective
viruses are involved in any of the progressive
degenerative changes usually associated with senescence"
(Gibbs and Gajkusek, 1978:559).

As for genetics, some

findings have been produced linking families of early
onset victims to increased susceptability (Heston et al.,
1981); the same study, however, found that late onset
victims (70 years or over) present no greater threat in
this regard.

In addition, in their review of the

literature, Matsuyama and Jarvik (1982:20-21) report:
There are 11 family studies and one twin study in
the world literature concerned with familial
incidence of Alzheimer Disease or Senile Dementia of
the Alzheimer Type. Increased familial incidence
has been found but no clear genetic etiology
established (emphasis added).
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In the final analysis, the testimony and debate of
those concerned suggest that the grammar of Alzheimer's
disease is inextricably tied to the way the "facts" are
interpreted.

The very biological facts of aging

regarding dementia can be either normal features of the
aging brain or indicative of disease.

The line

distinguishing them is, as it was shown, a
"philosophical" choice.

Dismissing the philosophical and

turning to facts as disease facts serves to secure the
gaze of the concerned, from philosophical confrontation
to empirical.
THE BEHAVIORAL SOURCE:

READING DEMENTIA

Alzheimer's disease is recognized to be a behavioral
entity as well as an organic illness, a brain/behavior
condition.

The neuro-organicity of the disease--marked

by neurofibrillary tangles, senile plaques, and
granulovacoular degeneration--has its correlate in
dementia, a diffuse cognitive and intellectual impairment
(Tomlinson, 1977; Wells, 1978).

The characteristic

symptoms include memory loss and confusion, as well as
conditions such as lack of judgment, disorientation, and
agitation.

A typical clinical portrait of the disease is

as follows:
The behavioral hallmark of Alzheimer's disease seems
to be memory loss, especially for recent events.
But many other behavioral changes are caused by the
illness. In its early stages, Alzheimer's disease
can lead to inability to concentrate, anxiety,
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irritability, agitation, withdrawal, or petulance.
Later, the Alzheimer's patient may lose the ability
to calculate, may exhibit lack of judgment, may
become disoriented as to time and place, may be
unable to understand jokes or cartoons. Some
persons with Alzheimer's disease tend to wander
about and lose their way; some become prone to
temper tantrums; some are depressed; some forget the
names of friends and neighbors, or forget words, or
forget how to make change. . . . the timing and
sequence of lost function varies from patient to
patient . . . . Occasionally, though not always,
Alzheimer's patients become incontinent in the final
months of life (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 1980b:2-3).
As the preceding extract shows, there is frequent
use of indefinite terms like "can," "may," "some," and
"occasionally" in describing the behavior of Alzheimer's
disease patients.

Such usage is found wherever

descriptions of the stages and symptoms of the disease
appear.

This includes not only the texts and talk of

medical researchers, but personal documents and
conversations of caregivers, ADRDA newsletters, and the
many pamphlets and handbooks that explain the disease and
its management.

The use of indefinite terms allows for

the full range of conditions to be characteristic of the
disease.

It makes quite a difference, for example, to

state that some Alzheimer's patients manifest withdrawal
or petulance and others do not, rather than that
Alzheimer's patients manifest withdrawal and
nonwithdrawal or petulance and nonpetulance.
is reasonable, the second contradictory.

The first
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The use of indefinite terms is also prevalent in
descriptions of the problems in activities of daily
living (ADLs) that Alzheimer's patients experience.

Some

of the impairments in ADLs commonly used to illustrate
cognitive deficiency were presented in the preceding
clinical portrait of the disease, such as forgetting
names or how to make change.

Other typical dysfunctions

include the inability to use a checkbook, forgetting to
turn off the oven, misplacing things, inability to
control bodily functions and loss of enthusiasm, among a
host of problems which could be considered to be ADLs,
such as problems of sleep, exercise, personal hygiene,
speech, self-esteem, traveling, and so on.

The list of

impairments could, conceivably, run the entire gamut of
everyday behaviors, elaborating the disease grammar to
include whatever problems of daily living that may occur
among the elderly.

As such, the use of indefinite terms

provide remarkable flexibility in the selection of
typical disease characteristics, allowing for the variety
of experiential behaviors of old age to be underpinned by
a single disease entity.
Many of those whose job is to service victims of the
disease are well aware of the "umbrella" problem.
Consider, for example, the following remarks made by a
geriatric clinical specialist in nursing at the day
hospital studied:
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There's already a lot of controversy. Like even
between the neurologists and the regular doctors.
Neurologists kind of like to hedge around. They're
not too sure about Alzheimer's but regular doctors
. • . well it's cut and dry for most of them, like a
recipe. That's the way they approach it. You've
got these symptoms, so it means such-and-such a
disease. Never mind the way the symptoms show up
against the family background or how they present
themselves at home. They're doctors after all! And
they know what symptoms mean!
It's too bad when you
see so much evidence that it's not that simple,
especially in a real shady area like memory loss,
confusion, and all the other behavioral things.
It's not all their fault either because the whole
system is set up so that it just can't handle all
that uncertainty about symptoms. It's like they've
got to mean something if they're symptoms. So you
have this category called "Alzheimer's" and you find
people to fit it, sometimes, I think, too well.
The "shady area" the nurse cautions against reflects
the well recognized observation that some sort of memory
loss occurs in all aging persons.

The question then

becomes a matter of where to draw the line between what
is considered normal versus pathological decline.

Kral

(1978) does make a distinction between the two, one that
is widely shared in the medical community.

With respect

to "normal" memory loss in old age, Kral (1978:47-48) has
coined the term "benign senescent forgetfulness" which,
as the author states:
can be found in aged people who are not suffering
from Alzheimer's disease or other types of dementing
process. Psychometric tests have demonstrated a
lowering of memory scores in all aging individuals
compared with young adults. Although the
correlation between chronological age and memory
loss is, on the whole, paralleled by the results of
the memory tests, there is a remarkably wide range
in scores achieved by the individual subjects within
the unselected quinquennial subgroups. Although
this could be explained by the initial individual
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variability of the memory function of the subjects,
one has also to consider the possibility that
qualitatively different types of memory impairment
might be hidden behind the quantitative differences
in memory scores.
Kral chooses to interpret the "individual
variability" of memory loss in old age as qualitatively
distinct "types" of decline, not as a process involving
"more or less of the same thing," so to speak.

The

author also describes the two types of memory loss which,
as he puts it, "might be hidden behind the quantitative
differences."

In contrast to the "amnestic syndrome"

associated with Alzheimer's, "characterized by shortened
retention time, an inability of the subject to recall
events of the recent past, and an inability to recall not
only relatively unimportant facts of an experience but
the experience itself," Kral portrays the second type
(benign senescent forgetfulness) as follows:
the second type of senescent memory dysfunction is
characterized by the inability of the subject to
recall relatively unimportant data and parts of an
experience (e.g., a name, a place, or a data),
whereas the experience of which the forgotten data
form a part can be recalled. However, the same data
not recalled on one occasion may be retrieved at
another time. The 'forgotten' data seem to belong
to the remote rather than the recent past. Also the
subjects are aware of their shortcomings and try to
compensate by circumlocution and they may apologize
• . • . it was proposed to term this type of
senescent memory dysfunction 'benign' in contrast to
the 'malignant' type, the amnestic syndrome
(1978:48).

Kral's use of the term "benign" and "malignant"
clearly show his preference for a disease distinction to

151
categorically separate pathology from the aging process
in general.

They are, in effect, two separate things.

One (benign) does not just become the other (malignant),
either prematurely or in advanced old age; instead, one
contracts, is stricken by, falls victim to, or is struck
down with the latter.
As with different interpretations regarding the
meaning of the neuro-organic markers of the disease,
different clinical realities are separated and assigned
meaning.

While some, such as Katzman (Katzman, Terry,

and Bick, 1978:44; Fisk, 1979:29; Katzman and Karasu,
1975:110-111; Fields, 1975:147), maintain that the two
processes (symptom versus benign characteristics of
aging) are indeed separate, others, like Terry (Katzman,
Terry, and Bick, 1978:12; Terry and Wisniewski,
1975:135), see the process differently, as the following
comments illustrate:
I would cautiously disagree in regard to the socalled benign memory loss. I can't help but wonder
whether there is only a quantitative rather than a
qualitative difference between that change and the
dementia [Alzheimer's disease] in which we are
interested today (Terry and Wisniewski, 1975:135).
Most medical practitioners, on the other hand, are
not as concerned with the debate over the nosological
problem of whether or not Alzheimer's is considered a
disease entity separate and distinct from aging (either
on organic or behavioral grounds), as they are with
"successfully" accomplishing what Katzman (1982:8) calls
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"the complex problem of diagnosis."

For most, the

disease status is largely taken for granted.

As one

physician at the day hospital flatly put it, referring to
Alzheimer's, "It's definitely a disease.

It's certainly

not a part of the normal aging process."

Still, a good

deal of effort enters into the process of interpreting
the diverse and related experiences presented by patients
and family members as either Alzheimer's or not.

The

diagnosis is based primarily on clinical evidence.

As

Katzman (1982:8) explains:
In many areas of medicine, diagnosis may be
accomplished by a single blood test, a special
radiological procedure, endoscopy, or other specific
investigations. The diagnosis of dementia and of
Alzheimer's Disease remain, however, in the domain
of the clinician and requires a comprehensive
workup.
A "comprehensive workup" involves a number of
different procedures, summarized by Kaufman (1982:2) as
follows:
WORKUP OF A DEMENTED PATIENT
ALL PATIENTS

USE
SELECTIVELY

1.

History from patient
and relative

1.

EEG

2.

Mental status examination

2.

Drug levels

3.

Physical examination with
vital signs

3.

Toxic screen

4.

Neurological examination

4.

Brain scan

5.

CAT scan

5.

Lumbar puncture
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6.

Thyroid functions, serum B,
and folic acid

7.

CXR, EKG

8.

CBC, UA, VORL & FTA, glucose,
BUN, ca, albumin, electrolytes,
alkaline phosphatase, ESR

The workup is performed to rule out diseases other
than Alzheimer's.

While said to account for fifty to

sixty percent of all persons suffering from a progressive
dementia (Katzman, 1982), Alzheimer's is diagnostically a
disease of exclusion.

It differs from fifty or so other

pathological conditions that may behaviorally mimic it.
Among them are such degenerative diseases as
Hallervorden-Spatz and Parkinson's disease, a number of
metabolic disorders including the liver and parathyroid
glands as well as hypoglycemia, uremia and Cushing's
syndrome, vitamin deficiencies, drug reactions, brain
tumors, subdural hematoma, infections of various kinds,
normal pressure hydrocephalus, depression, and multiinfarct dementia (Haase, 1977).

The CAT scan (computer

assisted tomography) can be used to identify many of the
reversible andjor treatable conditions which present as
dementia such as brain tumors, subdural hematomas, and
normal pressure hydrocephalus.

The instrument cannot,

however, detect the neuropathologic lesions
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(neurofibrillary tangles and senile plaques)
characteristic of Alzheimer's disease.

As such, it is

repeatedly noted that only upon autopsy can a definitive
diagnostic conclusion be drawn.

ostensibly, post-mortem

neuropathological data, as revealed by the quantity and
distribution of plaques and tangles in the brain, will
either confirm or disconfirm a clinical diagnosis.
(This, however, is debated by those medical researchers
who see the Alzheimer'sjnormal aging distinction in
quantitative rather than qualitative terms--see Katzman,
Terry, and Bick, 1978:267).
The differential diagnosis of Alzheimer's, as such,
lies in both further ruling out other causes of dementia
and, in so doing, attempting to "get at" the disease.
Two pathological conditions that are especially difficult
to distinguish from Alzheimer's are multi-infarct
dementia and depression.

The cognitive and intellectual

impairment found in multi-infarct dementia (hardening of
the arteries), the second most frequent cause of dementia
in the aged, is similar to that of Alzheimer's.
Moreover, it has been estimated that the two disorders
occur together in approximately twelve percent of elders
with a progressive dementia (Katzman, 1982).

Yet, as

Hachinski (1983:188) points out, "Clinical evaluation
remains the single most important means of distinguishing
AD from multi-infarct dementia."

Whereas Alzheimer's
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presents as a slow, progressive condition, multi-infarct
dementia is frequently abrupt in onset with a stepwise
course of progress, and with focal neurological signs.
Hachinski (1978) has devised what he calls an "ischemic
score," composed of the above criteria, which is commonly
cited as a useful means of differentiating between the
two conditions.
Depression, or what is often called "pseudodementia"
(Kiloh, 1961: Wells, 1979), is also at times very
difficult to discriminate from Alzheimer's.

Depression

has not only been shown to mimic dementia to a
considerable degree (McAllister and Price, 1982) but, as
with multi-infarct dementia, can also occur along with
Alzheimer's disease (Wells, 1983).

These complications

have reportedly resulted in several mistaken diagnoses
(Nott and Fleminger, 1975; Ron, Toone, and Garralda,
1979; Liston, 1977).

Wells (1983:194) offers the

following solution in this regard:
The clinician who attacks these problems must do so
largely with the tools of clinical observation;
ancillary diagnostic procedures, though sometimes
helpful, cannot establish the correct diagnosis for
the clinician, and indeed they depend for their
correct interpretation on the clinician. In most
instances, careful attention to details of the
history and clinical observation will lead the
physician to the correct diagnosis.
What Wells is suggesting is that the use of
diagnostic aids will not yield the "true" condition of a
patient.

His is a useful caution against the common-
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practice of uncritically relying on mental status
examinations or questionnaires (see, for example,
Pfeiffer, 1975)

~o

diagnose Alzheimer's.

Wells points

out that while these tests provide measures of cognitive
impairment, that alone is inadequate in diagnosing a
brain/behavior condition such as Alzheimer's disease
(Wells, 1983; Wells and Buchanan, 1977).
In the preceding extract, Wells also speaks of the
considerable discretionary powers of the physician.
While Wells provides an understanding of the complexities
of clinical diagnosis, his concern is with providing the
"correct interpretation" in order to get at the "correct
diagnosis," not in impairment construction itself.

He,

like others, does not directly question the vocabulary
and grammar of Alzheimer's disease.
The patient's family, too, is a considerable
resource in the diagnosis of the disease, especially in
regard to the patient's history--what Wells, in the
preceding quote, advocates.

The information they provide

can be quite valuable in determining, for example,
whether the problem behaviors' onset and course was
sudden and stepwise or gradually progressive, the former
signalling multi-infarct dementia, the latter
Alzheimer's.

A family member or relative might also

report that the patient "was always poor at figures" or
"never cared a hoot about politics," challenging the
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results of mental status questionnaires and other
diagnostic procedures.

As one social worker put it, "You

might come across something that looks like extreme
withdrawal but then, if you bothered to ask a family
member, you find out that he's been that way all his life
and all the family considers that normal."
Yet, while the patient's family and friends provide
much needed data, what they report is not necessarily the
same interpretation of the patient's presenting condition
as the physician's andjor other service providers•.

A

physician at the day hospital, for example, commented on
families' conflicting testimony by stating that he felt
"in most cases, the family thinks the patient is worse
than he really is, but you also have the opposite
situation where the family member unconsciously protects
the patient."
The patient's self-presentation also must be
interpreted.

Often, he or she is characterized as still

possessing many social skills (Paulson, 1977) as well as,
among other things, denying the impairment.

As Wells

(1977:3) describes:
[The] lack of awareness and concern for memory loss
in most patients with significant dementia attests
to the effectiveness of the defense mechanisms of
denial.
Early in the process of dementia a variety of
other symptoms may present and may capture the
attention of the patient, his family, and his
physician. Many of these early symptoms of dementia
differ little either qualitatively or quantitatively
from those that occur in normal, healthy individuals
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who are exhausted, anxious, or subject to severe
environmental pressures . . . . Often the patient's
attention centers on various somatic complaints,
previously present or arising de novo, for which no
adequate organic cause can be found and for which
the usual remedies provide no relief. Here only the
physician's acumen prompts him to search beneath the
facade of somatic symptoms for the nidus of the
problem.
At this juncture, the "definition of the situation"
is perhaps most readily apparent, with what the author
calls "the physician's acumen" taking center stage.
While eliminating other pathological conditions at the
same time signals a diagnosis of Alzheimer's, the
physician also faces the task of reading the behaviors
presented before him as dementia rather than "normal" old
age forgetfulness.

In this regard, certain experiences

such as the inability to manage one's finances are more
apt to be cited as a "sign" of the disease.

As Katzman

(1982:8) writes:
The diagnosis of dementia is usually suggested by a
history of forgetfulness, repetitiousness, losing
one's way around; there may be loss of ability to
perform complex tasks on the job--for example, a
radiologist may no longer be able to interpret the
x-ray film. In our society, one of the most
demanding tasks is control of one's own personal
finances and checkbook; deterioration in this
function often heralds the development of a
progressive dementia.
Consider also the following remarks made by a nurse
at the day hospital concerning one of the caregivers who
attended their weekly support group, the adult son of a
demented mother:
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Don't you all think that sam has some dementia. You
visited with him and talked for awhile. He's always
late. You know how he forgets and sneaks in here a
half hour and sometimes an hour late. He comes in
and looks at me and shrugs his shoulders and • . .
like he's saying • • . 'what can I do?' He drives
around and is always running over curbs • . . • You
can't tell me that he couldn't get his income tax
done. I mean he just filed for his 1980 taxes. He
keeps writing in and getting extensions. And of
course, he's late on his '81 taxes too.
I really
think he's got some dementia, don't you?
While select behavioral conditions are more
frequently described in the attempt to "spot" dementia,
there are no simple and "ready-made" solutions which can
be used as automatic diagnostic criteria.
the affair accomplished?

How, then, is

What sort of interpretive rules

are used in defining a presented behavioral trouble or
troubles as pathology as opposed to normal (natural) old
age development?
Consider, in this regard, Katzman's (1982:8)
definition of dementia:
Alzheimer's Disease presents as a dementia, that is,
as a progressive deterioration in intellectual
capacity in an otherwise alert individual. The
deterioration must be sufficient to interfere with
social or occupational performance or both. This
definition of dementia paraphrases that in the Third
Edition of'the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
the American Psychiatric Association. This
definition is welcomed by most physicians since it
marks the agreement by the·psychiatric community to
drop the awkward term 'chronic organic brain
syndrome' for the more specific descriptive term of
'dementia.'
The definition, in effect, provides a working ruleof-thumb for revealing an underlying pathology out of the
diversity of behaviors and conditions a physician
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confronts (see Drachman•s comments in Katzman, 1983:9-10
for a similar definition).

As Katzman puts it, while the

disease presents as a "progressive deterioration in
intellectual capacity in an otherwise alert individual,
[the] deterioration must be sufficient to interfere with
social or occupational performance or both" (emphasis
added).

By the same token, "insufficient" interference

includes those conditions of aging that have their own,
not

incapacitating~

impact on performance, what Kral, in

the earlier quoted extract, refers to as "benign" memory
loss.

As such, Katzman locates the differential

diagnosis in the everyday social competence of the
suspected patient, its particulars being detailed on the
occasions of their consideration.

This, ironically,

brings the clinical picture of the disease experience
back to the tacit disease;normal aging tension.

As with

the use of indefinite terms, evidence is marshalled to
cover a wide-range of old age experiences.

"Sufficient"

deterioration, for example, may show up one way for this
patient, another way for that patient, and take yet
another form for the next, conceivably stretching the
symptomatic grounds of the disease to include troubles as
diverse as advanced old age itself--with all of the
diversely-related particulars collectively representing
each other as a single entity, Alzheimer's disease.
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The nebulous features of the disease are wellrecognized by those who share the experience.

It should

be noted, however, that while many may stand to benefit
or have special interests in the disease distinction,
professionally-concerted deception is not the basis of
its existence.

In fact, as will be shown in Chapter 6, a

rather strong case can be made that it is the ADRDA,
itself, that is at the center of the disease's public
recognition.

Whatever the "hidden" intent, as such, from

medical researchers to service providers and caregivers,
what brings all of them together is their belief and
concrete knowledge that something has gone wrong with
elders of concern to them, that something ostensibly
being Alzheimer's disease.
It is the urgent need and active pursuit to do
something . about the "silent epidemic" that "dims bright
1

minds" that breathes life into the disease's realitydefining existence, something which, at the same time,
however, also creates the tension between it and old age.
Yet, as one nurse at the day hospital, after discussing
the shortcomings of the "medical model," exclaimed,
"They're real problems out there begging for help . .
You can't just sit around and do nothing."

As such, in

getting on with the task at hand, Alzheimer's, as
evidenced by it's brain/behavior markers, is revealed by
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the grammar that articulates what it is surely said to
be:

a disease, not a normal part of aging.

CHAPTER 5
ONSET AND COURSE OF ILLNESS:

THE QUESTION OF TIMING

In this chapter, I turn to the question of timing as
a way of organizing the Alzheimer's disease experience,
the second component of its grammar.

The problematic

that was introduced in the last chapter--the relationship
between the experience as a .. disease structure, on the one
hand, and as a configuration of aging, on the other--is
considered here in terms of the progress of the
experience.

Focusing on onset and course of decline, I

consider how disease as opposed to normal aging
interpretations are applied.
It is argued that a rational vision of timing
organizes the experience to define it as illness,
something which stands in considerable tension with the
variety of symptoms encountered.

While not challenging

the reality status of the disease itself, caregivers and
service providers nonetheless face its highly diverse
presentation in their attempts to understand and deal
with its "troubles."

In this respect, it is further

argued that the vision facilitates the use of formal
assessment procedures for dealing with the feelings and
perceptions of caregivers, the "other victims" of the
163
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disease.

Finally, in conjunction with the latter, the

decision of whether to continue home care or to seek
institutionalization is analyzed.
THE RATIONAL VISION
The first step in the rationalization of the
Alzheimer's disease experience is to give the experience
a name, the effect of which supplies a containable
(categorical) thing to describe.

(The interpretive

challenge posed in this regard was examined in the last
chapter.)

The "fleshing out" of the rational vision, as

it were, produces a well-defined disease chronology, in
principle, one with a relatively clear beginning and a
regular course of progress (Lynott, 1983).

Underpinning

the vision is a sense of a systematic process of decline,
where behavioral changes occur in a more or less
preestablished manner, with associated levels of care
burdens.

The Question of Onset
Consider, first, the course's point of origin.

It

is repeatedly noted in the related popular, promotional,
and professional literature that Alzheimer's disease has
an insidious onset, one that, as Wells (1977:3)•states
"is often dated in retrospect and with imprecision, the
informant being aware that things are seriously amiss at
present but unaware just when things began to move in
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this direction."

The endeavor is further hampered due to

the diagnostic ambiguity of the disease.

As noted in the

preceding chapter, Alzheimer's is a disease of exclusion,
having no known detectable cause.

As such, the task of

isolating dementia presenting as Alzheimer's from the
fifty or more "nonAlzheimer's" dementias that mimic it
must also be dealt with.

The insidious uncertainty of

Alzheimer's disease is well illustrated in the following
example:
Over the period that we worked together . . . I
became gradually aware that the fine edge of his
intellect was becoming dulled. He was less clear in
discussion and less quick to make the jump from a
new piece of evidence to its possible significance.
He spent more time over his work and achieved less;
and he found it increasingly difficult to get his
results ready for publication. He tended also to
become portentous and solemn about his subject, as
though one small corner of knowledge nearly filled
his world, and the wider horizons were narrowing in.
The change was so slow as to be barely perceptible,
and the signs vanished when I tried to pin them
down: they were like those faint stars which are
seen more easily when they are not in the direct
line of vision.
I was left with a feeling of
uneasiness which I could not justify • . . . after a
period of absence, I looked forward with special
pleasure to my homecoming, but when we met I knew
with immediate certainty that I had lost the
companion of my earlier years. The change was as
yet mainly a loss of intellectual clarity and he
remained himself, but a self that was subtly
devitalised. To me it was as though a light had
gone out, but no-one else seemed to notice anything
amiss.
By this time he was worried about his general
health and attended a doctor from time to time with
rather vague symptoms. For several years he had
been said to have low blood-pressure, but nothing
was found wrong apart from this, and he was
reassured (Wells, 1977:3-4).
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Though it may be indicated repeatedly that
Alzheimer's disease has an insidious onset, it is,
nonetheless, considered concrete and factual in people's
lives, not being equally descriptive and constitutive.
It thus becomes reasonable to search for the onset of a
particular patient's problem in order to conclude that it
occurred on this or that date.

While caregivers and

service providers might change their minds or disagree
with one another over the age of onset, the differences
are understood in terms of error, not as reconstructions.
The insidious quality of onset, as such, is the result of
the lack of a means of handily detecting its emergence,
not of a missing origin per se.

The search for onset,

thus, is a reasonable, albeit perhaps difficult, pursuit.
In discussing the preceding quote, for example, Wells
(1977:4) notes how easily the "subtlety of presenting
signs and symptoms . .

. may be overlooked even by a

concerned and qualified observer" (emphasis added).

As

such, while admittedly sometimes hard to detect, the
onset of illness can be located, in principle, in
particular aspects of people's lives, existing at some
"objective" point in time.

The "discovery" of onset as a

discrete and self-contained entity provides a beginning
for the disease chronology.
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The Course of Progress
Consider next the presented course of progress of
the disease.

The course is commonly delineated into

stages, phases, or earlier and later parts, the former
being part of more formal models of decline, the latter,
less so.

The divisions provide rationalized

(systematically organized) general descriptions of a
disease process with a common, developmental complement
of decline.

Consider, for example, Cox's widely quoted

developmental scheme, taken from the July, 1984 issue of
the Cleveland ADRDA Chapter's Newsletter (reprinted from
the Tucson ADRDA Newsletter).

Cox states that his model

is explicitly directed towards "practical considerations
which lead to decisions concerning level of care or
degree of intervention appropriate to any particular
stage."

The stages are then presented as follows:

•

1. The first stage of AD is made only in
retrospect; in other words, it is all of those
little changes in memory, intellect and social
function which had been observed in the early phases
of the disease but really were overlooked or not
thought significant until such time as the patient
was disabled enough to require formal medical
evaluation. Once the diagnosis is established,
then by looking back one can tie in 'all those
little things' with the known diagnosis
and see
how the first stage of AD is subtle indeed in many
cases.
2. Phase two really begins with the establishment
of a clinical diagnosis. The degree of disability
at this point depends largely upon the sensitivity
of the family in terms of seeking medical help . .
stage two goes from the time of diagnosis to the
time of significant incontinence of bowels or
bladder.
(Incontinence is used as the dividing line
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between stage two and stage
an important determinant of
families find it really not
individual with significant
home-setting.)

three because it is such
levels of care that most
feasible to care for an
incontinence in the

3. Stage three goes from the time of the onset of
incontinence to the development of a rather severely
dependent and almost 'vegetative' stage. At this
time, the patient may be totally unable to
communicate, to recognize family or loved ones, to
do any element of self-care and probably will needs
to be bodily lifted from bed-to-chair or bed-totoilet.
4. Stage four is basically the end-stage of the
disease from the development of extreme dependency
and noncommunicativeness until death, this latter
usually caused by either pneumonia (from the
inability to swallow without getting food or fluids,
etc., into the lungs) or urinary tract infection
usually subsequent to chronic bladder
catheterization.
While Cox, wittingly or not, describes the nebulous
and discretionary features of Alzheimer's disease,
especially its earlier manifestations which can be
recognized "only in retrospect," what is clear is that
the concern is with a single entity--Alzheimer's disease
--that is being referenced.

Cox presents its, the

disease's, systematic and progressive course of
development, noting the inexorable process of cognitive
and, eventually, physical debility that takes place.

The

process of decline is linear and sequential, like clock
time (see Hendricks and Hendricks, 1976).

The clock-time

understanding informs service providers' and caregivers'
ongoing attempts to distinguish the early, middle, and
later stages of impairment and its corresponding care
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burdens.

The disease, as such, is structured as a well-

ordered entity to permit intervention.

Yet, following

his stage descriptions denoting the "typical" path the
disease follows, Cox informs the reader of its unordered
and inconstant features, as follows:
The time course through any phase is completely
individual and variable. Whether an individual goes
through all four stages is determined in part by the
age of onset of the disease, by its rapidity of
progression and by the presence or absence of other
significant or serious medical problems which may be
far more important in determining longevity than is
AD.

The homogeneous and straightforward time scheme
depicted in Cox's stage descriptions now becomes
heterogeneous and uncertain, having no set time pattern.
Indeed, the temporal quality of the disease, being
"completely individual" and having no clearcut course of
progress, becomes as diverse as are the varied
experiences characterizing old age.

Once again, this

time in terms of the progress of the presented disease,
the tension between Alzheimer's as a unified and concrete
entity in people's lives and normal age-related troubles
is manifested.
The descriptive tension is not unique to Cox's
presentation but, rather, is depicted across all levels
of concern with the disease experience.

Consider, for

example, Berger's (1980:235) "Severity Rating System," a
six-stage classification scheme pertaining to degree of
functional capacity.

His model is also geared to those
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servicing the disease, especially practicing physicians.
The class ratings follow:
Severity Class I:
can function in any
surroundings, but forgetfulness is often disruptive
of daily activities;
Severity Class II: can function without direction
only in familiar surroundings;
Severity Class III: needs direction to function even
in familiar surroundings but can respond
appropriately to instruction;
severity Class IV: needs assistance to function;
cannot respond to direction alone;
Severity Class V:
remains ambulatory, needs
assistance to function, but cannot communicate
verbally in a meaningful fashion;
Severity Class VI: bedridden or confined to a chair
and responds only to tactile stimuli.
Berger's time scheme, like Cox's, is unilinear and
progressive, both viewing change, either in decline or
increasing burden, as developmental and stage-like.

The

sense of timing in Berger's (1980:235) rating system is
further distinguished by what he calls a "core midpoint," separating "Severity Class III, in which the
patient must be told to pull up his pants (direction),
and Severity Class IV, in which someone has to pull up
his pants for him (assistance)."

Later, however, the

developmental pattern shifts to being nondevelopmental
and irregular, as Berger (1980:235) illustrates:
Moreover, it is not uncommon, particularly before
serious deterioration sets in, for the picture to
vacillate from day to day.
Further, while the
disease remains, the severity is not permanent nor
is it forever progressive. Once the patient feels
secure in his environment, or the superimposed
congestive heart failure has cleared, or the
bronchitis has subsided, the physician, the patient,
and the loved ones may well be rewarded with a
change from Class IV to Class II.
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Here, again, the tension between disease versus
normal aging interpretations is apparent.

What was

earlier described as a well-delineated, progressive time
trajectory is now depicted as erratic and regressive.
While the latter, idiosyncraticjnonrational view, is
suggestive of variations in old age behavior (some
perhaps unpleasant) due to factors such as changes in
environmental or health conditions, for the author, "the
disease remains," as a taken for granted, unified, and
concrete thing, separate from its diverse presentation.
There are still other, more elaborated, formal
models of decline.

One such scheme, presented in the

JunejJuly 1984 issue of the Portland ADRDA Chapter's
Newsletter, describes the "progressive phases of
Alzheimer's disease" along three separate dimensions:
cognitive, personality, and functional changes.

Each

component, itself, contains a detailed list of activities
of daily living to further illustrate a given level of
decline.

The course of progress even specifies timing

along chronological lines.

Yet, while it is stated that

the course of Alzheimer's disease is progressive and the
"symptoms reflect a continuous decline," also noted are
its volatile and shapeless features, where "some symptoms
will overlap," some will "vary in sequence and the rate
at which they progress," and "some may be absent in
individual patients."

Indeed, depending upon such
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factors as age of onset, the condition of one's health,
and availability of support systems, it is stated that
the disease "may last from a few to twenty years," which
comes close to being about as unpredictable and eccentric
as the aging process itself.
There are also less formal models of the disease
course, emphasizing a beginning, middle, and end or
earlier and later aspects.

As with the more elaborate

stage model presentations, a distinct temporal feature of
the disease process is readily apparent--Alzheimer's has
a course that is inexorably degenerative, leading to
eventual institutionalization and death.

Here again,

this form of discourse structures Alzheimer's as a welldefined disease entity, one with a relatively clear
beginning and systematic course of progress.

At the same

time, however, the disease is said to have no coherent
pattern, its timing being as diverse as the aging
experiences it presumably is not.

While less formal

models of timing are found throughout the disease
literature, they share a considerable likeness in wording
and format.

The following example, presented in a

pamphlet published by the

u.s.

Department of Health and

Human Services (1980a), is illustrative.

Consider,

first, the systematic and progressive time element
presented:
At first, the individual experiences only minor and
almost imperceptible symptoms that are often
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attributed to emotional upsets or other physical
illnesses. Gradually, however, the person becomes
more forgetful, particularly about recent events.
The individual may neglect to turn off the oven, may
misplace things, may recheck to see if a task was
done, may take longer to complete a chore that was
previously routine, or may repeat already answered
questions. As the disease progresses, memory loss
increases and other changes, such as confusion,
irritability, restlessness, and agitation, are
likely to appear in personality, mood, and behavior.
Judgment, concentration, orientation, and speech may
eventually render its victims totally incapable of
caring for themselves.
Immediately following, the erratic and highly diverse
symptomatology and course of progress are pointed out:
There are many different patterns in the type,
severity, and sequence of changes in mental and
neurological functioning that result from
Alzheimer's disease. The symptoms are progressive,
but there is great variation in the rate of change
from person to person.
The same cognitive tension concerning the
grammatical status of Alzheimer's also exists in spoken
form.

Service providers and caregivers commonly make

references to a rational understanding of the disease's
course of progress.

For the most part, descriptions of

changes in the disease are casual and incomplete, with
statements such as, "(the patient] is in the later
stages" or "[the patient] is in that early, hard to
detect, stage," without any further description.
Rationalized understandings are most apparent when
Alzheimer's is described as a general entity, typically
referencing stage-like features of the disease.

On other

occasions, however, the disease is portrayed as not
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having a distinct course of progress, because "it all
depends so much on the circumstances and the
personalities involved," and "no two cases are alike,"
again abrogating a disease structure.
Measurement
Another component in the rationalization of the
disease experience is the formal assessment of caregiver
tolerance or "felt burden" (Zarit, Reever, and BachPeterson, 1980) .

With no cure available, the medical and

human service care of the patient is largely custodial,
limited to symptomatic relief and behavioral management.
As one social worker at the day hospital put it, in
describing some of the program's scheduled activities
patients engage in, such as "getting their daily cup of
coffee," "feeding the fish," "playing catch with the
ball," "helping to prepare lunch," or "taking an
afternoon walk:"
I don't think there's any magic about it in terms of
the activities that we do.
It could be done at
home.
I think the big thing is that somebody else
is doing it, which also gives the caregiver a break.
That's a big thing. Another thing is just in terms
of the preprofessional relationships.
I find it
real difficult to tell my dad to brush his teeth.
I
think my dad would find it real difficult to accept
those kinds of things.
I think it makes it easier
to accept those kinds of things being here than
being with their families.
Thus, the primary focus of attention, in terms of
intervention, is the caregiver, who, because of the
patient's mental demise combined with a body that is
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often remarkably fit, faces a "funeral that never ends."
As part of the day hospital's research program,
assessments of caregivers' felt burden were regularly
measured by asking them a series of questions concerning
their personal experiences with their Alzheimer's
patients.

Part of the test format consisted of

completing a "burden interview," comprised of twenty
items drawn from Zarit, Reever, and Bach-Peterson's
(1980) 29-item, self-report inventory.

Caregivers were

asked how they felt about select aspects of their
patient's impairment, rating each of the twerity items for
"burden" on a scale from "not at all" to "extremely."
Following is a sample of the items (see Appendix B for
the complete inventory):
1. Do you feel that your spousejparent makes
requests which you perceive to be over and above
what he/she needs?
2. Do you feel embarrassed over your
spouse'sjparent's behavior?
3. Do you feel guilty about your interactions with
your spouse/parent?
4. Do you feel that your spousejparent currently
affects your relationships with other family members
and friends in a negative way?
5. Do you feel that the present situation with your
spousejparent doesn't allow you as much privacy as
you would like?
In attempting to relate measured burdens to given
levels of decline, service providers are again faced with
a working tension in the disease experience.

The tension
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centers around the attempt to rationally assess burden
and tolerance when the latter are matters of continued
interpretation. (On formal measurement occasions, the
il

formality of thel. questioning, itself, "demands" answers,
more or less definitive ones.

They are demands in the

sense that an answer is desired, a nonanswer being
treated as useless for the most part.

Comparing this

with the flux of answering that caregivers provide and
offer up concerning their level of tolerance on other
occasions show that the measures seem to tap only
crystallized moments of interpretation of the condition
under consideration.
The tension is resolved for the practical purposes
at hand, in this case, for the purpose of collecting
ostensibly precise information about the felt burden of
care.

The information gathered can be used to counsel

family members on how best to cope personally with the
heavy demands of patient care as well as facilitate what
is believed to be the eventual decision to
institutionalize.

For example, when an Alzheimer patient

is considered to be at a certain state of decline,
service providers would then be informed of the related
burdens of care and, depending on their express
assessment, that a family might now seriously or not yet
seriously seek institutionalization.
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The tension between the rational, unitary vision of
the disease course and its relationship to the diverse
experiences of service providers and caregivers with the
Alzheimer patient exists across all levels of concern
with the disease experience.

It was shown, for example,

how the disease's popular, promotional, and professional
literature, in describing the symptoms and course of
progress of the disease, also takes precaution to mention
',

its varied

ind~idual

manifestations and chronology.

I

Likewise, ser\,l"'ice providers and caregivers, whether
i

presenting thei "typical" progress of the disease or
attempting to assess and manage the presumed
corresponding burdens of care, face the same problem,
namely, recognizing temporal unity (a disease structure)
out of the diversely-related experiences.

In the

remainder of this chapter, I show how the working tension
is socially organized, first, by describing the role of
exemplars in the disease experience and, then, by
displaying its socially constructed temporal features.
EXEMPLARS
Part of the process of making sense of the disease
experience involves the use of public exemplars, a means
of transforming private troubles into public
understandings (Mills, 1959).

Celebrities who now have

or had the disease, like Rita Hayworth, Norman Rockwell,
and Edmond O'Brien, together with their caregivers,
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combine with less renowned disease victims and caregivers
to provide a slate of comparable exemplars by which to
evaluate individual impairments.

Rita Hayworth, the

Hollywoood actress, is perhaps the most famous exemplar
of the disease.

Her story, entitled "The Tragedy of Rita

Hayworth," is presented in an article written by Rosemary
Santini and Katherine Barrett (1983) in the popular
magazine Ladies' Home Journal.

The article describes the

onetime "glamorous movie star" as still physically
attractive, a well-dressed older woman with "shoulderlength red hair," and "dark brown eyes."

But she now

stares ahead fixedly, her eyes "clouded and
uncomprehending."

As Rita's daughter, Princess Yasmin

Aga Khan (Santini and Barrett, 1983:84-85), explains:
It's so hard to know what she's feeling, what's
going on inside . . . . I don't know what she can
understand, but there are fleeting moments when I'm
sure that she's at least somewhat aware.
I do know that she needs the security of my
love, that in some way I bring her joy. And I visit
her as often as I can because I need to be there for
her, to tell her I love her, to tell her everything
is all right.
The article goes on to introduce the reader to the
"devastating illness that has slowly been robbing Rita of
her memory, her ability to function and, finally, her
personality":
It is called Alzheimer's Disease, and because
it affects the outer layer of the brain--creating a
chaotic tangle of nerve filaments--a patient's
intellectual ability is eventually destroyed. Other
victim's relatives have likened it to •a slow
death,' a 'funeral that never ends.' Often they
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speak of their afflicted wives or husbands or
parents in the past tense. Like Yasmin, 33, they
describe the agony of not being recognized, or their
feeling that a stranger has inhabited the body of
their loved one (Santini and Barrett, 1983:85).
The course of Rita's disease experience is presented
under two sections entitled "The rumors about Rita" and
"The growing darkness."

Yasmin describes Rita's "stormy"

career, her five turbulent marriages, as well as the
dogged coverage by the press of her alcohol problems and
otherwise "bizarre" behavior.

The article explains:

What no one--not Yasmin, nor even Rita's doctors-knew at the time was that the former movie star was
already gravely ill. Only Rita herself may have
suspected that something was wrong. An introverted
person, she may have been worrying silently for
years about her mind's growing darkness. When an
interviewer asked her about a past she couldn't
remember, or when her extreme mood changes began
costing her longtime friends, she must have been
terrified (Santini and Barrett, 1983:139).
Rita is reported to be in the final stages of the "dread
disease," her insidious onset and "slow, agonizing
changes" having resulted in the "confusion and terror
that still seem to remain after all other emotions and
thoughts and memories have faded away" (Santini and
Barrett, 1983:142).
A portrait of the caregiver as "the other victim" is
also presented.

Resembling her mother, Yasmin is

beautiful, "an extremely attractive woman, a classical
singer who temporarily abandoned her own career a year
ago to devote herself to her mother's care and to the
Alzheimer's Disease and Related Disorders Association"
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(1983:139).

Like the title of the popular caregiver

handbook, The 36-Hour Day, Yasmin's experience informs
the reader of the time-consuming and emotional sacrifices
caring for an Alzheimer patient entails.

As she reports:

This whole thing has been too grueling emotionally
for me to devote my energies to singing . . . . I'll
continue my music later. I don't resent that. This
is a time when my mother's needs come first (Santini
and Barrett, 1983:139).
Yet, demanding as it is, Yasmin at least can afford
round-the-clock care for her mother.

Those less

fortunate, who cannot so readily obtain outside help,
seemingly face an even more difficult caregiving task.
The Rita Hayworth story is a centerpiece for sharing
individual disease experiences, a public mirror for
personal reflection (Gubrium and Lynott, 1985).

It is

relayed in national and ADRDA newsletters and is
frequently reported in the print and the broadcast media.
Indeed, it is often stated that Alzheimer's disease is
"Rita Hayworth's disease," or "what Rita Hayworth has."
While Rita's victimization is the most widely recognized,
there are many other stories that display "what it's
like."
Consider, for example, the portrait of a "typical"
disease experience which first appeared in Barry
Reisberg's (1981) book, Brain Failure, but has since been
reprinted as a caregiver handbook and retitled A Guide to
Alzheimer's Disease.

Reisberg devotes an entire chapter
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to Joe

s.,

a once successful newspaperman who had always

possessed "an enviable memory," and his "loving and
devoted" wife, Ilia.

The author (1983:101) describes

when Ilia, Joe's writing assistant, who "knew his
abilities and style better than anyone," first began to
notice "a change in [his] previously enviable
performance."

Among other things, Joe's "dictations

began to lose their customary flow" and he "seemed to
encounter some difficulty finding exactly the proper word
for what he wished to say."

Reisberg goes on to describe

Joe's course of decline through three separate phases of
the disease, presented as the "forgetfulness phase,"
"confused phase," and "dementia phase."
Early on, Reisberg informs the reader of the pace of
Joe's initial decline, one that was more rapid than
"many" others with the disease; one that had "symptoms
nearly identical" to those same "many" as well.

As the

author (1981:102) states:
Many elderly people who begin to notice
'forgetfulness' symptoms nearly identical to those
observed by Joe and his wife seem to live with these
symptoms for many years without any further decline.
Joe, as we shall see, was not so fortunate.
Reisberg (1981:100-22) chronicles Joe's
deterioration from his initial "distress at his loss of
cognitive facility and his desire to 'do something about
it,'" to "denying the extent of his impairment," to, in
the final phase, "being unable to sit still," engaging in
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"continuous purposeless activity."

And, still later,

Joe's condition is described as getting to a state where
he "would become very angry and shout and verbally attack
people without apparent provocation."

The author

provides an extensive description and cites numerous
examples illustrating Joe's transition from stage to
stage, at the same time, portraying the plight of Ilia,
"the other victim" of the disease.

For example, in

presenting an instance of Joe's condition in stage three,
the author (1981:105) describes:
the intact energy of these dementia-phase patients
is expressed as restlessness and rapidly changing,
seemingly random activities. For example, when Ilia
actually took Joe out onto the street, he
immediately wanted to return home. Dutifully, Ilia
would take him home, whereupon Joe would again
insist upon leaving. Joe was like a man
'possessed,' wanting to do things but not really
knowing what he wanted to do.
Unable to cope with the "36-hour" burden Joe presented,
Ilia eventually had to place him in a nursing home--her
almost daily visits and recurring guilt vividly
displaying a labor of love.
Like Hayworth's, Joe's story presents g model for
interpreting individual experiences.

There are, of

course, other exemplary models of the disease experience.
These include the more well-known cases of caregivers
Bobbie Glaze, ADRDA's national chairperson for program
development, and Jerome Stone, the organization's
President.

There are also visual portraits that
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exemplify the disease experience, including, for example,
the five different victims and their caregivers presented
in the frequently shown videotape Someone I Once Knew.
In their variety, they offer an expanded platform for
interpreting experienced particulars.

There are many

local exemplars, too, whose stories have spread through
the routine borrowing of news and coping items among
ADRDA chapters, reprinted in their newsletters.

Often

without formal authors as such, the portraits further
expand the disease's horizon.

Regardless, though, of how

familiar or of what style, exemplary presentations
provide a considerable chronological resource, typically
describing the disease's onset, diagnosis, course of
progress, the decision to institutionalize, and the
burdens of care while, at the same time too,
communicating a recognizable means of sharing diverselyrelated disease timings.
Finally, there are the ad hoc exemplars that serve
as temporary examples for comparing other patients'
symptoms and courses of progress.

In the day hospital's

support group, for example, caregivers not only shared
their personal burdens of care, but had also interacted
with each other's patients in a weekly social and
recreation program.

Over time, caregivers witnessed

several patients' conditions, enabling them to compare
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firsthand what the mental and physical status of their
own victims is "really like."
All in all, exemplary details collectively represent
the "typical," yet diverse disease chronologies.

The

question of which specific exemplar provides the
semblance of particular cases, however, is not just a
simple matter of matching exemplary onsets and courses of
progress, and their interrelated "task burdens," with
individual experiences with the disease.

As the

following section shows, in practice, the use of
exemplars to display "what it's like" often entails a
considerable amount of negotiation in its accomplishment.
APPLICATION
Having seen that the rational vision of the disease
experience and its illness interpretation does not square
with the highly diverse symptomatology and course of
progress as well as the burdens of care, how, then, is
the tension socially organized?

How is a sense of

temporal unity recognized out of the individual
chronologies?

In application, through the use of

exemplars as well as other disease-related concerns that
enter into the perception of severity, the pattern
becomes as unilinear and systematic or varied and
unpredictable as are disease versus aging discourse.

In

the process, timing becomes an artifact of the work that
all concerned do to assign reasonable courses of progress
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to the disease experience.

I consider first the onset of

the disease, then its course of progress and, finally,
the caregiving burden.
When did it begin?
The arrival of a given date or period of time when
some sort of impairment, typically memory loss, first
occurred is something that does get achieved.

Caregivers

often discuss among themselves the particular years when
problems began to emerge.

It is not unusual, for

example, for a wife to state that her husband's illness
began in the summer of 1977 "when he started forgetting
things," or some such date.

As discussed earlier, the

question of onset is important to caregivers and service
providers because it provides a starting point or
benchmark by which to estimate the changing needs of both
patient and caregiver, in effect, to rationally organize
care and treatment.
While obtained, information about age of onset is
retrospective and is continually sensitive to its current
considerations (Lynott, 1983).

It was not uncommon for

caregivers in the support groups to state that they wish
they had kept a record of events of the course of their
patient's illness, that such a log would have helped them
to better plan how to deal with it.

As one caregiver

remarked, "If only we had kept a diary or something, at
least now we might know where we stand, instead of being
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so confused about it all."

But, at the same time, they

also stated that such a record would have been impossible
to keep since they "usually didn't know what was
happening until much later."

Indeed, caregivers

frequently said that they thought the patient was "just
getting old" with its accompanying limitations until a
diagnosis of Alzheimer's was made.

Only then did they

interpret the patient's problems as disease.
When asked about the onset of their patients•
illness, caregivers indirectly refer to the retrospective
nature of their estimates.

They typically preface their

responses with phrases such as "Now that I think back on
it, I really think it began in •

" or "It's hard to

say but we [family members] were just talking about that
and • . • . "

Others remark that they really don't know

for sure, but, upon being urged to provide a given time
of onset, proceed to reconsider past events in terms of
the request.
Moreover, the times of onset that are provided are
sensitive to ongoing exemplary comparisons.

The exchange

of information and experiences that takes place in
interactions with others and by reading available
literature about the disease provide a slate of exemplars
which serve to inform caregivers' changing accounts about
the onset of their patients' disease.

For example, a

wife who had determined the year 1976 as the age of onset
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of her husband's illness might later learn of an event in
the life of another patient said to manifest the disease,
one that similarly occurred in her husband's life but in
1974, and thus proceeds to reconsider the age of onset of
her husband's illness.

The work of assigning a given

time of onset, as a concrete point in the past, is
reconsidered time and again as exemplars enter into its
chronology.
Consider an example drawn from one of the support
groups studied.

One of the regular participants, Harold,

had a rather definite sense of the onset of Alzheimer's
in his wife Cynthia.

Both in and out of the proceedings,

he said he was certain that Cynthia's disease began about
four years before when she started to forget where she
had placed various items.

Harold said that his wife

began to behave much like a husband who was well-known to
most of the local ADRDA chapter membership.

Cynthia

forgot simple things at first, such as taking off her
wedding ring to wash the dishes and not remembering where
she had done so.

Harold began to suspect that Cynthia's

forgetfulness was worsening, again, "just like" the
exemplary husband.

Later, still resembling the husband,

Cynthia began the typical accusations, blaming Harold for
misplacing her ring, even accusing him of deliberately
hiding things from her.
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Harold's daughter, Martha, would sometimes
participate in the support group.

While the question of

onset was not considered at each meeting, it became a
topic of conversation at one point when both Harold and
Martha were in attendance.

As usual, Harold described

the disease's onset in Cynthia and compared it with the
well-known husband.
disagreed.

Listening, Martha respectfully

She then turned to her father and asked:

Dad, don't you think that it started much earlier
than that? Mike [her brother] and I were talking
about this the other day and I think that Mother had
symptoms at least ten years ago when she was still
working. Remember how she would come home and
complain about how everyone at work was down on her
because of the way she filed things? Remember how
we all blamed it on that woman she worked with, who
we didn't much like anyhow? I really think now that
it's more like the Rita Hayworth thing, like Mother
had it for a long, long time but we just didn't
notice it.
Harold considered the possibility that his daughter, and
his son, might be right.

He stated that he hadn't really

given their interpretation much thought.

Other

.'
careg1vers,
too, addressed the alternative, continuing to
cite various exemplars, more or less popular, in the
negotiation of cynthia's onset.

They did this until, as

on other occasions, the issue of "when it all began" was
settled for the time being.
The process of determining "when it all began" might
again later be redetermined, as it were, as caregivers
take into account service providers' and other
caregivers' ongoing considerations.

Yet, while
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originally a product of retrospective and practical
considerations, the time of onset does, at some point or
another, begin to take on a life of its own, toward which
caregivers subsequently interpret other aspects of their
caregiving experiences.

The assigned beginnings provide

the concrete basis for disease, not normal aging, a
distinction which continues to be problematic in
considering the disease's ensuing course of progress.
Where does it go?
The course of progress of the disease, as earlier
examined, is encountered in two ways.

One way is that

impairment is described as increasingly progressive and
systematic until death.

As informed by the rational

vision, this form of description is most apparent when
caregivers and service providers engage in a
developmental mode of reasoning, referencing stages and
their duration.

Yet, the disease also is said to be

erratic, having no clear course of progress.

The variety

of symptoms among early onset patients is often depicted
to be as great as among all patients.

Likewise, those

who have had the disease for years are described as
"remarkably different."
Consider an example of the tension as it occurred in
one of the support groups studied.

A psychologist

attending the session, in responding to a caregiver's
remark that, while each individual was different, "there
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must also be some general patterns to the disease,"
cautioned about overgeneralization and then proceeded to
describe different stages of the disease from a care
manual she had on hand.

As the psychologist described

the different stages, the others present began to "fill
in" their patient's respective chronologies.

Upon

hearing the characteristics of stage two, for example,
the inquiring caregiver exclaimed, "Fantastic, I can see
Max right there."

Yet, the tension concerning the

disease's "typical" course would soon become focal.
Another caregiver, the middle-aged son of a demented
mother, took issue with the presented characteristics of
stage three--featuring aggression as one of the primary
symptoms--stating that his mother has always been that
way:
I don't want to be disagreeable but my mother's been
aggressive all through this thing.
It's the first
thing we noticed. You all know how easy-going and
considerate she was . . . well, when she started to
bully the family, I think that's when I started to
notice the Alzheimer's. It's been like that from
the very beginning.
Others, too, pointed out related stage difficulties.

One

caregiver, for example, mentioned that her demented
husband had never shown any signs of aggression, that her
main problem was his constant wandering.
When asked to explain the discrepancies, the
psychologist• reminding the caregivers of her earlier
caution about overgeneralization, then explained how
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"each patient's a unique individual that's different from
the rest" and, as such, "has to be evaluated on its own
terms."

While the disease's chronology, of course, would

again become developmentally depicted, rendering
Alzheimer's as a structured entity, the tension was
clearly manifested in its diverse presentation.

How,

then, faced with the dilemma, do those concerned manage
to discuss their "common" disease experience?
There are two significant features of the disease
experience that enable its social chronology to be
accomplished, each discussed in turn.

The first is that

it is never entirely clear just what a given patient's
"actual" course of progress is, impairment being as much
a product of ongoing interpretations and exemplary
comparisons as it is a feature of the disease itself.
What an earlier or later deficit is described to be often
shifts as caregivers and service providers hear the
details of other patients• conditions and care burdens.
Such shifts might even occur several times in the course
of a single support group session as participants share
their patients' functional impairments.
Consider an example as it occurred during one
particular session (Gubrium and Lynott, 1986).

One of

the caregivers, Fern, the middle-aged daughter of a
demented mother, complained about the terrible burden her
mother was getting to be.

Citing the results of mental
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status examinations the patient had recently taken as
well as her own personal experiences with the patient,
Fern described how her mother had declined considerably
in just the last few months.

Turning to a caregiver

seated next to her, Fern asked, "Rose, haven't you
noticed the same thing?"

Rose replied that she did

indeed notice it, especially the mother's changing
disposition, a woman who, most agreed, had always been
one to laugh easily.

Fern continued:

And the worst of it is, Rosie, that I used to be
able to stand all the other things, you know, the
folding [of clothing] and you know how stubborn she
can be sometimes. It wasn't as bad at least when I
could laugh at some of the silly things she did and
she'd laugh too. But it's not the same anymore.
She still does all those same things but I think
she's gotten worse because she's gloomy all the
time. She's got that vacant look more and more,
kind of staring ahead like they say Rita Hayworth
does. It's a really, really heavy situation, and I
feel it.
When another participant remarked that a patient's
temperament was a major factor in the illness, the
discussion turned to the general question of the
relationship between functional impairment and patient
mood in the caregiving burden. A husband, for example,
commented that his wife's lack of humor was especially
difficult for him, that he could, in his words, "take
twice the wandering if she'd only be happy and laugh
again."
Yet, the previous consensus over the relative
importance of mood and physical functioning altered when
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another caregiver, Milt, offered a different
interpretation:
I wouldn't be too sure about that if I were you.
That's not the way I see it.
I don't know if I can
place that much faith in the person's mood.
It
isn't all it's cracked up to be.
I get sick and
tired of all that happiness stuff and that 'smile is
your umbrella. 1
You all know Belle [his wife, the patient] very
well and you all can see for yourself that she's the
real joker and tease of the group [day hospital
patients]. She's a very social person. She's
always been. Talking and always laughing, like you
wouldn't believe. Well, I hate to say it, but it's
just driving me bananas. The constant chattering
and laughing at everything. It's gotten so's I wear
my Walkman [radio headphones] whenever I'm at home
and Belle's around. The only time I get any peace
and quiet is when she comes here [the day hospital]
twice a week. All that chatter and giddiness have
made her a real handful. You should all thank God
for small favors.
I only wish Belle's mood were
like your mother's. It would really lighten the
burden. It's not me, I don't think, because any of
you would have a time of it in time.
The group then turned their attention to Belle's
mood. Each member knew her well, having regularly
interacted with her in the day hospital unit.
no doubt that Belle was a happy patient.

There was

Each of the

support group members had frequently commented on her
mood, to the point where she came to exemplify for them
what the happy, yet functionally impaired, patient can
be.
As Milt continued his argument for the real burdens
of excessive joviality, another caregiver, Charlotte,
whose demented husband, Phil, was perceived as happy-golucky, began to reappraise Phil's impairment.

Her change
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in outlook was based on what she also saw as the general
implausibility of a simple mood-dysfunction argument,
considered against particular experiences with her own
husband.

Charlotte explained:

I'll tell you. Fern, until I started to really hear
what Milt was saying, I thought the same. Who could
argue with that? Better a happy wanderer than a
miserable one. Right? But you know, when I think
of my Phil, now he's a happy enough fellow.
You
know.
I don't have to explain. But it can really
get to me, too. Like I know how it gets to Milt.
I
mean, just face it, things just aren't that funny.
Just because Phil treats everything like it's a
joke, it makes his restlessness twice as difficult.
He just can't get serious about himself and it only
makes the wandering worse, just awful sometimes,
like he's laughing at you and kicking you in the
behind at the same time.
Charlotte's remarks did not convince either Fern or
Rose. They responded that they'd much prefer Phil over
their own patients.

In support of her view of the

composition of impairment, Rose incredulously asked all
participants, "You mean to say that someone like that
wandering, morose mother in that movie we saw [a popular
documentary about five Alzheimer's patients, entitled
"Someone I Once Knew"] is not as much a burden as Phil or
Belle; you've got to be kidding!"

Rose maintained that

the wanderer depicted in the film was "clearly" a case of
what any caregiver would want to avoid because, as she
declared, "That's really what I would call a 36-hour
burden," repeating the familiar slogan.

For Rose, it was

"plain as day," as she put it, that the patient in the
movie was the worst kind of impairment short of being a
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vegetable.

Correcting herself, Rose noted that at least

totally demented and bedridden victims stay put.
A short while later, however, Fern, like Charlotte
before, also reconsidered her own patient's impairment,
this time describing it as "not so bad after all," in
comparison to another caregiver's tearful story of how
her demented husband, "once a kind and loving person,"
had recently attacked her with one of his old golf clubs.
Addressing Rose in a lowered voice, Fern went on to
state, "Those combative types are really the worst kind.
We're pretty lucky after all."
As this and other support group proceedings show,
there was no overall consensus as to the apparent facts
of impairment for any given case.

Indeed, what for one

caregiver was seen as nearly total impairment, for
another was likely to be perceived much more benignly.
Moreover, each caregiver's judgment of his or her own
patient's concrete set of dysfunctions seemed to become
objectively different "stages" of decline depending on
what, and to whom, it's "task burdens" were compared.
Yet, while a patient's "actual" course of decline
could be transformed into greater or lesser degrees of
impairment, at the same time, there were regular
agreements and routine conclusions about the objective
impairment and burden presented by each case.

Different

types of patients came to exemplify a wide-range of
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behaviors and chronologies, from the "very rapid
declines," "plateaued victims," and "near vegetables," to
the "combative types," "wanderers," and those who
periodically displayed "lucid moments."

In their

variety, exemplars served to inform caregivers' and
service providers' changing accounts of their patient's
presented symptoms and burdens of care, impairment having
at least as many interpretations as exemplars.
Moreover, the use of such terms as those or them
(see Fern's comments above) enables caregivers and
service providers to "bridge the gap," so to speak,
between patients' contrasting conditions.

Manifestations

of the disease which do not conform to a particular
patient's deficits or course of progress are explained as
the way those patients' behave or the way they have
declined, acknowledging that it is "them," that kind of
patient, not mine, or some other type, that is being
referenced.

Exemplars, then, in their detailed usage,

combine to collectively document the experiential
particulars the disease is understood to be about.
Those who experience the collective "details" of the
disease experience, in their diverse presentation also,
at times, come to question the existence of a single
underlying disease entity.

This is the second way the

disease's varied chronology is socially organized,
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through the elaboration of the conception of the disease.
Consider, for example, one service provider's comments:
Sometimes you wonder because the diagnosis of
Alzheimer's is difficult and sometimes you look at
other people and wonder if it's just something that
they're displaying; is that really Alzheimer's
disease or could dementia become something else too?
So I don't know.
I don't think I could say for sure
that everyone in there [the day hospital] is in a
different stage of . • . I mean they've all been
diagnosed as Alzheimer's disease but I think there
are probably some different types of Alzheimer's
. . . or there could be • . . hopefully if they
learn more about it, there would be different,
several different types of dementia.
Exemplars are also used to elaborate the disease's
symptoms and course of progress by medical researchers.
Consider, for example, how Drachman organizes his
understanding in excerpts from a roundtable discussion of
a 1978 conference at the Banbury Center of Cold Spring
Harbor Laboratory in New York.

Following a videotape

presenting three exemplary-type patients in different
stages of the disease, Drachman remarked on patients'
contrasting conditions:
When we have examined all this semiology--all
the signs and symptoms--what do we do with the
details? We have followed perhaps 150 patients
closely in our dementia clinic, and the semiology is
enormously variable. This is an important concept
to get across:
that, while you have seen three
stages of dementia, there are many, many more
clinical attributes in which demented patients may
differ substantially (Katzman, 1983:10).
The researcher goes on to present the diverse
clinical features of the disease that he has encountered
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in dealing with patients, describing several unnamed
exemplary types in the process.

For example, he writes:

You may see patients whose dementia is early in
onset or late. • . .
Some patients progress rapidly, some slowly.
Recently, I saw a woman of 84 who had had AD for 10
years, but had retained all of her gracious
mannerisms; at a cocktail party, you would not pick
her out of the crowd. At the same time, I saw a
much younger woman who had had AD for 4 years and
was absolutely anarthric; not the slightest sound
emerged from her mouth; and her manifestations
included a stooped posture, tremendous paratonic
rigidity, and excessive attentiveness to each person
who talked, presenting the appearance of someone
watching a tennis match (Katzman, 1983:10-11).
After finishing his descriptions and a discussion of
the disease's diagnosis, Drachman states that, in his
opinion, Alzheimer's is not a single disease but, rather,
is composed of a number of other conditions.

Drachman is

not questioning the existence of disease itself, as he is
the existence of

~

disease's ability to accomodate the

varied character as displayed in its exemplification.
Rather than abandon the disease grammar as a unifying
principle, the researcher instead elaborates its
structure to encompass the multitude of experiential
particulars to which it applies.

As his later remarks

illustrate, following other researchers' comments
regarding the videotape:
We certainly do make the assumption, though, tacit
though it may be, that this is ~ disease. And I
think the crucial point is that we don't know that
at all. We don't know that this patient who had,
perhaps, a 9-, 10-, 11-, or 12-year course until he
was really severely disabled is quite the same as
the individual who goes careening downhill in 3
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years.
I think that until we have made those
observations, we need to retain a certain degree of
uncertainty as to what the subsets are, whether
we're severely overlooking different diseases which
masquerade under the general rubic of AD (Katzman,
1983:20).

Drachman's elaboration to include different forms or
types of the disease enables him to account for the
diversely-related experiences, patients so much alike,
and yet, at the same time, so very different.

However

elaborated and transformed, the characteristics of
Alzheimer's, in their variable manifestation, take on as
many meanings as is required by those concerned.

In

practice, through the use of exemplars, the meanings
collectively represent a unified disease structure while,
at the same time, displaying as many individual timings
as there are exemplars to share the experience--as
patterned or unpatterned as disease versus old age
itself.
What is the Response?
The interpretation of the progress of the experience
as a disease structure provides a developmental time
frame by which to assess and, thereby, intervene into
caregiving affairs.

How does the social organization of

measurement and the question of institutionalization fit
with the disease's temporal quality?
Consider, first, the social timing of assessment
procedures.

During measurement situations, caregivers'
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comments and questions concretely display the ongoing
practical constructions and transformations of the
meaning of felt burden.

This was quite evident when,

completing the "burden interview," caregivers prefaced
their responses to tolerance items with "well it
depends," "I tolerate it sometimes but not other times,"
and "I tolerate it more now than I used to, I think."
The levels of tolerance that caregivers do provide
during measurement might later shift from, say, being
overburdened and depressed by a patient's impairment, to
feeling rather fortunate and not "so bad after all."
Indeed, in the span of a few moments, the felt burden
defined against what is perceived as overwhelming
impairment might change, as it did for one caregiver, to
"not burden really but just those daily irritations,"
when compared to the "really frightening picture"
presented by another caregiver's patient.
What is clear is that differences in levels of
tolerance expressed vary with the context of their
consideration--across testing and nontesting occasions-not chiefly with some objective state of impairment.

As

such, the felt burden evident in any caregiver's
experience "depends" on the occasions, situations, and
comparisons taken into account in their interpretation,
having as many disease-related timings as there are
assigned meanings.
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The same social configuration is also featured in
the decision to institutionalize the patient (Lynott,
1983).

The decision commonly focuses on the question of

when "it's time."

The expression signals the decision in

a variety of sources, including ADRDA chapter
newsletters, caregiver handbooks, and support group
discussions.

Consider, for example, a poem, itself

entitled "It's Time," written by Dorothy Hessel of the
Detroit chapter, which lists the conditions indicating
when one should "let go" and seek a nursing home
placement.

Following the initial question, "When should

I give up my loved one to another's care?" among the
conditions cited are:
When he [patient] sits in front of me and
objects when I talk on the phone.

When he doesn't remember
to use the bathroom.
When he gets out of bed
and runs into the night.
When he thinks
people are "after him."

When he runs away and I am GLAD
to have a few minutes to myself.
When I DO fall asleep and I am
too tired to respond to his needs.
When I feel I might die first.
Yes!
It's time!
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While these and other maxims pertaining to
institutionalization suggest that timing is a
straightforward process of matching patient conditions
against caregiving capabilities, determining when to seek
a nursing home placement is socially organized.

Some

link their readiness to the patient's vegetative state,
as in the response, "I don't think I'm ready for that
[nursing home] because Sara's not a vegetable."
link it to family pressures.

Others

As one caregiver put it, in

relation to placing his mother in a nursing home, "I have
to think about my wife and how she needs me too."

At

still other times, however, caregivers say that they
don't know when "it's time" to institutionalize the
patient.
Being an ongoing issue among support group members,
the expression "it's time" is routinely heard in the
sharing of caregiving experiences.

For example, after an

exchange of stories about the "really bad things" that
have recently occurred, a common retort might be, as one
caregiver put it, "Yes, you know it's time when they
start to piddle on the floor!"

Yet such statements do

not automatically signal a decision to institutionalize,
for timing and such unpleasant conditions as piddling are
interpreted, compared, and reinterpreted against ongoing
considerations, such as the loss of companionship,
familial obligation, the shame of giving up, and even the
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denial of one's love for the patient.

such comparisons

are part of the continuing interpretation of burden.
Consider, for example, a series of discussions in
one of the support groups studied (Gubrium and Lynott,
1986), which centered on a wife's frustration over her
demented husband's increasingly careless toilet habits.
For two weeks, participants had been sharing what one of
the facilitators had called "horror stories" about
patient conduct, such as tales of midnight wanderings in
subzero temperatures and violent outbursts in public
places.

For example, after a patient's daughter, Carol,

told how upset she had been when her mother had mostly
missed the toilet when the mother last defecated, another
caregiver, Vel, whose husband had Alzheimer's, flatly
stated:
Look when I hear those things, I think if it comes
to that, that's it! No way will I put up with that
kind of thing. I love Ben dearly but I couldn't
handle that.
I'd really have to find a place for
him.
I hate to say it but that's when I'd say,
"It's time."
Yet Carol's response suggested that patient behavior
and the decision to institutionalize were not simply
linked.

Carol remarked that putting her mother in a

nursing home had, indeed, crossed her mind as she cleaned
her and the soiled bathroom but went on to say:
But, then, I thought, too, well it really wasn't her
[the mother's] fault.
She didn't mean it. It was
an accident. And we all have accidents, don't we?
Even the dog sometimes makes a mistake right there
on my carpet and I wouldn't dream of putting him
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away. Sure, at the time, I thought this was the
worst thing that could happen. But, later, you
change your mind. She could have wandered off and
gotten hit by a car. But, thank heavens, she didn't
[Carol knocks on wood].
Carol continued to discuss the incident, what it had
meant to her then and how its meaning had changed over
time.

The incident represented a different degree of

impairment as Carol considered her mother's related
intentions and compared what the mother had done with
what other impairments her mother and other patients,
even family pets, presented.

It was evident that the

decisive impairment and felt burden were matters of
ongoing interpretation.
The decision to institutionalize is complicated even
more by family obligations and concerns.

Caregivers

would frequently comment on their loyalties for the
patient and the contrasting burdens of their care.

One

caregiver, the husband of a demented wife, described his
feelings this way:
I know Sophie's not the same person that I married.
I have to be realistic about it. All I've got left
is someone who's become a stranger to me. And you
have to think about your own needs too. Sophie
demands a lot of work . . . the girls [daughters]
help. But tough as it is at times, I know what she
was and that's all that matters.
Other caregivers, however, especially those who had
experienced burdens of caregiving for a long time, told
how the disease took a toll and affected loved ones.
They spoke of finally coming to terms with the dilemma of
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love and hardship, and having to "face the fact" that a
nursing home was the only answer.

Consider, for example,

the following caregiver's strong retort:
(you have to] shake yourself and wake up to the
realization that you've got a life of your own to
live. You've got to face the fact that the guy
doesn't know you, doesn't even know who he is.
Dear, when it comes to the point where they're
unaware of anything, then what's the difference?
It's time to start seriously thinking about a
nursing home.
Even after institutionalization, decisions thought
to be permanent are entertained, as new situations and
sources of comparison emerge.

Whatever the burden that

was once "objectively" assessed, it is continually
reconsidered in relation to ongoing considerations and
experiential comparisons.
The timing of the disease experience for all
concerned, then, is not simply a matter of the disease
working itself out.

What is made of onset, course of

progress, and their ensuing senses of burden and
tolerance is a matter of social comparison, retrospective
reconsiderations, and prospective visualizations of
things to come.

These temporal assessments of the

disease serve to articulate its experience.

CHAPTER 6
THE PUBLIC AND THE PERSONAL: THE QUESTION
OF RESPONSIBILITY
In this chapter, I turn to the third question of the
three that have been brought to bear on each of the
grammars--the question of responsibility.

Having

discussed the nature of agency in the disease experience
in Chapter 4, I now consider the moral consequences of
locating agency in the disease as opposed to normal
aging.

Asserting and demonstrating that "Alzheimer's

disease is not normal aging," concerned agents of the
ADRDA aim to publicize the fact.

As a medical, not a

normal condition of aging, interpretation of "symptoms"
shifts responsibility from personal intention to
pathological conditions.
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY
Consider, first, the public side of responsibility.
The major concern here is in "spreading the word" about
Alzheimer's.

Since its establishment in 1979 (see Stone,

1982), the ADRDA has been the chief organizational force
in this regard.

A self-help organization with missions

of public education, research support, advocacy, and
206
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caregiving assistance (ADRDA, 1982), the ADRDA has
engaged in continuing efforts to increase public
awareness about the disease.

It is interpersonally

connected with other cooperating agencies like the
National Institute on Aging, the National Institute of
Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke, and
the Gerontological Society of America as well as related
professional interests in medical schools where
Alzheimer's disease research is conducted.

The ADRDA

itself, however, "orchestrates" the disease's growing
public recognition, a concerted attempt to expose the socalled "silent epidemic."
The ADRDA's success in "spreading the word" has
proved to be far-reaching.

In 1982, the organization

persuaded Congress and the President to proclaim National
Alzheimer's Awareness Week from November 21-27 (extended
to include the entire month of November the next year).
The following Spring, 1983 issue of the national ADRDA
Newsletter reported a surge in media attention that
resulted, noting, too, that the "ADRDA supplied the bulk
of their source material."

The newsletter goes on to

state: "This is a major breakthrough for us; it indicates
that our efforts have impressed the urgency of the AD
problem upon the media."

The newletter cites numerous

examples of media exposure since the event.

During that

November, for example, "literally hundreds of newspaper
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articles appeared around the country and nationwide TV
coverage began."

As part of the coverage, a "very

sensitive piece was shown on the CBS Network News with
Dan Rather."

In January of 1983 the article, "The

Tragedy of Rita Hayworth," written by Rosemary Santini
and Katherine Barrett, appeared in the Ladies Home
Journal.

On January 18, Marion Roach, the author of the

New York Times Magazine article "Another Name for
Madness," appeared on NBC's Today Show and later, on
February 11, on CBS Nightwatch.

The espisode of CBS'

Trapper John. M.D., entitled "Forget Me Not," which aired
January 30, featured a surgeon who was "showing all the
early symptoms" of the disease.

The newsletter story

goes on to describe still more examples of media
attention, with the following concluding remarks:
While Alzheimer's Disease is still not exactly
an everyday household word, our goal of increased
public awareness is steadily being realized. We've
come a long way in 2 1/2 years, but still have a lot
more work ahead. Meanwhile, Alzheimer's is a topic
that could appear in your favorite newspaper or
magazine or on your television screen at almost any
time.
The ADRDA's continued success in its publicity
campaign is celebrated in bold headlines on the front
page of the Spring, 1985 issue of the national ADRDA
Newsletter, which reads:
EPIDEMIC".

"ALZHEIMER'S NO LONGER A SILENT

The following column credits its success to

the "unprecedented" media attention given to Alzheimer's
disease during the previous six months.

Most notable was
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Newsweek's December 3, 1984 cover story, "The Agony of
Alzheimer's Disease," where more than "3,000,000 readers
were given an iri-depth view of AD."

Other highly visible

sources included nationally syndicated columnists Ann
Landers and Bob Greene (Chicago Tribune), who "have
brought home the message of Alzheimer's in daily
newspaper columns which addressed common questions and
issues surrounding AD," as well as the nationally
televised Phil Donahue talk show, which featured Dr.
Peter Rabins, co-author of The 36-Hour Day, actress Maria
O'Brien, daughter of former actor Edmund O'Brien who is
now an Alzheimer's patient, and two other family members
of Alzheimer's patients.

Documentaries and radio

programs also are mentioned in the newsletter as
contributing to the cause, including Group W
Westinghouse's airing of the film "Whispering Hope,"
hosted by Jason Robards, and the radio show "Prime Time,"
which has transmitted its broadcasts from Washington,
D.C. to more than 450 stations nationwide.
The ADRDA's efforts are supported by a number of
other well-known figures as well.

The Fall, 1982 issue

of National's ADRDA Newsletter reports, for example, that
actor Jack Lemmon "helped to tell the Alzheimer's Disease
story" in a public service announcement which Michael
Landon directed.

And the Winter, 1985 issue cites Joanne

Woodward, whose mother has been diagnosed as having
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Alzheimer's, as another celebrity who "has helped to
spread awareness about AD through her moving portrayal of
an AD victim in the television special,

'Do You Remember

Love.'"
Yet publicity itself is not enough to win the war
over Alzheimer's disease.
speaks louder than words."

As the old saying goes, "money
Accordingly, it is the

public's dollars that will ultimately support the
research needed to someday hopefully find the elusive
cure.

The ADRDA's publicity campaign, as such, is also

intended to elicit a societal obligation to "join the
fight against Alzheimer's disease."
In addition to research funds, the ADRDA advocates
for

Alzheimer's victims and their caregivers, especially

with respect to the financial burden.

For example,

because Medicare (a federal program providing medical
insurance for the elderly) only pays for skilled nursing
care and Alzheimer's is considered to only require
custodial care, victims' families are not eligible for
the assistance.

Most private insurance policies also do

not cover custodial long-term care.

This leaves many

spouses, whose assets are considered the same as the
patient's, in the situation of having to dilute their
savings until being able to qualify as indigents and thus
receive Medicaid--a joint federal and state welfare
program which covers both skilled and custodial care.
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The ADRDA's advocay successes regularly are reported
in its national newsletter and reprinted in the various
chapter newsletters.

Growing research dollars, from

individual donations and contributions in memory of a
recently deceased loved one, to much larger sums from
grants awarded by foundations such as the Andrew Mellon,
the Wood-Kalb, and Lauder, are welcomed, the latter often
making front page headlines in National's ADRDA
Newsletter.
Legislative developments are also broadcast.

The

Winter, 1983 issue of the national ADRDA Newsletter, for
example, under the heading "Government Responds In The
Fight Against Alzheimer's Disease," reports how
"government leaders put aside their political and
ideological differences to unite behind legislation
dealing with AD."

The column emphasized the ADRDA's

ability to get Congress to unanimously designate National
Alzheimer's Disease Awareness Month in November of 1983
and the President's subsequent proclamation.

Other

approved legislation includes providing additional funds
to support research into possible causes of Alzheimer's
disease and its treatment as well as the creation of
specialized centers to deal with the "complex nature of
the disease."

Achievements yet to come include the

passage of bills which would relieve some of the
financial problems for the families of Alzheimer's
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patients, such as reforms in Medicare and tax credits to
caregivers.
In addition to efforts focused at the national
level, the ADRDA has over 120 local chapters across the
country engaged in publicity and advocacy.

The grass

roots efforts run the entire gamut of activities, from
fundraising events and media appearances directed towards
greater public awareness, to sponsoring public seminars
to educate professionals and community groups, lobbying
for key legislative issues nationwide, and providing help
to family members in the multitude of support groups.
Local contributions are selectively highlighted in the
regular "Chapter News" feature of the national
newsletter, demonstrating the "persistent team work at
both the Chapter and national level" in the ADRDA's
mission of public recognition and support (national ADRDA
Newsletter, Fall, 1985).

A sample taken from the Spring,

1982 issue illustrates the grass roots lobbying and
educational efforts:
ADRDA--Northern Virginia launched a telephone campaign to
local delegates of the Virginia House of Delegates when a
bill was being introduced in the House to appropriate
money for Alzheimer's research. The bill passed the
House of Delegates and contact is now being made with the
Senate Finance Committee. The chapter wants to involve
more members in contacting their legislatures concerning
pending legislation.
ADRDA--Greater Philadelphia participated in a large
Health Fair sponsored by a major TV station at
Independence Hall Quadrangle and also at a Health Fair
sponsored by a local hospital. Literature has been
mailed to all neurologists in the area, and speakers from
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the chapters have appeared before professional and
community groups.
The Spring, 1984 issue reports on other kinds of local
publicity:
ADRDA--Omaha had an "Alzheimer's Disease Night" at an
Omaha Royals baseball game to raise money and promote
awareness. The Royals' general manager helped by
printing 200 posters and 20,000 tickets. He also
arranged for Chapter members to see Coke donated by the
Coca Cola Company with the cooperation of the local
concessionaire. This fundraising event was so
successful, they are already planning for a bigger and
better AD night at the ball park for next year.
ADRDA--Providence has an active membership of well over
600 families and seven support groups meeting monthly.
The Chapter's Speaker's Bureau has been providing inservice education to long-term care facilities as well as
community health agencies and to hospitals for two years.
They also speak to senior citizen and church groups.
Local media coverage has kept the office telephones busy.
And the Spring, 1985 issue presents continuing media
attention, publicity events, and legislative incentive:
ADRDA--Chicago Chapter members appeared on ABC-TV's AM
Chicago with Oprah Winfrey, Jan. 14 and worked closely
with WLS-TV on a 5-part series on Alzheimer's which aired
Feb. 4-8. An AD Conference was held in Springfield, IL
12/10 under the auspices of the Illinois House
Appropriations II Committee and the Southern Illinois
University School of Medicine on Alzheimer's Disease:
Directions for State Policy. ADRDA Chapters in the state
of Illinois are now actively involved in formulating
legislative initiatives, in both the state House and
Senate to benefit AD victims and their families.
ADRDA--Cleveland is planning three major events: A
Phonathan--Feb. 25/27 and March 3, with 25 volunteers
staffing the phones. Our goals are to increase
membership support for program development. A workshop
for professionals is planned for March 31st, jointly
sponsored by ADRDA and Cleveland State University. The
biathlon "Race for Reason" will be May 5th which we hope
will attract over 700 participants from Ohio and
surrounding states, who will bike and jog in support of
AD.
Local racing clubs along with ADRDA volunteers are
hard at work to make this event a whooping success!
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ADRDA--Houston National AD Month activities included
efforts which led to state and local proclamations, large
scale distribution of posters, provision of PSAs to radio
and TV stations. Channel 13 devoted several news program
segments to AD and aired both the Phil Donahue show the
"Whispering Hope." We also participated in an all-day
workshop on AD sponsored by the Texas Department on Aging
and Health and by local Councils on Aging.
The ongoing need for more funds to support research
efforts as well as alleviate the deep financial crunch
many families face require the full effort of the
membership.

Members are encouraged to write their

representatives in Congress requesting additional
support.

The April, 1984 issue of the Honolulu Chapter,

for example, under the heading "News from National,"
presents the following plea to its members:
November was National Alzheimer's Disease Month
last year--the first every!!!! Well, this year we
need to support this measure again to assure
Congressional approval of AD Month, 1984! According
to Jim Novy from the national ADRDA public relations
office, it will be a matter of years before the
resolution for AD Month becomes automatic.
PLEASE--it is urgent for you to call or write
to our Hawaii representatives in Washington and ask
them to support National Alzheimer's Disease Month
1984.
The message goes on to ask for letters:
ANOTHER IMPORTANT request from national is to write
Congress to urge their support for ADDITIONAL
FUNDING for RESEARCH on Alzheimer's Disease and for
AD research CENTERS. Last year additional funds
were approved, but NOT ENOUGH! With the aging of
the population and with costs of AD care and
treatment estimated to be 26 billion last year,
goverment must increase funding!
(Almost $40
million was appropriated last year for research,
which is an extremely small percentage of the
rsearch dollar, especially when you consider the
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numbers of people with the disease--an estimated 2.5
million in the United States.)
The column also provides the addresses and phone
numbers of legislators as well as advice on how to
formulate the letter and what to include in it.
with the charge:

"DO IT NOW! !

TODAY! ! "

It ends

Other chapter

newsletters present completely written sample letters as
guides for requesting money for research and aid to
families of Alzheimer's patients.

However detailed, the

pursued goal is the same, to marshall as much support as
possible for the Alzheimer's disease organization.
To this end, Princess Yasman Aga Khan, on behalf of
her mother, has written President Reagan asking for
whatever help he might give.

The letter was reprinted in

a number of places, including the Spring, 1983 issue of
the national newsletter.

Under the heading "A Plea to

the President," the letter reads:
Dear Mr. President:
My mother is the actress Rita Hayworth a woman
known and loved throughout the world for her beauty
and spectacular screen career. She is one of the
1.5 million victims of Alzheimer's Disease, and
because of this, the simple things that we all take
for granted have slipped away from her.
More research is needed on this silent
epidemic. We ask that you give us your support, and
help to persuade the public, the insurance companies
and the representatives in our government of the
importance of fighting this devastating disease.
Thank you.
Princess Yasmin Aga Khan
The President's response to Princess Yasmin's
letter, conveying his commitment to a growing public
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concern over the threat of Alzheimer's disease as well as
the dearth of funding for research, was printed in the
summer, 1983 issue of National's ADRDA Newsletter as well
as the chapter newsletters:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 10, 1983
Dear Princess Yasmin:
Like most Americans, my true understanding of the
tragedy called Alzheimer's Disease is relatively
recent.
For too long this insidious, indiscriminate
killer of mind and life has gone undetected, while
the families of its victims have gone unaided.
In your letter, you asked for my help in increasing
this awareness--among the public, insurance
companies and governmental representatives.
It is
assistance I will provide whenever and wherever
possible.
You asked, too, for the commitment of additional
research funds.
I am pleased to note that Federal
funding for this will increase by nearly 50%--from
$17 million to $25 million--in fiscal 1984. Also,
Secretary Margaret Heckler of the Department of
Health and Human Services has established a task
Force on Alzheimer's Disease to coordinate and
promote the Department's many activities in this
area.
In closing, I sincerely wish to applaud your efforts
and those of the thousands of ADRDA volunteers who
tirelessly provide support and hope to Alzheimer's
Families nationwide.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
At the other end of the spectrum, ADRDA members have
been encouraged to share information about the disease
with their friends and neighbors or anyone else who might
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benefit or be interested in supporting the cause.

The

October, 1980 issue of the Cleveland ADRDA Chapter's
Newsletter, for example, presents the following
directive:
SPREAD THE WORD
The more people you talk with about Alzheimer's
disease, the more support we are likely to get. By
talking about Alzheimer's disease with your friends
and neighbors, more people become aware of the
disease and concerned about its cause, cure and the
care of those afflicted. You never know when
someone you talk with might know of someone with the
disease whose family and friends would be grateful
to know of our organization or someone else who
would like to donate his time or money to our
efforts.
The ADRDA also takes it upon itself to inform its
members of a variety of disease-related information to
enable them to both better understand the disease and
cope with its effects.

The national ADRDA Newsletter

carries regular "Research Update" and "Ask the Doctor"
columns, which present news about the latest research
developments and general scientific knowledge about
Alzheimer's disease and related disorders.

Care is taken

to be as straightforward as possible, with caution
offered against so-called advances in the disease, lest
false hope be raised.

For example, under the heading "A

Word of caution," the Spring, 1984 issue of the national
ADRDA Newsletter states:
Several regimens, treatments, food substances
and drugs have been advertised as "cures,"
"treatments," and "retardants" for Alzheimer's
Disease. Some may have questionable value. Says
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Dr. Robert Katzman, chairman of ADRDA's Medical and
Scientific Advisory Board, "The fact is that at this
moment we don't know of any drug or any other
treatment that stops the progression of Alzheimer's
Disease."
A word of caution to our readers:
skepticism
can be very healthy.
Before embarking on any
program or any course of treatment, it would be wise
to check with your family physician, ADRDA Chapter,
local medical school, or perhaps, when in doubt, the
Food and Drug Administration. You can then make an
informed decision.
Tips and advice frequently appear concerning how to
deal with the many problems that inevitably crop up in
the disease experience.

While National's ADRDA

Newsletter has its "Helpful Hints" and "Ask the Lawyer"
features, chapter newsletters focus explicitly on the
day-to-day management of concrete caregiving.

Advice is

offered· on how to manage a whole range of problems, from
the patient's sexual behavior, eating habits, and
incontinence to problems of vacationing, bathing, and
communication.

Assistance in obtaining power of attorney

or conservatorship, handling financial affairs, seeking
respite care, and institutionalizing the patient, among a
host of considerations, are also available.
Caregivers are frequently asked to share their
caregiving knowledge and strategies in print, which gets
passed on to other chapters.

The following care tip, for

example, was offered by Shirley Nimitz, a chapter member,
in the July, 1984 issue of the Columbus ADRDA Chapter's
Newsletter.

The information is introduced with the

statement, "Caregivers will appreciate the following
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suggestions from one of our members who recently lost her
husband:
When I cared for my husband at home, it seemed to me
that I should explain what I was trying to do, in
the hope that he would understand and cooperate.
I
was so wrong. To explain things to a man who had
lost his ability to understand words was useless.
Then, I discovered that if I didn't speak, things
went so much better. The anger, the total
frustration, the disappointment cannot be conveyed
by the tone of voice, if the caregiver remains
silent. Sometimes humming a tune would help,
sometimes other quiet music of the patient's liking
would ease the strain.
I also found that if my husband resisted my efforts
to help him, that if I walked away and came back a
few minutes later, he would be more cooperative.
By
saying, 'Are you ready to do this?' I found it was
then his choice to do what needed doing and the
resistance would cease.
The following "TIPS FOR DRESSING," which originally
appeared in the Greater New Orleans ADRDA Newsletter, and
reprinted in the Spring, 1985 issue of the Western
Pennsylvania ADRDA Newsletter, is an example of how
assistance is shared by all:
When men or women are having a hard time getting
dressed, e.g., when patients can no longer button,
jogging suits provide a warm, goodlooking, easy care
and easy to get into and out of clothing. There is
the added advantage of not requiring underwear or
brassieres, no zippers at the waist or belts. While
a patient can still dress himself, difficulty may
come in deciding which clothes to wear and in what
order to put them on. You may assist by laying out
clothes in the correct order or by handing the
patient one item at a time.
While caregiving assistance is sought and received
at many levels throughout the Alzheimer's disease
movement and support groups continue to flourish, the
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ultimate goal of the ADRDA is to find a means of
prevention and cure.

In the meantime, hope is

highlighted and public awareness efforts engaged in full
force.

To this end, the disease itself has truly become

the "disease of the century."
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The ADRDA's diligence in generating widespread
exposure of Alzheimer's disease has increasingly brought
opportunities for its recognition and subsequent
application.

As the earlier quoted comments taken from

the Spring, 1983 issue of the national ADRDA Newsletter
pointed out, "Alzheimer's is a topic that could appear in
[one's] favorite newspaper or magazine or on [one's]
television screen at almost any time."

The chances of

coming across the disease, at some point or another, are
thus quite high.
Consider, for example, how the ADRDA helped one
person learn of Alzheimer's, as revealed in the following
anonymous letter taken from the March, 1981 issue of the
Chicago ADRDA chapter's Newsletter:
Dear Friend,
Recently my father, 86, died. He was a victim
of Alzheimer's Disease, but it was only the last two
years of his life that this was known. His symptoms
had been attributed to senility.
No one in my family had ever heard of the
disease. My mother, caring for my father in their
home in Pennsylvania, had become increasingly
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perplexed and distraught by his continuing physical
and mental deterioration.
Not long after the tentative diagnosis was made
(at a gerontology clinic in Pittsburgh), there was
an announcement in the Sunday edition of The Chicago
Tribune of an Alzheimer's self-help group.
I called
the number listed, hoping for some sort of
information. The response was immediate and
personal. Every bit of information that ADRDA had
was made available to me and I, in turn, sent it to
my mother.
The letter goes on to report how the knowledge
acquired "was of great value in giving [the mother] some
framework within which to understand" her husband's
condition (emphasis added).

Having a medical means for

interpreting old age troubles not only provides a new way
of seeing dementia, but has moral significance as well.
Like the mother in the letter, a caregiver is able to
locate the source of travail in something other than the
person.

The focus centers on pathology, not individual

characteristics.

This provides a pointable and

referencial thing toward which to place blame.

Thus,

dementia becomes something that one, anyone, simply
cannot help.

As one caregiver described, in reference to

the disease, "It's like sayin' someone has a heart
attack, and that can happen to a younger person too."
The ability to cast blame onto something other than
the Alzheimer's patient is quite beneficial to those
concerned.

such troubles as the patient's "constant

chattering," midnight wanderings, or even not recognizing
a spouse of over 50 years, can be attributed to a
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disease, not its victim.

Thus the person is absolved

from deviance, making it possible to still love and
forgive the patient for behaviors he or she cannot
control, while at the same time hating the disease.
The blame function, however, is not automatic.

In

the everyday experience of living with the patient, even
the "little things" done can weigh on the most valiant
caregiver's attempt to be patient and understanding.
Caregivers frequently state how, in their frustration and
anger, they will fail to recognize that the patient is
helpless, at times reporting that they "forget" the
patient even has a disease.

As the spouse of a demented

husband explained, "Charlie does things that I know he
can't help but sometimes I forget that and I really get
mad at him

. like I think he deliberately is trying

to annoy me by forgetting and repeating everything."
caregiver's plight and conflicting feelings are well
illustrated in the following poem, entitled "No Longer
You," written by Lois Ellert of the Boulder, Colorado
Chapter and reprinted in various chapter newsletters:
You are no longer you;
The body is yours, a shell,
The head and face the same,
But the light has gone from your eyes,
Windows of a vacant house.
You sit for hours, often a little unkempt,
Nodding, dozing, or trying to put together
The puzzle of your life;
But many of the pieces are missing,
And you ask me for them.
I give them to you,

The
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But
And
And
And

they will not stay in place,
so you ask again,
again--again---

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The daily irritations are small,
But like the constant dripping of water on a rock,
They eat away at my love and patience.
In sleep there is respite,
In dreams a return to normalcy,
But you jolt me back to the nightmare of reality
By rousing me at three in the morning,
To ask me where we are living,
Or what time it is,
Or if I want to make love.
Weariness and rage overcome me;
Angrily I tell you to go back to sleep.
Then I am filled with remorse,
For I know you cannot help it
And you do not mean to be unkind.
But there is no way I can explain
Or make you understand
That the marriage of our bodies, our minds, our
spirits
Has ceased to be.
You are not my husband,
Nor I your wife.
I am only your caretaker.
And you?
You are no longer you.
As the poem's message conveys, caregivers and other
family members face extreme frustration.

The pain and

suffering of living with "someone once known" is a heavy
toll to bear.

While a mind has been stolen from them,

they must still deal with its bodily reminder, an active,
often remarkably fit "shell" of a former loved one.

The

annoyance of that presence easily leads to an angry
response on the part of the caregiver who, when he or she
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is reminded that it is a disease, not the person, that is
the source of inappropriate conduct, guiltily "realizes"
the patient's helplessness and lack of accountability.
Caregivers who have experienced the same situation,
as well as service providers and the related disease
literature, offer support and comforting advice on how to
feel and manage such behaviors and their responses.
Caregivers are informed, for example, that feelings of
anger are common reactions and that they should try not
to feel guilty, that "it's only human" to respond that
way at times and that the patient usually forgets the
episode anyway.

Caregivers are also told that such

reactions on their part do not worsen the disease for the
patient, which will run its own course in any case.
Besides the "daily irritations", for many
caregivers, the patient's actions and speech are often
directed at the caregiver.

Having to face such untoward

behavior from the patient often evokes personal hurt and
resentment.

Caregivers are advised not to take such

behaviors personally, that it is impossible to know what
the patient's "true" feelings and thoughts really are, as
the patient is not able to express them accurately in his
distortion of the world around him.

As the popular care

manual The 36-Hour Day (Mace and Rabins, 1981:105-06)
cautions, "Even though the person looks well, he actually
has an injury to his brain."
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Caregivers are advised that it is important to
separate the behavior of the patient from the person.
While the patient may, say, complain or shout verbal
insults at a neighbor or loved one, the acts should not
in themselves be seen as a reflection of an underlying
intent but, rather, the frustrated expression of the
confusion and helplessness experienced by the person
hidden behind the ravages of the disease.

For example,

the expression "'You're cruel to me' may really mean
'life is cruel to me"' (Mace and Rabins, 1981:106).

Such

distinctions display the patient's inability to express
accurately the "deep down" sentiments and meanings of the
lived experience.

In this regard, those concerned are

cautioned to appreciate and sympathize with the human
being that still exists under the shroud of disease, one
who, while not evident, faces his own torment and burden.
The following poem, entitled "Advice on Caring for
Alzheimer Patients," written by Joy Glenner of the San
Diego Chapter and reprinted in a number of newsletters,
illustrates the point:
Dear Family and Friends:
Please try to understand
What I am now, not think of me
As I was.
I am alone, shut in
With my fears
My frustrations,
My forgetfulness.
Forgive me if I strike out at you.
Why do I do that?
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What has happened to me?
I cannot cope with this alien world.
I feel threatened. I am frightened.
Speak softly, approach slowly.
Repeat again and again what you
Want of me.
Those twisted tangles in my brain
Have messed up my world.
Be patient, for
I do love you,
And I need your help and love
So very, very much.
Your Alzheimer Patient
Information such as the poem offers can be of great
value and a source of relief to the families of
Alzheimer's patients in coming to terms with the
patient's combativeness.

A patient who "strikes out" at

a loved one is often the most difficult challenge to
understand.

It is here that the disease can be the most

devastating and merciless to those who must endure its
conditions.

As such, caregivers are repeatedly reminded

from the varied sources to try and accept such violent
outbursts and "odd reactions" as due to the
manifestations of the disease, not as any change the
patient may feel towards them nor as having anything to
do with the care they are providing.

Indeed, as one

caregiver put it, knowing that "No one is really at fault
except for that damn disease," allows one to focus anger
and resentment more concertedly on pathology.

In that

regard, consider the following anonymous letter printed
in the Summer, 1984 issue of the Albuquerque ADRDA
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Chapter's Newsletter (reprinted from the Duke ADRDA
Newsletter).

Under the heading, "Coping with

Combativeness," the letter reads:
"Last night he hit me. This strong man, eleven
inches taller, 80 pounds heavier than I am. He
could have beat me to death in his sudden rage.
This person, so familiar to me after 40 years of
living together, this man always so confident in
himself that he could be a gentle father and a
tender, loving husband.
Yet, as I leaned over to untie his shoe so he
start undressing for bed, he grabbed my hair,
me around, on hand fastened onto my wrist, he
with his other fist, twice, hard. How lucky,
on my shoulder and arm.

could
spun
hit me
only

My anger is so deep, I retch. At this moment I know
I could rage and scream and claw like an animal
myself. But my tears release me.
If he could see himself, he'd despise his actions,
he wouldn't believe it could happen. There is no
remorse now, he is unaware. This morning, my anger
is still there, my body aches, I can't forgive him-but I can't blame him. Alzheimer's disease is the
real enemy.
Even though there is something other than the person
upon which to attribute blame, as the example shows, that
does not simultaneously get rid of the felt hurt and
anger.

such actions may be understood to be

unintentional on the part of the patient, yet their
effects are quite real indeed.

While the physical and

emotional pain and suffering of having to deal with the
patient's aggression, together with the burdens of the
day-to-day activities of caring for the patient, is very
disturbing, as the woman in the example notes, even in
her extreme situation, while she "can't forgive him," she
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also "can't blame him," for it is Alzheimer's disease
that is "the real enemy."
The Alzheimer's patient's life history might also be
morally reconstructed to absolve him or her of past
actions, interpreted to fit the biography of a diseased
person.

Consider, for example, how the lifelong troubles

of Rita Hayworth, the Hollywood actress discussed in the
previous chapter, were recast.

Earlier on, alcohol was

believed to be the cause of Rita's troublesome behavior,
including her "recurring lapses of memory" and "extreme
mood changes," even her five difficult marriages.

As the

article in the Ladies Home Journal (Santini and Barret,
1983:139) reports:
Everyone seemd to agree that Rita was drinking
heavily, and when she entered the Silver Hills
alcoholic treatment center in Connecticut in 1977
few people were surprised.
"At that point, I also
thought alcohol was her problem," says Yasmin
[Rita's daughter].
"I thought it was really
destroying her brain."
With Rita's later diagnosis of Alzheimer's, however,
her actions are then explained as having been all along
"really" the manifestations of the disease.

As the

authors (1983:141) report:
If, as Yasmin suspects, Rita began suffering from
Alzheimer's as long ago as twenty-five years, it
could explain a great deal about her difficult
personal life. . • . In retrospect, it could very
well be that because of Alzheimer's she began to
lack the judgment to pick her friends wisely.
Looking back, the evidence of Alzheimer's may
already have been showing up when Yasmin was a
child. At the time, Rita's problems weren't
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dramatic enough to affect her career . • . but there
were hints of the tragedy that was to come.
Another example of retrospective interpretation
occurred on the Phil Donahue Show, which was shown in
Chicago on CBS in December of 1984.

One of the guests

featured on the show was Maria O'Brien, daughter of
Edmund O'Brien, another well-known Hollywood figure
diagnosed to have Alzheimer's disease.

At one point

during the telecast, in response to a statement made by
Donahue concerning the initial appearance of symptoms in
her father, Maria reflected back on how his earlier
"fabulous memory," which allowed him to "recite reams of
Shakespeare at will," soon failed to remember even the
"very basic things" of the famous dramatist's work.

In

describing her attempts to understand her father's
behavior at that time, Maria noted that, "He would sweat
buckets just going to work and we thought it was just
because he had this incredibly energetic and wild
personality."

Now, with the benefit of hindsight, Maria

describes her father's "real" problem as having been an
"early fear of not being able to cope with remembering."
She went on to state how "we didn't understand what he
had until about two or three years ago," during which
time, "over a fifteen year period, he faked coping with
reality without really any help at all," noting even
further how she "refused to speak to him for periods of
time because [she] thought he was so crazy."
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A medical interpretation also affects caregiver
reactions to the patient's appearance in front of others.
Having a culprit, other than the individual in question,
caregivers and other family members are able to
acknowledge their experiences with others without
embarrassment.

Many caregivers informally interviewed

stated that after they "really began to understand" the
patient's problems, they were less troubled by their
friends' and neighbors' reactions.

Their previous

attempts to cover up the patient's disease, and even
pretend that it didn't exist, were frequently discarded,
breaking the "conspiracy of silence."

For example, the

following caregiver described these experiences:
Before, I used to try and hide it. When someone
would ask him a question, I knew he wasn't going to
answer so I used to speak up for him. And one fella
one time says, 'Don't you ever let him talk for
himself?' Then it hit me, oh my God, do I really do
it that much that . . . I was trying to conceal. I
suppose I was embarrassed for him. But now I don't.
And it's a lot easier too, knowing that it's a
disease. People look at it differently.
I just
tell them it's what Rita Hayworth has. They can
identify with her because she was written up in the
paper three or four times.
Initially, after learning of Alzheimer's, caregivers
may still be somewhat reluctant to share their burdens
with others or may feel awkward when the patient is
present in social gatherings.

Reminders by other

caregivers, by service providers, and by the varied
literature on Alzheimer's aimed at easing the burden of
care that, as one newsletter put it, "illness is no cause
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for shame," serve to lessen the tension.

Caregivers are

also encouraged to find out more about the disease so
that they can better explain and share their patient's
behavior to "outsiders."

Having more knowledge about the

disease provides caregivers with an available store of
information by which to warrant their testimony.
Caregivers are able to explain, for example, that their
patient is in this or that particular stage or manifests
this symptom as opposed to some other form of the
disease.

Those more knowledgeable about the disease and

its treatment can also describe the disease's neuroorganicity or the latest drugs now being used.

The more

detailed the explanation, the more the disease gets
objectified as a discrete and concrete entity in its own
right, separate from the person described.
Public acknowledgment of the disease provides
personal recognition and elaboration.

The two go "hand

in hand," so to speak, reinforcing the disease experience
on a number of levels.

In coming to see common cause

with others, by means of and through a growing disease
culture, those concerned see themselves in the light of
the common knowledge and find that they share the same
experience.

A growing public response affirms a

definition, and the limits, of personal responsibility.

CONCLUSION
The conclusion addresses two considerations.

First,

I summarize the argument and what the approach and study
say about the meaning of the aging experience,
considering grammars against the so-called "facts" of
aging.

Second, I place this in a broader context, in

terms of a general understanding of human conduct.
SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT
This dissertation has examined a variety of
approaches to the old age problem, from activity,
modernization, and exchange theories to Alzheimer's
disease.

The term grammar was used throughout the study

to stress the separateness of the approaches considered
regarding the reality construction of the aging
experience.

I have argued that each approach has a

different understanding of what the old age problem is
and interprets concrete observables accordingly.

Each

sees the problem in terms of its "perception rules" for
locating particular agents, timings, and responsible
entities in later life.
Chapter 1, "Activity Theory and Life Satisfaction,"
centered on "busyness" as the arena of the good old age.
The source of satisfaction was contingent on the
232

233
individual, found in an ability to stay active and
adjusted--in effect, to "remain young."

Inactivity

signaled unsuccessful aging.
The distinguishing characteristics of old age
shifted in Chapter 2.

outside conditions were treated as

independently affecting individual adjustment, even while
the object of explanation remained the individual.
Disengagement, modernization, and age-stratification
theories located large-scale social conditions as sources
of the life satisfaction of the individual.

Exchange,

developmental, and continuity approaches emphasized
interpsychological and face-to-face encounters as
background.

And, the socio-environmental, social-

career, and subcultural approaches combined the macro and
micro sources in different ways.
Chapter 3 saw a further shift in focus to more
theoretically self-conscious grammars.

The approaches

dismissed individual life satisfaction as the central
feature of the aging experience, seeing it instead as an
outcome of other forms or processes--respectively,
ideological and epistemological concerns.
Chapters 4 through 6 saw abnormality in its own
right as a new grammar for defining the problem of old
age.

Centered in medical conditions, the old age problem

was pathologically revealed in neurological and
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behavioral markers, in degeneration, and disease
culpability.
Approaching grammars as reality-defining
understandings, not representational of social objects,
does not mean that they are fictive.

Grammars are not

simply labels but, rather, have concrete empirical
referents.

There are, after all, objects in the world

that do exist.

Yet, it is the meaning of the objects of

experience that is critical.

While, for example, it can

be pointed out that those in late life experience the
withdrawal from roles previously held, what it means to
withdraw is entirely different depending on how it is
framed.
To a spokesperson of activity theory, withdrawal
infers maladjustment.

To a spokesperson of disengagement

theory, it is precisely the opposite, adjustment on
behalf of societal functioning.

The grammar of

continuity construes either adjustment or unadjustment
against the backdrop of earlier life.

For the socio-

environmental approach, the degree of congruence between
personal needs and environmental conditions determine
individual well-being.

The grammar of developmentalism

sees personality type and "growth" as the keys to success
or failure in late life.

The political economists turn

to the capitalists, the state, and the mode of production

235

to investigate a class of persons and their life
conditions and chances.
The "same" conditions, then, as revealed in the
respective grammars of the aging experience, represent
discrete, experiential realities.

Accordingly, the

"factual" status of old age becomes as manifold as the
variety of grammars that articulate the experience.
The social construction of fact was concretely shown
to be part of the Alzheimer's disease experience, what I
have argued is the most recent grammar of aging.

The

disease was not a mere label or vested fiction for the
parties concerned.

It was clear that those affected by

the disease's conditions experienced considerable
suffering.

The existence of the objects of turmoil--

tangles and plaques in the brain and their erratic
behavioral correlates--were equally empirically validated
as was the alarm they generated.

Their meaning, however,

was problematic, the realities pinpointed being tied to
the practical usages they served.

In this regard, the

desire to ameliorate the conditions observed were part
and parcel of Alzheimer's assigned factual status.
Likewise, the ADRDA's instrumental efforts in spreading
the word about what was increasingly presented as

~

disease's devastating effects served to transform the
meaning of the conditions dealt with.

The result was

that "Alzheimer's disease [was] not normal aging."

The
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telltale signs of aging became a disease, the "disease of
the century."

By implication, a reality meaningfully

came to possess its own concrete facts.
Yet, it was clear that the ongoing assignment and
descriptive practices of those concerned were continually
productive of what the sense of this thing-aging/disease--was to be for the practical purposes at
hand.

For example, in the support groups for caregivers

of Alzheimer's patients, a condition of a patient could
be interpreted as a sign of a late stage of the disease
against a background of certain comparisons with others.
That "same" condition could shift with a change in
framework, to an interpretation of old age, or another
stage of the disease.

In this respect, there were no

straightforward facts concerning any aspect of the
disease experience.

Rather, the facts entered into

ongoing practical experiences as more or less useful ways
to understand the condition and related experiences under
consideration.
THE BROADER IMPLICATION
At a broader level, what does the analysis say about
the epistemological relation between the practical use of
facts and their objects of concern, as it relates to the
varied grammars described in the dissertation?

In his

book, Knowledge and Human Interests (1971), Habermas
distinguishes three kinds of cognitive interest toward
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any world of concern.

Cognitive interests are the

general intellectual task orientation taken in describing
a world of objects.

Asking, in effect, "For what purpose

is this knowledge?" he offers three answers, three
cognitive interests.
control.

One he describes as an interest in

From this viewpoint, in distinguishing between

facts and what they represent, one might be interested in
how facts, in their use, serve to reveal "natural"
objective relations between the objects represented.

The

state of objects is delineated by variously
"manipulating" them in order to discover how they are
organized in relation to each other.
Within sociology, Blumer (1969), has referred to a
form of this as "variable analysis."

(Blumer's term is

not as radically metatheoretical as Habermas' sense of
cognitive interest.)

The aim of "variable analysis" is

to control in two senses:

(1) to control variables in

order to display their objective organization and (2)
with the knowledge of the organization, to control the
organization itself, such as exists in the variety of
ways to intervene in social affairs, as a consequence of
policymaking.
With the exception of the phenomenologists, whose
cognitive interest will be discussed shortly, interest in
control is implicit in all of the grammars described in
this dissertation.

For spokepersons of these grammars,

238

from activity theory to Alzheimer's disease, the object
of concern is postivistic in that the conception of the
relationship between the social phenomena of interest, on
the one hand, and the subjects' attention to them, on the
other, is considered to be obvious.

The grammar of

activity theory, for example, takes for granted that
aging is an individual social problem.

The researcher's

business is to investigate its manifestations in the
individual, to discover its variety of resolutions, and
to offer solutions based on the facts gathered.

Thus, it

is suggested, on the basis of what are discovered to be
the correlates of life satisfaction, that adjustment is
the result of variables such as church attendance and
membership in voluntary associations, among other forms
of personal involvement.

The implicit sentiments of

researchers dealing with individual membership in the
social order, such as allegiance, loyalty, and the moral
obligation of self realization through hard work reveals,
in the data, its mirror image.

What these researchers

discover to be the nature of aging--individual
unadjustment and life satisfaction is readjustment--has
its source in their implicit grammar of the nature of
growing old.

Their work and data reproduce the vision.

The remaining normal grammars of the old age problem
treat the subjects studied as, more or less, "subject to"
the variety of conditions, forces, and other social facts

239
of their everyday world.

Accordingly, they gather data

on variables like social systems, cohorts, careers,
stages, or the relations of production, on the one hand,
and on variables such as self-esteem or life
satisfaction, on the other.

They then attempt to trace

the relationship between the sets of variables.

Control

here lies in the assumption of the objective status of
the variables whose objects they name and their
consequent manipulation (control) in order to discover
their "natural" variations.

Once discovered, knowledge

of their variation allows one to effectively intervene in
the relationship, or at least to suggest alterations, in
order to bring about desirable changes (control) in other
aspects of the relationship.
The research concern for these grammars is with the
question of explanatory robustness, that is, relative
explanatory power in respect to a select set of data.
While this was perhaps most pronounced in the famous
activity/disengagement debate, the other grammars,
likewise, claim to better explain "the data", in one
fashion or another.

For example, Dowd (1975) has offered

his exchange theoretical challenge to disengagement
theory.

Gubrium (1973) has attempted to bridge the gap

between activity and disengagement theory in his socioenvironmental approach.

Riley and her associates (1972)

have treated social structure in a Mertonian fashion,
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defining age stratification in terms of differential
cohorts, suggesting that one attempt to understand the
individual experiences of growing old by means of
membership in the age structure.

The political

economists, while metatheoretical in their questions
raised concerning "individualistic" thinking in
gerontological theory--asking, in effect, "Whose
interests are served by thinking of age in particular
ways?"--nonetheless offer their own causal argument,
namely, a class explanation for the helplessness of the
position of the aged.

The Alzheimer's disease grammar,

likewise, takes for granted an obvious body of knowledge,
having concrete consequences in its accomplishment in
that it serves to organize its assigners' courses of
actions.

For example, the disease distinction allows

medical researchers to search for treatments and possible
cures that aging itself does not.

Its utility function

also serves to locate fault in pathology, not selves.

As

such, the disease grammar sets new agendas for organizing
and altering human affairs.
It is important to note that while spokespersons of
these grammars are not aware of their implicit interest
in control as such, at the same time, grammars do not
completely dominate their users' actions.

Those who

reference grammars are free enough from them to recognize
them as entities separate from themselves (Giddens,
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1979).

This is so whether they are useful justifications

for one reality or another or useful apologies for
challenges to ongoing realities.

For the most part,

however, few directly address grammars as such, for their
concerns are with the objects of description, not
description or discourse in its own right.
A second cognitive interest described by Habermas is
understanding (verstehen).

From this metatheoretical

point of view, attention turns away from that which is
signified and toward the signs themselves, in terms of
how objects are produced.

The question here is, "How are

'things' to be understood?"

It is an interest that is

prior to control, whose understandings are taken for
granted by control interests.

It is an entirely

different cognitive interest and organization than the
first one, not in any way reducible to it.
This form of interest underlies the social
phenomenological grammar as an interest in social forms
and objects.

The concern lies with the issue of how the

objects of and ideas about things are understood by
people who experience them and how these experiences
serve to produce and reproduce themselves along certain
lines.

The product of research from this viewpoint--as

"understandings"--is radically different from "facts" or
"data" as products.

The latter terms are only reasonable

when cognitive interest is in control; the former is
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reasonable when cognitive interest is in understanding.
There is a double sense of the term "understanding" here.
One, sometimes called "verstehen," refers to the
researcher's discovery of his understanding; the other
refers to what respondents offer up as their own
understandings.

Giddens (1979), in his book, Central

Problems in Social Theory, refers to this as a "double
hermeneutic," the interpretation of interpretation.
A third cognitive interest specified by Habermas is
an interest in emancipation.

In contrast to the first

cognitive interest, this one does not take for granted
the separate and objective existence of objects, separate
that is from those for whom they are objects.

Thus, for

example, old age, as a thing, is not treated as an entity
ontologically distinct from those who experience it.

It

would make no sense with this interest to ask how persons
enter into old age since the entering itself, in some
critical sense, produces old age.

On the other hand, in

contrast to the second cognitive interest, it does not as
totally bracket an interest in objects in the service of
inspecting their understandings.

Rather, it concerns

itself with the processes by which socially constructive
subjects come to encounter a world of objects.

The

interest here is in the process by which, on the one
hand, the objects of the world like systems,
individuality, careers, stages, and the like, get
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produced by meaningful action and, on the other hand, how
these productions are, upon their realization,
encountered by actors.
The interest in emancipation arises out of the
understanding that all action is, on the one hand,
productive of objects and yet, on the other hand, in the
course of human affairs, the source of the objects gets
lost.

To be interested in revealing the manner by which

objectivity is "the lost subject" is to free the subjects
from objects, to reveal to him or her that the objects of
his or her experiences are products of his or her labor.
The research task for this cognitive interest is
critique and thus theory becomes critical.

What is

critiqued is transformations of the relationship between
subject and objects from being genuine to being
alienated.

Thus, a major concern for critical theorists,

with respect to the grammars of the old age problem,
would be how they represent a language serving to reify
experience as something separate from those doing the
experiencing.
Critical theorists assail what they call "identity
thinking," which they would apply mainly to control
interests.

For example, critical theorists would resist

the identification of experience with the objects
experienced.

They see the relationship between signs and

what is signified as in a state of tension.

What is in
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tension is intention, that is, the subject is seen as in
tension with the object he or she intends, the negative
reduction of tension being alienation, its positive form
being emancipation.
All description, it is assumed, is generated from
some ground(s).

Accordingly, for this dissertation,

those grounds have been understanding and emancipation.
The broader implication of the analysis is to shed light
on the factual status of late life.

I have argued that

the potential realities assigned to the aging experience
are constitutionally tied to ameliorative concerns with
old age.

The critique is the attempt to demonstrate how

much the old age problem is a problem of our making, the
grammars we use constructing the problems we view.
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APPENDIX A
TOPIC GUIDE FOR INFORMAL INTERVIEWS
OF CAREGIVERS
1.

Patient impairments

2.

Onset

3.

Burden of care

4.

Personal responsibility; others; family

5.

Personal feelings (history of)

6.

Coping strategies

7.

Sources of information; knowledge of disease

8.

Hospital and professional contacts

9.

Typical day

10.

Institutionalization

11.

Disease labelling

12.

Burnout

13.

Caregiver respite; daycare

14.

Association with ADRDA; resources

15.

View of future
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APPENDIX B
BURDEN INTERVIEW

1.

Do you feel that your parent makes requests which
you perceive to be over and above what hejshe
needs?

2.

Do you feel that because of your involvement with
your parent you don't have enough time for yourself?

3.

Do you feel stressed between trying to give to your
parent as well as to other family responsibilities,
job, etc.?

4.

Do you feel embarrassed over your parent's behavior?

5.

Do you feel guilty about your interactions with your
parent?

6.

Do you feel angry about your interactions with your
parent?

7.

Do you feel that your parent currently affects your
relationships with other family members and friends
in a negative way?

8.

Are you afraid of what the future holds for your
parent?

9.

Are you pleased about your interactions with your
parents?

10.

Is it painful to watch your parent age?

11.

Do you feel that your parent is dependent on you?

12.

Do you feel strained in your interactions with your
parent?

13.

Do you feel that your health has suffered because of
your involvement with your parent?

14.

Do you feel that you are contributing to the wellbeing of your parent?
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15.

Do you feel that the present situation with your
parent doesn't allow you as much privacy as you
would like?

16.

Do you feel that your social life has suffered
because of your involvement with your parent?

17.

Do you feel uncomfortable when you have friends
over?

18.

Do you feel that your parent seems to expect you to
take care of him/her as if you were the only one
he/she could depend on?

19.

Do you feel that you don't have enough money to
support your parent in addition to the rest of your
expenses?

20.

Do you feel that you would like to be able to
provide more money to support your parent than you
are able to now?
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